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The question how faces, as opposed to other visual stimuli, are recognized has
received a lot of attention in recent years. Faces are perhaps the most important visual
stimuli to us, presenting us with information for establishing and maintaining social
contacts. There is an intuitive logic to the notion that this important visual
information is dealt with by specialized processes, and that perhaps even an area of
the brain is reserved for processing face stimuli. The degree to which faces are
"special" has been a topic in different research fields (e.g. electrophysiology,
neuropsychology, developmental studies, and behavioral studies). One could say that
the research field on face recognition is in fact divided in several separate segments,
asking different questions and using a variety of paradigms. The reason of this
disunity is that the question whether there is something "special" about faces as
stimuli intrigued many researchers, from different theoretical and experimental
backgrounds. As a consequence of this multiple input in the face recognition debate,
it is not easy to integrate all results to a unified total. As we will show below, there
are however some returning issues.
One particularly striking finding in face recognition literature comes from
neuropsychological reports on "prosopagnosia" (Bodamer, 1947). Prosopagnosic
patients cannot recognize an individual face while recognition of other visual stimuli
is still intact. The patient can still recognize the person through non-facial cues such
as clothing or posture. Sometimes, the patient can still identify the person through the
face, if the face has a particular striking feature such as a mole, a remarkable haircut,
or eyeglasses. However these procedures are not only odd, but also unreliable and
Slow, stillleaving the patients unable to perform face recognition tasks within the
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normal range. As Davidoff and Landis (1990) have argued, a minimum requirement
for using the term prosopagnosia is that at least the first visual input into the stream
of face recognition processes is intact. On the other hand, prosopagnosia needs not be
confined to impaired face memory but is often accompanied by impaired visual
processes as well. In fact Schweich and Bruyer (1993) have reported on the
heterogeneity of the deficit and showed that patients differ in their ability to perform
face decision (recognition of the face class rather than individual face), visual analysis
of unfamiliar faces, and familiar face recognition.
Different explanations have been put forward to account for this puzzling
selective deficit. Of course, a compelling interpretation is that there are separate and
independent processes specifically reserved for the stimulus class of faces. Damage to
these processes results in a selective impairment to face stimuli. In its most extreme
form, this explanation is one of an impaired 'face module'. One alternative
explanation is that prosopagnosia is a less severe form of agnosia, and as faces are
more difficult to recognize this is the stimulus group suffering most from such deficit.
However, this hypothesis has been convincingly countered by the finding of double
dissociations. While prosopagnosic patients are selectively worse with face stimuli,
other patients are impaired with object but not face recognition (Farah, 1991;
McCarthy & Warrington, 1986; Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 199D. Damasio
and colleagues put forward the "individuation hypothesis" (see Moscovitch et al.,
1997; Damasio, Damasio, & Hoesen, 1982). Face recognition requires within-class
discrimination (one face from the other), while object recognition tests are between-
category (discriminate a car from a flower). These authors showed problems with
subtle within-category discrimination for prosopagnosic patients, however other
prosopagnosic patients have shown intact within-class discrimination (DeRenzi,
1986). McNeil and Warrington (1993) reported a farmer suffering from prosopagnosia
that was still able to recognize the sheep in his flock. We will return later to this idea
9
Introduction
that face recognition is special in the particular combination of demands it poses on
the recognition system.
The issue whether there is something'special' about face stimuli cannot be
understood while it is not clear which are the processes involved in face recognition.
Behavioral data from normal participants have indicated that face stimuli might
indeed be processed in a different manner than object (non-facial) stimuli. The most
well known behavioral finding is the "face inversion effect"; recognition of faces is
more impaired by inverted (upside down) presentation then is recognition of other
stimuli. The explanation provided for this finding (see Yin, 1969) is that besides a
general factor of familiarity making mono-oriented objects (such as faces and houses)
more difficult to recognize upside down, there is an additional factor of increased
difficulty only for faces. The additional difficulty for face stimuli would be related to
the particular importance of configural information in face recognition. Presenting a
stimulus upside down hinders extraction of configural information, while analysis of
isolated features is relatively spared. Other stimulus classes can still be recognized
fairly well using this featural information, but face recognition is severely disturbed.
Similarly, other behavioral findings of different patterns of performance with face
than with object stimuli are generally explained as somehow related to face
recognition depending more on information of the whole face configuration, while
recognition of other stimuli can use features or parts-based information. One example
of a behavioral effect supporting this notion is the face context effect (Homa, Haver, &
Schwartz, 1976; see also Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1995) where a normal upright face
context aids recognition of a face part. Tanaka and Farah (1993) found that this effect
of context was stronger with face than with other (house) stimuli. After learning
whole faces or houses, recognition of only a part was more difficult than recognition




Farah (1990) has put forward a clear model, with a dichotomy between face
recognition depending more on 'holistic' (whole-based) information and object
recognition depending more on featural (parts-based) information. In
neuropsychology, such similar assumption explains prosopagnosia as impaired
configural processes (Levine & Calvanio, 1989). The opposite case of only spared
configural processes then predicts agnosia without prosopagnosia, which has indeed
been reported (Moscovitch et al., 1997). In this thesis, this assumption of a strict
division between configural face recognition processes on the one hand and parts-
based object recognition processes on the other hand was tested in different
paradigms.
If there is nothing "special" about the stimulus class of faces, the face specific
findings must reflect a failure to present the correct control stimuli. In these models
not the stimulus class of faces itself, but rather a combination of stimulus properties
underlies the way in which faces are recognized. There are two characteristics that
clearly emerge in the literature as being most important. The first is the expertise we
all hold for faces, and the second is the fact that recognition or matching of individual
faces requires within-class discrimination. In these models, it has been suggested
(Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes & McLean, 1990) that extraction of "norm-based"
("second-order relational") information is an important component of expertise with
within-class discrimination of a homogeneous stimulus class. This norm-based or
second-order relational information is not only the configuration of the face itself, but
moreover how this configuration deviates from the mean (or prototypical)
configuration of the stimulus class. We are all experts in recognizing faces, and the
stimuli are alike (i.e. the members share a configuration), causing particular
importance of configural information in face recognition. Thus, opposite to the "face
module" model is the assumption that faces are only special in their particular
combination of stimulus properties. The difference between this latter viewpoint and
11
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the position that the face stimulus class itself is special, is the question whether it is
possible to find object stimuli with which the same behavioral, neurological and
neuropsychological findings can be obtained.
Finding the exact right control objects to compare with face stimuli has proven
problematical. It is always possible to explain the difference between face and object
stimuli as a side effect of choice of control object (it does not contain the right
combination of stimulus properties). Similarly, it is difficult to discuss whether
different or separate processes are involved in the "special case" of faces as long as it
is not yet clear which exactly are the processes involved in face recognition. The main
focus in this thesis therefore is to provide a better picture on the visual processes
involved in face recognition. Subsequently the question can be asked whether these
processes are involved in object recognition as well, or are reserved exclusively for
the stimulus class of faces. If the processes are reserved for faces, as we explained
above, this either reflects an effect of stimulus class per se (a face module), or is a
consequence of the specific stimulus properties combined in a face image. Particularly
the factors "within-class processing" and "expertise" are assumed essential
underlying these processes. Thus, in studying the visual processes involved in face
recognition, also the influence or importance of these factors is considered.
As will become clear when reading the following chapters, the role of
"configural" processes in face recognition and face matching is a main issue in this
thesis. In face recognition literature, "configuration- is assumed of critical importance
in face processing, as opposed to "parts-based" or "featural" information.
Unfortunately, using these terms necessitates disentangling the different terminology
and definitions used in previous research. To avoid confusion, please note that
"configural" can refer to both information and processes. First as also explained in
the introduction of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the term "configuration" is used to refer
to the information present in a normal face stimulus. Thus, the worse performance of
12
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prosopagnosic patient LH with normal upright faces than with inverted faces is a
disrupting influence of face configuration on matching performance. Second, there is
a question of what visual processes are involved in extracting information from the
face stimulus. Different notions on what these processes are, is reflected in the use of
different terms such as "whole-based" or "holistic" and "configural". In the literature
is not always made clear what are the definitions of these terms and how they are
separate from each other. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine in a certain task
whether one or the other kind of information is used. For example, disturbing
relational information by moving a face feature also disturbs the "whole face"
information. Vice versa, contrasting presentation of a face part with whole faces not
only manipulates the presence vs. absence of "holistic" information, but also that of
relational information. In our experiments we often do not differentiate between
relational (configural) information and holistic (whole-based) information. To avoid
confusion, simply the contrast is made between on the one hand processing of the
whole stimulus, the relations between the parts, and the relations between parts and
whole, and on the other hand the isolated parts or stimulus features.
II. Neurological Basis
Each chapter in this thesis starts with an introduction of the specific research question
at hand. Though literature of immediate relevance is discussed, the space is too
limited to provide a more extensive discussion. In particular, in the introductions of
the chapters there is little discussion of the extensive research field on the
neurological basis of face recognition. This subject though of clear importance in the
broader field of understanding face recognition, receives little attention in the
following chapters. To include information on face recognition obtained in this field,
13
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and moreover to indicate the parallels between questions raised and theories
proposed in this field with the ones discussed in the following chapters of this thesis,
a short discussion of this research field is provided below.
Area Responding Specifically to Faces?
Recent imaging studies reported "face selective" activation in the focal region of the
fusiform gyrus, and termed this area the fusiform face area or "FFA" (Ishai,
Ungerleider, Martin, Maisog, & Haxby, 1997; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997;
McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997). The degree of face specificity was studied by
comparing level of activation to faces with level of activation to other stimuli. FFA
shows stronger activation for faces than for letter strings (Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore,
& McCarthy, 1996), flowers or assorted objects (McCarthy et al., 1997), houses
(Kanwisher et al., 1997), and scrambled faces (Tong, Nakayama, Moscovitch, Weinrib,
& Kanwisher, 2000). Sergent, Ohta, and MacDonald (1992) showed in an earlier study
using PET that the activation found in a face recognition task but not an object
recognition task was located in the right lingual and fusiform gyrus, the right
parahippocampal gyrus, and the anterior temporal cortex. This indicates that face
specific activation might be found more strongly in the right hemisphere. The issue of
right vs. left hemisphere involvement is separate (though related) issue and will not
be further discussed here. For a more detailed discussion of lateralization effects, and
a viewpoint on how different face recognition functions might be served in the two
hemispheres, see De Gelder and Rouw (in press), Laeng and Rouw (in press), and de
Schonen & Mathivet (1989).
Studies have shown that the face activation is not due to some low-level property
(such as contrast and complexity) that happens to be present with face stimuli but not
with control stimuli. The FFA responds to stimuli recognizable as a face but not to
very similar stimuli that are not recognized as a face. Kanwisher, Tong and
14
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Nakayama (1998) found activation in the fusiform face area to upright or inverted
grayscale face stimuli and upright two-tone "Mooney" faces. However, when stimuli
were no longer recognizable as a face (the same two-tone faces presented upside
down) no FFA activation is found. Similarly, Puce, Alison, Gore, and McCarthy (1995)
compared face stimuli with stimuli containing the same components but with their
features rearranged. Greatest fMRI activation to faces was found in the midfusiform
gyrus, and more posterior and lateral (occipitotemporal sulcus and inferior temporal
gyrus). There was no significant difference between right and left hemisphere
activation. Presentation of scrambled faces activated different areas, namely the
lateral lingual gyrus and the collateral sulcus. The authors of this study conclude that
the findings do confirm the face sensitivity of areas but "the degree to which it is face
selective remains to be determined."
McCarthy et al. (1997) demonstrated in their fMRI study that both faces and
flowers activate large and partially overlapping regions of inferior extrastriate cortex.
The faces or flowers were viewed among non-objects or among objects. While flowers
among non-objects evoked bilateral fusiform activation, flowers among objects did
not result in any flower-specific activation. Presenting faces among non-objects
resulted in face-specific activation in bilateral regions of the posterior fusiform gyrus.
Even faces among objects showed face-specific activation (though smaller than in the
non-object presentation condition), namely in the focal right fusiform region. Taken
together the findings showed activation specifically to faces, primarily in the right
lateral fusiform gyrus. The authors conclude that faces are perceived at least in part
by a separate processing stream within the ventral object recognition system. Still, the
findings also indicate that activation to one but not another class of stimuli can also be
found with other stimuli but faces and other areas than the "face area".
The possible neurological basis of face processes and the existence of face
selective brain areas has also been studied recording cortical field potentials.
15
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Electrophysiological studies comparing faces with other stimuli have reported an
early negative potential (N200) responding preferentially to faces but not to other
stimuli such as scrambled faces, cars, and butterflies (Allison, Ginter, McCarty,
Nobre, Puce, Luby, & Spencer, 1994a). This component was recorded at locations in
the left and right fusiform and inferior temporal gyri. Furthermore, electrical
stimulation of the same region sometimes produced a temporary inability to name
familiar faces (Allison et al., 1994a). Puce et al. (1995) observed that the face sensitive
areas (in the fusiform and inferior temporal gyri) reported in their fMRI study were
approximately coextensive with the face areas identified in these electrophysiological
studies (Allison et al., 1994a; Allison et al., 1994b). Similarly, Puce et al.'s findings
with scrambled face stimuli were corresponding with evoked potentials in the striate
and peristriate cortex in response to high spatial frequency stimuli such as
checkerboards and scrambled faces (Allison, McCarty, Nobre, Puce, & Belger, 1994b).
These congruent findings from different methods to measure brain activity provide a
particular convincing argument in favor of some degree of "face specificity" in the
brain. In clinical studies, Puce, Allison, Spencer, Spencer, & McCarthy, G. (1997) also
studied face-specific ERPs as well as fMRI activation to faces in two epileptic patients
with intracranial electrodes. The early surface-negative potential (N200) and the fMRI
activation in response to face stimuli were found at corresponding locations. In both
patients, activation was found in right fusiform gyri. The two patients showed
additional activation in the lateral cortex, one on the left side and the other at the
right side.
These findings provide clear evidence for areas of the brain responding more
strongly to faces than to other classes of stimuli. This does however not establish
whether these areas are face selective, and respond exclusively to faces. A second issue
is that even if there is a selective brain area responding exclusively to faces, this does
not inform us on the functions involved in face recognition or the selectivity of these
16
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functions. Perhaps the functional specialization of the brain allows specific activation
to stimuli other than faces.
Tile finding that the FFA responds to inverted faces led Kanwisher et al. (1998) to
propose that this area might be involved in detection of the face class rather than
identification of the individual face. Behavioral studies have shown that inverted
faces are much harder to recognize (and might be recognized in a different manner)
than upright faces, but this difference between upright and inverted faces was not
reflected in activation of FFA. Bentin, Allison, Perez, Puce, & McCarthy (1996)
reported a corresponding finding with the face specific negative component (N170)
responding preferentially to human faces and isolated human eyes, but not to a
variety of control stimuli. This component was not much affected by alteration of the
location of the inner components or by face inversion (Bentin et al., 1996). Thus, both
the early negative component as face-specific activation found in the FFA appears
once a stimulus is recognized as a face (Kanwisher et al., 1998) but is not dependent
on further identification processes. Even if the early component is not related to
identification, later components might however be. Bentin and Delouell (2000)
reported besides this early component (N170) a later negative face component
(ranging between 250 and 500 ms). In line with their proposal that N170 reflects an
early stage of face perception while the later component reflects later processes of
identification, they found that the early component (unlike the later N400) was not
modulated by the familiarity of the face, nor influenced by task (Bentin & Delouell,
2000). However, other findings point to a role of the FFA in identification rather than
categorization or detection. Recent studies examined brain activity patterns in
prosopagnosic patients, and did not find activation in the FFA in response to face
stimuli. (De Gelder & Kanwisher, 1999). However, the activation found in what has
been termed the parahippocampal place area (PPA), an area responding to scenes
(Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998) was still present. Apparently, the issue is not settled yet.
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In conclusion, in literature clear support for face specific areas is provided.
However, this does not imply a face selective area surrounded by general object
recognition areas. A more just conclusion holds that the areas are only relatively face
specific, and are most strongly activated by faces as compared with other stimuli.
First, studies found that faces activate specific areas, but other areas are activated by
flowers and butterflies (McCarthy et al., 1997). Second, though the area called
"fusiform face area" is reported to show selective face activation, both the location
and intensity of the activation is influenced by task and even stimulus settings. The
FFA thus responds not selectively, but more strongly to faces than to other kinds of
stimuli. Although no clear consensus exists, face specific processes seem located in
the area of fusiform and inferior temporal gyrus. Tentatively, we suggest that the
early face negative component reported in electrophysiological studies, and the face-
specific activation in the FFA reported in brainimaging studies reflect a similar
system. This system is involved with early encoding of the face shape.
"Face Specific" us. "Stimulus Properties"
The previous overview showed support for the notion of a "face area" in the brain.
The degree of specificity was indicated by the relative activation to faces as compared
with activation in these areas to other stimuli. As discussed previously with
behavioral findings, the findings of "face specificity" can be explained either as
reflecting the special status of the stimulus class of faces (face module), or as a
function of a particular combination of stimulus properties.
Gauthier and colleagues argued that "face specific" activation in an area in fact
reflects the sensitivity of these areas to the factors of expertise and subordinate level
(within-category) matching. This latter factor is related to level of processing
(recognizing "a face" is superordinate to recognizing "Jan's face"), but also to the
higher similarity or homogeneity of the exemplars within the category of faces as
18
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compared with the similarity of an arbitrary group of objects. Face specific findings
are explained as failure to control for level of categorization at which stimuli are
typically recognized. For example, Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, and Gore
(1999) pose that both the study of McCarthy et al. (199D and Kanwisher et al. (1997)
did not require subordinate level processing of the control objects, because the task
was one of passive viewing or because presentation times were too short. According
to these authors, passive viewing of a stream of faces and non-face objects results in
subordinate level processing of faces (the individual person) while objects are
processed at a more basic level. Gauthier and colleagues found, using object stimuli,
additional activation to verify a subordinate level of a picture over its subordinate
level in the fusiform and inferior temporal gyri as well as temporal poles. Gauthier,
Anderson, Tarr, Skudlarski, & Gore (1997) concluded "the additional visual
processing required to access the subordinate level of a non-face object over and
above its basic level, engages the region of the brain previously defined as the face-
selective area. "
Some questions arise on the processes underlying the activation level of the
fusiform inferior temporal region. Possibly the measurements have included more
than the visual processes of particular importance in face processing, however, as the
volume of activation in this area was not larger in the visual than in a semantic task.
Another question involves how the regions of interest (ROI) are determined.
Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson (2000) studied subordinate level processing
using both averaged and individually defined ROIs. These areas responded more
strongly to faces than objects in a passive viewing task. In a word-to-object matching
task these ROIs showed additional activation to subordinate level object matching
("sparrow") over basic level object activation ("bird"). Furthermore, the additional
activation of faces over objects did not differ significantly from the additional
activation of subordinate over basic level activation. Although these findings indicate
19
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that the FFA does not respond to face stimuli exclusively, it also does not show that it
is a "subordinate level matching area". There were many areas responding more
strongly to subordinate than to basic level matching: the "visual subordinate minus
basic" condition elicited activation of the middle and posterior fusiform gyri, but also
the entire occipital gyri as well as posterior middle temporal gyri. Finally, note that
activation of the "face areas" by stimuli other than faces (see also Martin, Wiggs,
Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996; Schacter et al., 1995) refutes a strictly modular
explanation, but does not put aside a model of relative specialization.
As discussed previously in this Introduction, the second property of particular
importance in the face-object stimuli comparison lies in the expertise we all hold for
face recognition. Does the face specific activation found in the FFA increase (or is
even dependent on) expertise with the stimulus class? Gauthier et al. (2000) found
indeed that bird and car experts showed FFA activity for their subject of expertise.
Furthermore, FFA activation was even found with nonsense objects called
"Greebles", but only if expertise with these stimuli was acquired through training
(Gauthier et al., 1999).
This brings us to the final point in this model, namely the interaction between the
factors homogeneity, categorization level and expertise. This interaction is assumed
necessary for "face specific" findings to emerge with other stimuli. Gauthier and Tarr
(1997) studied the importance of the combination of stimulus settings with "Greeble"
stimuli. Two groups, either "novices" or "experts", were presented with a recognition
procedure with upright and inverted Greebles. Only "experts" were participants
trained with Greeble gender, family and individual Greebles. Both novice and expert
participants learned the names of 6 parts and 6 individual Greebles, followed by a
recognition task of the parts either in isolation, in studied configuration (the
individual Greeble) or in transformed configuration (upper features rotated). The
same procedure was repeated with inverted Greebles and Greeble parts. Both novices
20
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and experts were faster and less accurate in the 'isolated parts' than in the 'studied
configuration' condition, regardless of stimulus orientation. Accuracy showed only
for experts presented with upright Greebles a significant better performance with
studied configuration than with isolated parts. Ignoring the latency findings (experts
were significantly faster with upright isolated parts) in this condition, the authors
conclude that this replicates the object superiority effect as measured with faces.
Further, only experts showed a significant advantage (faster responses) of studied
over transformed configuration, and only in the upright condition. This finding is not
unexpected, as only experts were trained extensively with this configuration. The
conclusion of this study was that not the stimulus class of faces, but expertise with
visually similar objects produces configural sensitivity.
The opposite standpoint asserts that face perception involves cognitive and
neural mechanisms specialized for processing of the stimulus class of faces, and
argues against an explanation based on a combination of stimulus properties. Such
counter argument was provided in a recent fMRI study by Tong et al. (2000). They
located per individual the FFA (Kanwisher et al., 1997), the area responding strongest
to human faces but not to objects. Taking the human face as one extreme (strong FFA
response) and objects as the other extreme (no FFA activation), they compared these
conditions with stimuli such as animal faces and schematic faces. The similarity
between findings in this study and the ones arguing against modularity is that the
FFA did not respond in a manner expected following a strictly modular account,
namely activation only to human faces but not to other stimuli. The study of Tong et
al. contrasted with these studies, however, in finding FFA activation for animal faces.
The participants had no expertise with these faces, and the activation was found
equally in a task of passive watching as in a delayed matching task. Therefore, the
authors argued, activation in the FFA can be found in absence of within-category
matching as well as expertise with the stimulus, the two characteristics assumed
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essential for FFA activation in Gauthier's model. Further, Tong et al. argued that the
FFA responds to both featural as configural aspects of a facial pattern: the FFA
responds to schematic faces (only configural information without face features) and
to only eyes (feature without the context of the face), but is much less activated by
these stimuli than to whole faces, cat faces or faces without eyes. Further arguments
against the "stimulus properties" model were provided by Kanwisher and colleagues.
Kanwisher et al. (1997) argued that FFA activation is not related to fine-grain
computations necessary for within-category discrimination, as FFA activation found
with faces was not found with discrimination of hands. Furthermore, FFA activation
is not dependent on task, as face FFA activation was equally present in discrimination
as in passive viewing tasks (a similar finding and conclusion was found with house
stimuli by Tong et al., 2000). Finally, Kanwisher argues that FFA activation is not
dependent on expertise: whereas there is considerable expertise with alphanumeric
characters FFA response is extremely low.
An important notion of Gauthier et al. (2000) is that within-category recognition
in interaction with expertise is important to strongly engage the FFA. Indeed, they
showed increased FFA activation in car and bird experts. Kanwisher (2000) however
argues "when the fusiform face area was defined using the standard criteria adopted
in my lab, face areas could be found in the right hemisphere in only 5 of the 19
participants in this study; of these, the magnitudes of the expertise and
categorization-level effects are quite small, and the response to faces remain at least
twice as strong as that to the expert category." Furthermore, she challenges the use of
Greebles as control stimuli, as these stimuli look like faces. Gauthier et al. (2000)
replied to this argument by pointing out that while Greeble experts showed Greeble-
specific activation in the FFA, this was not found with Greeble novices. Thus, the FFA
activation is not found simply in response to face-like features of the stimulus, but to
the expertise with this stimulus.
22
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.In conclusion, the debate on the exact function and specificity of the "face area
has not been settled yet. A final remark on the "stimulus properties" model is that not
a single factor is sufficient to explain the different level of activation to faces as to
objects. To find the same level of activation in the "face area" to objects as to faces, an
interaction of factors, or a simultaneous optimal setting of factors is needed. This
raises the obvious question which objects fulfill these requirements. So far, it has
proven difficult to find control non-face stimuli that show equally strong activation of
this area as face stimuli have. Most convincing findings were reported with the
"Greeble" stimuli, however Greebles were specifically designed  as " face control".
Greebles resemble faces not only in terms of subordinate level matching or expertise,
but also in many other stimulus factors (nameable parts, individual as well as families
of Greebles) and even in general shape (3D surface with protruding features). If no
"real world" control objects can be found that give similar FFA activation as faces, the
face specificity of this area might in theory still be explained by the specific
combination of properties present with faces. However, the great number of faces and
little number of objects activating this area would then make it legitimate to call it a
"face  area"  .
As in behavioral research, a returning issue is the relative dependence on
"configural information" (though no consensus seems to exist on how this term is
defined). Perhaps expertise does not always lead to configural processing. This
explanation is supported by the study of Tanaka and Gauthier (1997) showing that
expertise with cells or dogs does not lead to behavioral effects expected with "holistic
processing". These effects were however found with Greeble experts, indicating
that either additional stimulus properties are necessary and "expertise" and "within-
class recognition" are not sufficient to lead to face specific findings. Perhaps only
certain objects fulfill the requirements to lead to "holistic" expertise. Indeed, it seems
logical that expertise with certain objects, e.g. recognizing different makes of
23
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airplanes, a featural-based approach leads to better performance that a holistic
approach. Thus, depending on what is more efficient expertise with some stimulus
classes willlead to increased whole-based or configural processing, while expertise
with other stimulus classes leads to strong dependence on extraction of certain
informative details.
Brain Models
Underlying the debate of the neurological basis of face recognition processes, of
course a more general question on brain organization is addressed. As discussed
previously in this introduction, one theory describes separate and independent "brain
modules" (Fodor, 1983). Face recognition processes have been explicitly mentioned as
an example of a component or "module" in the brain. A module is localized
(neurologically separate), and its functions are innate, separate, independent and
mandatory. Thus, not only are face recognition processes neurologically separate
(located at a particular brain area), but there are different separate and independent
functions involved in face vs. object recognition.
A very different notion of how face recognition is based in a brain organization
underlies the "object form topology hypothesis" (Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin,
Schouten, & Haxby, 1999; Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999). In this model, the ventral
temporal cortex has a topological arrangement with continuous representation of
information on objects. The representations of different categories are distributed and
overlapping, as the information is on object form rather than object class. Thus,
characteristics of an object cluster together.
A third model was termed by Tarr and Gauthier (2000) the "flexible process-
map". Rather than dividing the brain according to stimulus class or stimulus form, in
this model areas are best suited for a certain computation or process. An assortment
of extrastriate areas supports separate components of visual processing. Through
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experience an object category recruits (via recognition strategies) certain components
of the process map. For example, we learn to recognize faces at the individual level
(for faces it is necessary to find subtle differences between similar objects) while most
objects are associated with a higher "basic-level" recognition.
Obviously it is not yet clear which model describes most closely the way the brain
works. The overview provided previously casts some doubt on the strongest version
of the "modular" theory, as it makes strong predictions on the separation between
areas involved responding to faces and other areas responding to non-faces. For one,
although the "face area" probably responds most strongly to face stimuli, it does show
activation to several other classes of stimuli as well. Similarly, presenting a face does
not lead exclusively to "face area" activation, but several areas throughout the brain
show activation to face stimuli.
Further evaluation of the three models described above is made difficult by the
fact that no specification is provided on the nature of functions and information
processes involved in processing a face image. What functions comprise the face
module? What is the nature of information stored in object form topology? Which
processes constitute the separate components of the process map? Furthermore, it is
possible that a different degree of "specificity" or dedication to the stimulus class of
faces might exist for separate levels of visual processes involved in face recognition.
However, with the exact nature of information or functions involved yet unclear it is
not possible to solve this issue. In this thesis the nature of visual processes involved in
face recognition is studied. Additionally the question is asked what factors influence
these processes (e.g. are the processes bound to the stimulus class of face, dependent
on expertise or on within-category matching?).
25
Introduction
III. Which studies are included and why
The chapters in the thesis are all submitted as articles and therefore can also be read
independently of the whole. The chapters are in chronological order, that is,
earliest writing first and the latest last. This structure was chosen as it allows the
reader to follow the logical course of development of ideas and experiments over the
years. In this paragraph we will introduce the chapters of this thesis. We describe the
questions asked and general paradigm used, without giving away all results obtained
(these are discussed in detail in the separate chapters).
As we said before, studies were performed to study the visual processes involved
in face recognition. Thus, the experiments presented to prosopagnosic patients were
not set up as clinical studies mapping out what underlies this deficit but rather were
designed to single out visual processes involved in face recognition. The 'clinical'
approach would imply that the level of performance of prosopagnosic patients is
directly compared with that of normal (control) participants. Instead, we studied the
pattern ofpe«ormance ofthe prosopagnosic patients and compared that with the
pattern of performance of normal controls. The normal participants were tested to see
whether with our choice of stimuli and test settings, the expected "normal" pattern
would be obtained.
We studied the puzzling finding of "inversion superiority", where prosopagnosic
patients show worse performance with stimuli in upright than with stimuli in
inverted orientation (a pattern opposite to that of normal participants). This
phenomenon is of particular interest because of the apparent contradiction it poses.
The patients show impaired performance in face matching tasks, but the differential
performance between upright and inverted stimuli indicates at least some intact
processing of the configural face information. This is in contradiction with the
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common assumption that impaired face recognition ability reflects impaired
"configural" processes.
The effect of worse performance with upright than inverted faces was first
reported by Farah, Wilson, Drain, and Tanaka (1995) with prosopagnosic patient LH.
In Chapter 1, we further study this phenomenon with patient LH. We examine the
generality of the effect by presenting to LH morphed stimuli, created from fusing
animal and human faces, in both upright and inverted orientation. Furthermore, we
presented a task with human face stimuli, inverted faces, and also scrambled faces
(with the eyes at the position of the mouth and vice versa). These latter stimuli are
particularly fit to examine the phenomenon as only the intact vs. impaired face
configuration differentiates between the normal and scrambled face stimuli. The
relation between intact and impaired processes was further studied by presenting a
task specifically requiring matching of a face part. Does this task, encouraging a
parts-based analysis, together with LH's intact ability to focus on a part, help him to
overcome his difficulty with normal, upright faces?
In the initial report on inversion superiority, Farah et al. (1995) account for the
effect as an impaired "face module". Recognition of face stimuli is severely impaired
but processing of objects or non-objects (such as inverted faces) can rely on alternative
routes. Our studies do not support this explanation of Farah and colleagues. In
Chapter 1 we provided logical reasons why we did not find the "face module"
explanation likely, and the studies reported in Chapter 2 were designed to provide a
convincing empirical counter argument. We again studied the pattern of performance
of prosopagnosic patient LH as compared with that of normal controls, but this time
we presented not only faces but also objects in upright and inverted orientation. The
questions on the "specificity" of configural and face processes indeed logically raise
the inverse question of whether the processes involved in face recognition are shared
with object recognition. For example, normal controls tested in Chapter 3 with faces
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and objects in upright and inverted orientation showed an inversion effect with object
stimuli as well (as was also found in the famous study by Yin, 1969) although the
inversion effect was smaller with objects than faces. Does this indicate the use of
configural processes in object recognition as well? Conversely, the explanation of
impaired "face module" is difficult to maintain if inversion superiority effect is also
found with objects in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, we add a new dimension to the discussion by contrasting a case of
acquired prosopagnosia with a case of developmental prosopagnosia, again with a
particular focus on configural face processing. The purpose of this study is twofold.
First the experiments provided an interesting contrast in matching performance
between the two patients. This again indicates that the relationship between
configural processes and face recognition ability is not an all-or-nothing situation.
While the acquired patient showed inversion superiority, the developmental case did
not. This finding indicates that the relationship between configural processes and face
stimuli may in fact differ, depending on whether at least some normal development
has taken place. (This idea of how the use of configural processes relates to
developmental pattern was further studied in Chapter 5.) The second issue in
Chapter 3 involved extending the contrast between the two patients to recognition of
the face class (superordinate level recognition of "a face"), rather than discrimination
of individual faces (subordinate level recognition of "John's face"). From literature on
prosopagnosia, it is known that impaired recognition of individual faces can be
accompanied by intact recognition of the face class, and even some spared face
processing with impaired face detection (Schweich & Bruyer, 1993). However, the
previous studies also assumed that impaired face recognition is accompanied by
parts-based processing, therefore the recognition of a face as "a face" could proceed
in slow parts-based analysis. These studies were set up in a manner (e.g. providing
unlimited timing) that allowed patients to perform such an awkward and inefficient
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strategy. In our face detection studies we included tasks with very short presentation
time that do not allow a feat:ural analysis but forces a rapid decision based on the
whole stimulus instead. Though severely impaired in the matching tasks, both
patients showed good ability to perform these tasks, and even still above chance with
50 ms presentation time. Furthermore, the patients showed a very different
performance pattern in the face matching task, but this contrast between the two
patients was not observed in the face detection task.
In the previous studies, the inversion superiority effect shown by prosopagnosic
patients is interpreted as some spared processing of the face configuration. This
entails a conclusion that is in contradiction with a common assumption in face
recognition literature, on the relationship between configural processes and face
recognition ability. If face recognition ability is impaired while patients are still able
to process the face configuration, this goes against the notion that face recognition
depends on whole-based or configural information, while object recognition depends
on parts-based information. Furthermore, this is in contradiction with the most
common explanation of prosopagnosia, which is impaired configural processes
forcing the patient to completely depend on parts-based analysis instead. Chapter 4 is
aimed specifically at this issue: Does face recognition depend on configural processes
while object recognition depend on parts-based processes? Similarly, does impaired
processing of the face stimulus reflect an inability to process the face configuration?
The experiments presented to prosopagnosic patient RP in Chapter 4 were designed
specifically to tear apart the influence of a face configuration (the normal face
stimulus) on the one hand, and a manner of processing (configural vs. featural) on the
other hand.
As mentioned before, Chapter 5 presents developmental studies. Our previous
findings contradicted the common assumption that face recognition ability is in fact
the same as ability to process configural information. One manner to study this
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division between face recognition ability and configural processing ability is by
examining how the two develop in relation to each other. If the two processes were
the same, one would expect that the pattern of relative dependence on configural
information in face processing does not change. Rather, configural processing ability
keeps pace with the development of face recognition ability. This relationship
between configural processing and processing members of the stimulus class of faces
was studied in child and adult performance on visual matching and recognition
tasks. Furthermore, we studied the assumption that children differ from adults in
their recognition or perception of faces due to insufficient availability of configural
processes. Chapter 5 directly tested whether children depend on featural or parts-
based processes rather than configural processes. In contrast with previous studies,
that tested children with already quite some development and visual recognition
experience (from 5- or 6-years-old), we tested also with very young children (3- or 4-
years-old).
Another reason to include the developmental studies in this thesis is that children
and adults naturally differ in their amount of experience with processing a facial
image. Expertise has been proposed to be an essential factor, with the use of
configural information depending on expertise with a stimulus class (Gauthier &
Tarr, 1997; Diamond & Carey, 1986). If this indeed were the case, one would expect
that the use of configural information increases with age. Adults, with more
experience and thus more expertise than children, then show stronger dependence of
configural information than children. This same relationship between configural
processes, face recognition ability and expertise was examined again, but with a very
different paradigm, in Chapter 6. Here, we presented Dutch and Taiwanese
participants with own or other face type (Dutch and Taiwanese). The effect of more
experience with own face recognition is reflected in better recognition of own than
other type of face (the 'own race advantage' or'cross race bias', Valentine, Chiroro, &
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Dixon, 1995; Levin, in press). The use of configural processes in face recognition is
reflected in the worse performance with inverted than upright faces ('inversion
effect', Yin, 1969). The hypothesis of a close link between face recognition ability,
configural processes, and expertise predicts dependence between the own-race
advantage and the inversion effect with the inversion effect larger for own rather
than for other race of face.
Furthermore, in this final chapter we returned to the issue raised in Chapter 3. In
the study of prosopagnosic patients, two routes for the recognition of the face class
and the recognition of the individual face were proposed. In particular, intact or
impaired use of configuration in one route does not influence the other route. The
cross-race effect presents us with an opportunity to again examine this issue. Is the
better performance (higher recognition ability) with own race than other race of face
in the matching task mirrored in an own-race advantage when detecting or
categorizing own- vs. other-race faces?
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Chapter 1
Structural Encoding Precludes Recognition
of Face Parts in Prosopagnosial
The extent and the impact of spared processing offacial stimuli in the prosopagnosic patient LH is
examined using the inversion e#ect and theface context e#ect. Our study asked how the deficit in
individualface recognition is related to two perceptual abilities that are spared in this patient but
between which there is interference when both are applied to theface stimulus, i.e. structural encoding
Of the.filce and parts-based matching procedures. Three experiments studied this relationship with task
demands  and  stimulus  properties  designed  to  trigger  the  parts-based processes.  In  the first experiment,
human and animalfaces are presented upright or inverted with good performance onlyfor the inverted
condition.  In  Experiment 2 normal participants show a clear face context effect (matching of upright
faces easier than scrambled or inverted ones) in thefullface matching task whereas in the parts
matching task the face  superiority  effect disappears.  In  contrast,  LH  shows  a face inferiority  effect when
matchingfullfaces but also when matching an isolated.face part to a.face part in afullface context. The
results show that structural encoding Of theface overrules parts-based procedures that could otherwise
be helpful to tell individualfaces apart.
1 De Gelder, B., & Rouw, R. 2000. Structural encoding precludes recognition of face parts in




Prosopagnosia is a deficit in face recognition (Bodamer, 194D, whereby the face no
longer elicits any sense of familiarity although the patient continues to recognize
familiar voices or gait. How specific to faces this disorder is, is still controversial,
partly because very few cases of prosopagnosia have been studied in such a way that
the possibility of at least some mild deficit in other areas like word or object
recognition can be entirely excluded (Bruce & Humphreys, 1994; Farah, 1990;
Gauthier, Behrmann, & Tarr, 1999). The debate is now broadened by contributions
from electrophysiological studies (see Jeffreys, 1996) and from brain imaging methods
(Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999; Kanwisher, McDermoth, &
Chun, 1997). Recent reports have provided evidence that loss of normal face
recognition can manifest itself not just as a loss of the normal pattern of performance
- for example, better performance with upright than with inverted faces -  but as its
opposite, superior performance with inverted in contrast to upright faces (De Gelder,
1999; De Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, & Degos, 1998; Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka,
1995). In other words, these patients present us with a reversal of the normal pattern.
This data suggests that loss of face processing ability is not simply a matter of losing
the ability to process a certain category of stimuli (faces) nor of losing a certain
processing style (one which targets the stimulus configuration), but that there is an
interaction between damaged and intact skills. In order to focus on this interaction we
refer to the intact aspects of face processing as "structural encoding" of the face. It is
important to note that in this paper the term "structural encoding" does not refer
specifically to one or another theory of face recognition. The present paper
investigates the hypothesis that spared structural encoding renders the patient unable
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to apply parts and feature based matching strategies to faces. The robustness and
generality of this effect is shown in three experiments.
A perspective common to many studies of prosopagnosia is that the deficit is
situated at the within-category level and that face categorization itself or the ability to
make a face decision is intact. In terms of the popular model of Bruce and Young
(1986), loss of face recognition ability corresponds to damage to the "face recognition
units", leaving intact the earlier stages of face processing. The fact that recognition at
the individual or exemplar level is critical for face recognition led to the
"individuation" theory of prosopagnosia (Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997)
or the view that prosopagnosia is a deficit of within-category discriminations,
defended by Damasio (Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982; Damasio, Tranel, &
Damasio, 1990). Like the model of Bruce and Young, this view assumes that prior to
individual identity recognition, visual face processing is intact in prosopagnosics. The
concept of structural encoding will be used throughout this paper to refer to this
initial face categorization stage because it is more general than some of the specific
notions advanced to explain face processing (see following)
A family of more or less related theories of normal face recognition has focused
on within-category processes of face recognition. A common theme is that the whole
face is more than the parts, but there is no consensus as to what is exactly meant by
"whole".  One  view  is  that  the face initially consists of clearly separate parts or primary
features, which when integrated give rise to the second-order features or to
recognition of the face as a configuration (the spatial relations between the individual
features), as argued by Rhodes and colleagues (Rhodes, 1988; Rhodes, Brake, &
Atkinson, 1993). A stronger claim made by Farah and collaborators, is that face
recognition does not start from the encoding of separate face parts or initial parsing
but that the face is represented holistically such that its parts are not represented
other than in the whole context (Farah, 1990; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Finally,
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developmentalists have argued that, at the entry level, faces are encoded the same
way as any other object by attending to the relations between the parts or to the
overall configuration. From there develops the ability to use second-order facial
information, which underlies individual face discrimination (Carey & Diamond, 1994;
Diamond & Carey, 1986). As Moscovitch et al. (1997) remark, these different theories
each address slightly different questions. Nevertheless, fine details aside, each of
them suggests just what might be lost in prosopagnosia: loss of configuration-based
processes in the sense of Rhodes et al., loss of the face module or of holistic processing
in the sense of Farah et al., or loss of face expertise related to second-order
representation of individual differences.
A critical question for grasping the differences between these three views
concerns what is then spared in prosopagnosia. If second-order or configuration-
based processing is lost is what remains the recognition of isolated face parts? Or,
once the face module is lost, are faces processed like objects, in a parts-based way? Or
again, is face expertise  - or the ability to use second-order relational information-
lost but are faces still processed as bundles of first-order relational information just
like objects? This latter view is in line with the consensus in the literature that
prosopagnosic patients have lost the ability to discriminate between faces but
continue to categorize faces normally. Thus, the notion that first-order information is
spared and second-order information is lost (in Carey's terms) reflects a certain
consensus concerning the pattern of spared and lost skills in prosopagnosia.
Recent studies of prosopagnosic patients have looked at this issue in more detail,
complementing traditional clinical tests of intact face decision with behavioral tasks
that have shown strong face-specific perceptual processing effects, like the inversion
effect in normal participants. But studies have revealed a paradox, because some
prosopagnosic patients are considerably better at matching inverted than upright
faces (De Gelder et al., 1998; Farah et al., 1995).
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The Paradox Of Inversion Superiority
The inversion effect, first reported by Yin (1969) for normal participants, has often
been referred to as a benchmark for establishing normal face processing (Yin, 1970).
Normal participants are better at recognizing, matching, and remembering a pair of
faces when these are presented upright than when upside-down (Yin, 1969). Recently
Farah et al. (1995) have studied the inversion effect in prosopagnosic patient LH.
Following the results obtained with right-hemisphere deficits the prediction was that
LH would perform the same way with upright and inverted faces. But instead, LH
showed face inversion superiority. We have confirmed this finding and at the same
time extended it to objects with agnosic patient AD (De Gelder et al., 1998).
Subsequently the same effects were observed with LH (De Gelder, 1999). This
reversed face inversion effect cannot be reduced to absence of the normal pattern.
This finding challenges the notion that the ability to use second-order relational
information is lost and is subsequently compensated for by using intact feature-based
routines to discriminate faces.
Instead, the paradox of inversion superiority is that individual face recognition is
lost but that some aspects of face processing are still active and interfere with reliance
upon general visual routines in order to discriminate individual faces. Thus, when the
normal pattern of better performance with upright faces is reversed, more seems to be
at stake than just spared face categorization in the presence of lost second-order or
within-category discrimination. Somehow these patients are handicapped by their
spared face categorization and prevented from using intact parts-based processes
with faces. The latter are successfully used with inverted faces but are clearly of no
use to deal with an upright face. Presumably inverting a face makes it object-like and
no longer triggers face-specific processes, therefore giving a chance to part-based
routines. The present study reports experiments designed to test the robustness and
generality of this paradox.
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Spared Structural Encoding in LH?
The case of patient LH is well suited for examining the relation and the interference
between spared first-order categorization and parts-based processes. Inversion
superiority was reported for this patient but there is inconsistency in previous studies
of LH concerning the issue of configuration-based processing. An older study by
Levine and Calvanio (1989) argues (p.151) that the core of LH's problems with faces is
an inability to get "an overview of sufficient features of a stimulus to allow the
structuring or crystallization of a coherent percept" and that LH's disorder is one of
"defective visual configural processing". These authors go on (p.161) to propose that
"defective configurational processing is characteristic of prosopagnosia". A more
recent study by Etcoff, Freeman, & Cave (1991) challenges this view, concluding
instead that configural processing is intact in LH. In the two cases the conclusion is
based on visuospatial tests and tasks of perceptual closure (for example, Kaniza
figures). Neither of these two studies provides data from face or object recognition
tasks that specifically addressed the issue of intact visual integration in higher-order
visual cognition.
A new paradigm for studying the influence of structural encoding of faces is
provided by studies that have investigated the effect of a face context on perception
and recognition of a face part. These effects can either manifest themselves as
superiority effects or as inferiority effects, depending on whether a memory rather
than a visual search is required (Mermelstein, Banks, & Prinzmetal. 1979). The face
superiority effect refers to the finding that face parts are recognized better in a normal
face context than outside it or in a scrambled face (Homa, Haver, & Schwartz, 1976;
Van Santen & Jonides, 1978). This effect is similar to the word superiority effect
where letters are recognized better and faster when presented in the context of a real
word than that of a pseudoword (Reicher, 1969). The same effect of context was found
in a search task with conjunction of features vs. isolated features (Suzuki &
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Cavanagh, 1995). A similar effect was reported in studies examining the whole face
advantage, as improved performance of recognizing whole faces vs. face parts was
not found with scrambled faces (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Recently Gauthier and Tarr
(1997) and Tanaka and Gauthier (1997) have studied this part/whole advantage for
objects other than faces in an effort to pull apart the importance of stimulus
configuration (which is either parts-based or referred to as "holistic" in the sense of
Farah and collaborators) and that of expertise with the stimulus domain. These
studies provided evidence for holistic processing of cars, houses, cells, and
"greebles".
There are two aspects to structural encoding of faces that are central to our
experiments. Since face superiority does not occur when the face configuration is lost
because the face parts are scrambled (Mermelstein et al., 1979), the effect is related to
presence of the normal face configuration. Moreover, since the effect disappears or is
strongly reduced when a normally configured face is inverted, the face context effect
also depends on canonical orientation. A reversed effect of that found in normals
would be consistent with the previous reports of inversion superiority. If, moreover,
the contrast between normal and scrambled faces also yields the reverse pattern of
that found in normals, we have significantly expanded the scope of the previous
findings and thereby pointed to structural encoding as the common factor explaining
inversion superiority as well as context inferiority.
The goal of Experiment 1 is to see whether structural encoding of the face
overrules LH's part-based strategies. If LH's performance still reflects inversion
superiority, this would testify to the strong dominance of structural encoding, more
specifically the role of canonical orientation. We then need to test with a new
paradigm based on the face context effect whether his spared structural encoding
still dominates explicitly induced internal part-based processes (Experiment 3).
Experiment 2 was run with normal participants in order to establish that the pattern
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of results typical for the face context effect obtains with our novel materials and
testing procedure. These results are also useful as control data for LH.
Case Presentation
Prosopagnosic patient LH is a 48-year-old minister and social worker, who suffered a
severe closed head injury in an automobile accident at the age of 18. What follows is a
brief summary of the aspects relevant for the present study, since the case has been
reported in the literature on previous occasions beginning with Teuber (1968). LH has
bilateral lesions affecting visual association cortices and the subjacent white matter.
These sites include the right temporal lobe, the left subcortical occipitotemporal white
matter, and bilateral parieto-occipital regions (see Levine, Calvanio, & Wolf, 1980;
Levine, Warach, & Farah, 1985, for details of visual testing). Spatial perception was
untouched by his injuries. LH performed flawlessly on a standard test of judging the
orientation of lines (Benton, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1978). He has no discernible
language deficits. Writing is normal but reading is slow. Copying of objects and
complex drawings is excellent. LH was 85% accurate on the object decision task,
judging 87% of the objects as real and only 11% of the nonobjects as real (Etcoff et al.,
1991).
LH's most striking deficit concerns faces. He is unable to recognize any familiar
face. Recognition of individuals via other channels such as their voices remains intact
as does his retention of biographical information. LH scored 36/54 on the Benton-Van
Allen face matching task (Benton & Van Allen, 1968), a result that qualifies as
impaired. On matching of identical faces he was 100% accurate, but when test and
target differed on lighting and appeared fragmented and silhouetted he scored only
54% correct.
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Experiment 1. Does Inversion Superiority Generalize to Nonhuman Faces?
Animal faces present stimuli that share the basic configuration and orientation with
human faces but differ in the internal and external face parts (eyes, mouth, but also
hair, ears, shape of head, etc). Prosopagnosia extends sometimes to nonhuman faces
for which the patient previously had a particular expertise (Bornstein, Sroka, &
Munitz, 1969). Sometimes prosopagnosics regain animal face recognition while
human face recognition remains impaired (Bruyer, et al., 1983; McNeil & Warrington,
1993). Prior to his accident LH had no particular expertise with animals, nor was he
particularly knowledgeable about a specific species. We reasoned that using animal
faces would enhance the use of part-based strategies. If so, his performance would be
the same for upright as for inverted stimuli. We chose a task that consisted of normal
human faces (man, woman) as well as animal faces (cow, monkey) and images
generated by blending these in order to obtain a stimulus continuum, enabling us to
use a task of categorical perception. From the literature on categorical perception it is
well known that the more participants are acquainted with the stimuli the more their
perception is driven by the underlying categories rather than by peripheral stimulus
aspects (Repp, 1984). The stimuli were presented to normal participants in an earlier
study (Campbell, Pascalis, Coleman, Wallace, & Benson, 1997). Campbell et al. found
a normal inversion effect in a two-alternative forced-choice matching task (2AFC),
although normals could still identify inverted stimuli as belonging to a specific
category. If overall similarity in configuration between human and animal faces
determines the course of processing then LH might not be able to take advantage of
the very obvious differences between parts of the face that easily allow discrimination
between a pair of adjacent stimuli. In that case LH would show inversion superiority




Two sets of 15 pictures each were obtained as follows. Starting from three natural
photographs (a female face, a monkey face, a cow face for the first series and a male
face, a monkey face, and a cow face for the second series), 12 intermediate stimuli
were created with a morphing program (see Campbell et al., 1997, for details). The
morphing went through 4 intermediate steps from one kind of face into the other
(from male or female face to monkey face and to cow face). Within each series, pairs
of adjacent stimuli were probes in a 2AFC task, with either the one or the other as the
target. This resulted in 30 trials, each with a different probe. For testing LH, laser
prints of the computer images were used. The probe was shown for 4 sec, followed by
the two alternatives. LH responded by pointing to the left or the right picture. In a
separate testing session, these same probes were used in an identification task. LH
made a forced choice between one of the three stimuli categories.
Results
Performance on this task was 60% (18/30) correct choices, which does not differ
reliably from chance performance (%2 = 0.61, p > .25). In a separate testing session
some weeks later the same stimuli were presented upside-down. LH was 83% (25/30)
correct on this test which is reliably better than chance performance (%2= 7.5, p < .01)
and superior to the performance on the normally oriented stimuli (%2= 4.02, p < .05).
Given the limited number of trials for the unmodified stimuli, a comparison between
the three face categories could not be made. Interestingly, on trials using stimuli
exactly in between categories (40%-60% of the two anchor points), inverting the
stimuli yielded the most improvement in performance (from 5/9,44% error to 0%
error).
In the forced-choice identification task, we analyzed trials with the normal
human, cow, or monkey images only (57%). LH performed at ceiling with the human
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faces (100%), reasonably well (71%) with the cow faces, and at chance (30%) with the
monkey faces. His bad performance with the monkey faces was due to consistently
classifying these faces as human. However, the cow faces were mistakenly classified
as monkey faces.
Discussion
The question raised in Experiment 1 was whether LH would show better
performance with inverted presentation (inversion superiority) for human as well as
for animal faces. The animal faces have the same schematic configuration as human
faces but are more discriminable because of numerous internal and external details.
Using the blended stimuli should encourage parts-based processing in LH. However,
the data show that LH performs at chance level with all upright stimuli but he is
clearly much better when the faces are presented upside-down. This generalized face
inversion superiority effect suggests that structural encoding of the face overrules the
ability to attend to the local details, which is so clearly manifest in LH's performance
with upside-down faces. Various aspects of this result require comment.
The first thing worth noting is that this result confirms the inversion superiority
for human faces previously observed for LH (Farah et al., 1995) and AD (De Gelder et
al., 1998). The finding also adds to evidence in favor of theories arguing that upright
and inverted faces are dealt with by separate mechanisms, also called dual-route
models (Moscovitch et al., 1997). The fact that LH's performance shows the same
pattern whether the faces are animal or human suggests that the critical factor is the
structural encoding of the face and not expertise with the stimulus class. Animal faces
have only a schematic configuration in common with human faces and differ from
each other and from human faces in many local details. The presence of this
configuration in its normal orientation appears to be enough to interfere with the
application of parts-based strategies to the upright stimuli. Our results are consistent
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with the findings by Tanaka and Gauthier (1997), showing that expertise with the
stimulus category is not a significant factor in determining holistic encoding.
Although our notion of structural encoding is weaker, the findings clearly converge.
The present result cannot be explained by referring to loss of the ability to
perceive second-order configuration characteristic of prosopagnosic patients.
Undoubtedly LH, like other prosopagnosic patients, has lost the use of second-order
configuration information or the typical ability to tell apart individual faces, and his
chance performance with upright faces confirms that once more. But the crucial
aspect of our results is the relationship between poor performance with upright and
good performance with inverted stimuli. This pattern cannot be explained by
reference to loss of the ability to use second-order information nor by reference to
intact parts-based strategies. Neither of these explanations can account for the
difference in performance between the upright and the inverted condition, since both
these explanations suggest that upright and inverted faces are dealt with in the same
fashion. Instead, these results testify to the influence on later processes of LH's spared
ability of structural encoding. As we noted in the Introduction, we have adopted the
notion of structural encoding to refer to the perceptual stage of encoding the face
structure but cannot at this stage favor a view that structural encoding is entirely the
same as making a category decision, or that it either precedes, parallels, or follows
upon it.
The next experiment with LH (Experiment 3) looks into the influence of structural
encoding more closely. It used a new paradigm, that of the face context effect, which
requires whole-based and parts-based matching processes. This paradigm allows us
to look at the effect of orientation (like Experiment 1) but also to study the impact of
the configuration by comparing normal and scrambled faces. Also, the stimulus set
could be controlled such that any difference between one face and another was
strictly limited to either the eyes or the mouth.
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Experiment 2. Inner Facial Features: Face Context Effects For Matching Full Faces
And Parts-Based Matching In Normals
Experiment 2 and 3 are designed to study directly whether structural encoding of
faces is intact, by using the face inversion effect and the face superiority effect with
new materials and a new task. A set of face materials was constructed, each one based
on the same natural-looking facial contour. Thus, in contrast with Experiment 1,
stimuli did not provide any external cues and attention was focused entirely on the
inner face parts. These stimuli should encourage featural processing as they can be
differentiated only by close examination of the eyes or the mouth. Two tasks were
designed: matching of two whole faces and matching of an isolated face part to its
corresponding face part presented in a whole-face context (see Appendix A for an
example of the latter task). Both tasks are presented in a simultaneous matching
paradigm with three conditions: upright, scrambled, and inverted. The comparison of
upright and scrambled performance is relevant for understanding the role of
configuration. and comparing upright vs. inverted presentation also informs about
the role of canonical orientation. A simultaneous matching task was chosen in order
to focus on structural encoding as it takes place in perception. To further encourage
parts-based comparison based on visual search, a 2AFC task was preferred over a
same/different decision.
Experiment 2 presented these tasks to normal participants and was performed
because of the novelty of the tasks and of the materials.
Participants





A black-and-white computer-edited prototype face of photographic quality of a
young male served as the framework. One of a set of 6 pairs of eyes and 6 mouths
were put in this facial contour, making for 6 different faces. These faces could be
presented upright or inverted. A face presentation covered approximately 2 degrees
of visual angle. Further, an equal number of scrambled faces was made by
interchanging the position of eyes and mouth. Thus, there are three conditions:
inverted, normal, and scrambled faces.
Method and Restilts
Order of the two tasks and the two blocks (normal-inverted-scrambled, or scrambled-
inverted-normal) was balanced between participants. In between the two tasks
participants were given another task with different stimuli, which lasted for about 15
minutes.
Experiment 2A: Matching Full Faces. For each condition (upright, inverted, and
scrambled) 60 face pairs were made: 30 "different" and 30 "same". Each participant
was presented with all conditions. Presentation was blocked and a block consisted of
18 "same" and 18 "different" trials, presented in random order. A trial started with a
fixation cross for 500 ms. Then two whole faces were presented simultaneously until
response was made.
As expected with unconstrained viewing time, participants' performance was
almost flawless. However, the pattern of latencies for the different conditions is
revealing. In task 1 (whole-to-whole matching), there was an overall effect of
presentation (F(2,  18) = 18.13, p < .001). The normal presented faces were responded  to
faster than either the scrambled faces (F(1, 19) = 40.04, p < .001) or the inverted faces
(F(1, 19) = 13.54, p < .002). Separate analysis revealed that the normal presentation
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advantage was significant for both the "same" trials (F(2, 18) = 9.11, p < .002), and the
"different" trials (F(2, 18) = 23.79, p < .001)
Experiment 2B: Matching Face Parts to the Corresponding Part in Full Faces. The same
participants performed a simultaneous matching task, this time involving faces and
facial parts. Stimuli were the same whole faces and face parts (6 eyes and 6 mouths).
There were three blocks of trials corresponding to three presentation conditions:
upright inverted, and scrambled. Each participant was presented with each of 108
trials: 18 eye and 18 mouth trials for each presentation block. A trial consisted of a
fixation cross for 800 ms, followed by a simultaneous presentation of a whole face at
the top and two parts at the bottom of the screen. Participants indicated by a key
press which of the two parts (left or right) was present in the whole face.
Table 1.1 Mean response time (RT) in ms and percentage correct of normal subjects at
Simultaneous matching of upright scrambled, or inverted faces with whole faces (Experiment
2A) or with face parts (Experiment 2B).
upright scrambled inverted
whole-whole RT 1393 1623 * 1621 **
% Cor 97.8 96.9 85.6
whole-parts RT 1785 1782 1869
% Cor 98.3 98.1 96.7
Faster response to upright faces: *p< .002;  -p< .001.
Again, errors were too few to reveal any effects in accuracy. Latencies showed a main
effect of Eye-mouth (F(1, 19) = 16.15, p = .001) and an Eye-mouth x Presentation
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interaction (F(2, 38) = 4.8, p =.021), but no main effect of Orientation. Accordingly, the
difference in response times between normal and inverted, or normal and scrambled,
faces is not significant (see Table 1.1).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2A show that in this novel design with normal participants,
using a simultaneous matching task, performance with normal faces is clearly
superior to that with inverted or scrambled faces. Thus, both the face superiority and
the face inversion effect obtain with these materials and are found even with
unlimited viewing time. These results further show that with stimuli differing from
each other exclusively in the internal parts of the face, there was still an effect of face
configuration even if both the stimulus properties and the simultaneous matching
presentation could have induced visual search for the critical part. In that case the
difference between the upright condition would have disappeared and latencies
would have been the same for the three conditions. This is exactly what happened in
Experiment 2B, where the context effect is no longer observed.
The pattern of an advantage of matching normal whole faces over scrambled
faces in the whole-face matching task but not in the parts matching task is consistent
with the results of Davidoff and Donnelly (1990) and Farah et al. (1998). The former
authors found an object (faces and chairs) superiority effect for whole but not part
probes, unless the presentation times were very short. This is consistent with our
findings. Which indicate that in the parts matching task but not in the whole faces
matching task some kind of featural or parts-based analysis was used. The fact that an
attentional manipulation can overrule face superiority is consistent with the results of
an fMRI study on the effect of attention on the activation of the face area in the brain
(Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & Driver, 1998).
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Experiment 3. Inner Facial Features:
Face Superiority For Whole Face And Part To Whole Matching In Patient LH
LH was presented with the same two tasks as normals (see Experiment 2).
Experiment 3 asks whether his ability to focus on stimulus parts will reduce influence
of the face configuration observed in Experiment 1. If so, he would not show the face
Superiority effect of normal participants in Experiment 2A and he should be able to
overcome the effect of configuration and orientation if the task demands explicitly
require this (Experiment 2B).
Experiment 3A. Method and Results. Stimuli were the same faces, differing only in
internal features, as described in Experiment 2. Laser prints of the stimuli were used
for presentation with LH. In the first task, two whole faces were presented. A
stimulus pair was shown for as long as it took LH to give an answer (same or
different judgement). Instructions were explained by two examples of each condition.
Presentation was blocked with sets containing 18 normal, scrambled, or inverted
faces. There was a total of 12 blocks alternating, divided over two presentation
sessions with some weeks in between.
Performance with upright faces did not differ significantly from chance: 31/72
(43.1%). Performance improved in the scrambled face condition: 49/72, 68.1%, both
compared with upright presentation (%2= 8.14, p <.005)  and from chance  (%2 = 4.84, p <
.05). Performance on inverted faces was good: 62/72 (86.1%), much better than chance
performance (%2= 21.6, p < .001) and upright presentation performance (%2 = 27.32, p <
.001).
Experiment 3 B: Method and Results. In a separate testing session the same task as
Experiment 2B was presented. Performance with upright faces was at chance 18/48
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(37.5%). Performance in the scrambled condition 32/48 (66.7%) improved from
upright (%2= 7.06, p < .01), but was just slightly better than chance (%2= 2.74, p < .1)
Presenting the faces inverted strikingly improved performance (38/48, 79.1%),
differing both from chance performance (f = 8.92, p < .005) and from upright
performance (%2 = 15.46, p < .001) (see Table 1.2).
Table 1.2 Patient LH's percentage correct on simultaneous matching of upright, scrambled, or
inverted faces with whole faces (Experiment 3A) or with face parts (Experiment 3B).
upright scrambled inverted
whole-whole 43.1 68.1 ** 86.1 ***
whole-parts 37.5 66.7
* 79.1 ***
Scores are significantly improved in scrambled or inverted condition compared with upright
condition:  *p < .01; -p < .005 ; *** p <.001.
Discussion
Unlike normal participants, LH does not benefit from the normal upright
presentation to match faces faster than is done in either the scrambled or the inverted
condition. His pattern of results is thus opposite of the face superiority shown by
normals (Experiment 2A) and amounts to a face inferiority effect. In Experiment 3A,
performance with upright faces was at chance, a result that confirms that LH has lost
normal processing of faces and cannot rely on a compensation strategy of attending
to a specific face part. The comparison of upright and inverted faces shows that LH is
very good at matching inverted faces. This aspect of the results confirms that the
normal inversion effect is replaced by inversion superiority and replicates previous
observations (De Gelder, 1999; De Gelder et al., 1998; Farah et al., 1995) and
Experiment 1 of the present study.
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The results of Experiment 3 consolidate and extend the original finding in
significant ways. The present inversion superiority is obtained with face stimuli that
differ only in internal parts. Loss of face processing due to prosopagnosia is thus not
a consequence of a shift in the reliance on external vs. internal cues or reliance on
external cues at the detriment of internal ones. Such a pattern was observed with
normal older participants. These participants showed the same inversion superiority
as reported there but when tested with stimuli that only differed in internal face
parts, the normal pattern of better performance with upright than with inverted faces
reappeared. Loss of face skills as a consequence of normal aging is thus different from
its manifestation in prosopagnosia (De Gelder, Rossion, & Pourtois, 1998). Next, the
original face superiority result was not simply due to noncanonical orientation of the
stimuli. Disturbing the face context by scrambling the parts raised LH's performance
considerably and indicates that the presence of the critical face structure is what
triggers the interference on parts-based matching.
In Experiment 38 LH again performs very poorly when having to match a part of
a face to the corresponding part in a full upright face. For LH, unlike for normal
participants, the facial context continues to influence part recognition even though it
is noninformative in the task. Only when the face configuration is lost as a
consequence of scrambling or the canonical orientation is lost due to inversion is
structural encoding no longer triggered, and can LH make an efficient use of his skills
in matching parts.
This result is in line with the goals of a previous study using the face superiority
effect to ascertain residual intact face processing in prosopagnosics (Davidoff &
Donnelly, 1990), but the outcome with LH is different. The authors correctly note that
if prosopagnosia were a disorder specific only for recognition of familiar faces,
prosopagnosics would show a normal face superiority effect. Instead, their patient
KD does not show face superiority and thus proves their point that some
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prosopagnosics have problems with structural encoding and cannot achieve an
integrated representation of a face stimulus (compromising subsequent processes of
identity recognition). In contrast LH's inversion superiority and face inferiority is
evidence that his problems do not have their origin ill a difficulty with achieving an
integrated face representation. With respect to that issue, the present study shows
that having intact structural encoding of faces is not sufficient for subsequent
personal identity recognition and may actually constitute an obstacle for alternative
compensation strategies.
General Discussion
The influence of spared structural encoding of faces in a prosopagnosic patient is
examined using the inversion effect and the face context effect. Starting from the
inversion superiority previously reported, the study asked how the deficit in
individual face recognition is related to two perceptual abilities that are spared in this
patient but between which there is interference when both are applied to the face
stimulus: structural encoding of the face and parts-based matching procedures. Three
experiments studied this relationship with task demands and stimulus properties
designed to trigger the parts-based processes. In Experiment 1, human and animal
faces are presented upright or inverted, with good performance only for inverted
condition. In Experiment 2 normals show a clear face context effect (matching of
upright faces easier than matching scrambled or inverted ones) in the full face
matching task, whereas in the parts matching task the face superiority effect
disappears. In contrast LH shows a face inferiority effect when matching full faces
and when matching an isolated face part to a part in a full face context. The results
show that structural encoding of the face overrules parts-based procedures that could
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otherwise be helpful to tell individual faces apart. Our experiments show that even
when task demands and stimulus properties are designed to boost an alternative
routine this is overruled by spared structural encoding of the face. Paradoxically, the
degree of face impairment of prosopagnosic patients thus seems to predict the extend
to which compensation strategies can be successful. In the case of LH, spared
structural encoding does lead to worse performance by inhibiting parts-based
procedures. Our results stress the need to examine in detail the initial stages on which
subsequent personal identity recognition depends. This perceptual stage of structural
encoding may be impaired, as for example in the patients reported by Davidoff and
Landis (1990), or it may be intact as for LH.
The notion of spared structural encoding as the locus of inhibition was already
hinted at by McNeil and Warrington (1993) at the end of their study of WJ. This
patient is severely prosopagnosic and has not recovered any recognition of human
faces. Nevertheless, he is perfectly able to recognize the faces of his sheep and he can
tell apart different unfamiliar examples in a recognition memory task. The authors
note that apparently WJ does not seem able to use the strategies he employs with
sheep to compensate for his deficit with human faces. They go on making two
important suggestions. First WJ's deficit might consist of a disconnection between
the structural encoding stage and the face recognition nodes of the Bruce and Young
model. Second, they suggest that this deficit might "prevent the development of
alternative methods of perceptual encoding" (McNeil & Warrington, 1993, p.9). This
suggestion of an interference from intact processes is supported by the present
results.
In this study we have not looked at inversion superiority for objects. Our
previous results with both LH and AD provide evidence that inversion superiority
also obtains in these two patients for matching of objects. As we argued previously,
this implies that structural encoding is critical not only for faces but also for some
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object categories. Our finding of an inversion superiority for some nonface stimuli is
actually consistent with the recent report by Farah, Wilson, Drain, and Tanaka (1998).
These authors now propose what in fact amounts to a relative version of their original
claims about face specificity, whereby the inversion effect is relatively strongest for
faces and faces are processed relatively more holistically than other objects.
Our findings have implications for what the theories of face processing we
reviewed suggest to be the critical loss in prosopagnosia. The pattern of lost vs.
spared processing routines does not correspond to the conventional view that
whatever is face-specific is lost and whatever is object-specific is spared. Neither does
our study support the view that first-order abilities are spared and second-order ones
(in the sense of Carey and collaborators) lost. Moreover, it suggests that first- and
second-order information is not independent. On the other hand, Farah's notion of a
damaged face module (Farah et al., 1995) is not entirely satisfactory because it does
not provide room for sorting out what is lost and what could be spared for an
inhibitory role of spared structural encoding. Our results add to the evidence
provided by Moscovitch et al. (1997), showing that a sharp division between face-
specific or whole-based procedures and object-specific or parts-based procedures is
not entirely satisfactory. Our results with LH make a point similar to theirs in a
different way, by showing an influence of whole-based on parts-based routines which
results in an inhibition of the latter by the former.
Inversion superiority has only been reported in a couple of patients so far. Given
the number of case studies available and the widespread view that these patients can
still see faces as a separate visual category, this is surprising. A question for future
research is to understand why only some prosopagnosic patients seem to show this
phenomenon (De Gelder, Rouw, & Rossion, 1999). A critical factor may be the extent
of preserved face processing abilities in prosopagnosics. The two patients for whom
we have now reported inversion superiority do not suffer from the kind of agnosia
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that has been labeled integrative agnosia (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987), where the
patient manages the see parts of an object but fails to integrate them into a whole. Our
conjecture is that in such patients inversion superiority will not be observed.
However, it is worth noting that only a few studies of prosopagnosics have addressed
this issue with the use of experimental tasks that are more demanding than clinical
batteries. How strong is the evidence for intact face decisions in prosopagnosia and
what conclusions about spared skills does it warrant? In conventional screening of
face problems, a face recognition battery like the Warrington Face Recognition Test
(relying heavily on memory for faces) or the face test by Benton and Van Allen (1968)
or a face decision task are used (for instance, Schweich & Bruyer, 1993). If it is indeed
the case that prosopagnosics can make intact category assignments for faces, they
should perform at ceiling on a face decision task. But as shown in the last study, out
of nine prosopagnosic patients only three perform like controls, two were borderline,
and the remaining four failed to tell faces from nonfaces. The question can still be
raised as to what the performance of the three good participants tells about structural
encoding? Davidoff and Landis (1990) argued convincingly that evidence from
performance on the Benton test or on a face decision task is not sufficiently
convincing to establish intact structural encoding. Usually in a face decision task the
stimuli (normal, scrambled, incomplete faces) are presented under unconstrained
viewing conditions, which allows for maximal contribution from general problem-
solving strategies. Patients can combine intact spatial knowledge of the canonical face
format and apply general visual strategies based on features, as in object recognition.
It is thus entirely possible to arrive at a correct facial decision without encoding the
facial structure in the course of perception. From this vantage point, an important
question for future research is whether prosopagnosics can make face decisions based
on structural encoding in the course of perception, as contrasted with being able to
use it off-line in order to make explicit conscious decisions about stimulus category.
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Finally, more detailed information is needed about the specific loci of, on the one
hand, the patient's lesions and, on the other, areas involved in treating upright vs.
inverted faces and other objects in normal participants (Kanwisher, Tong, &
Nakayama, 1998). But we cannot exclude at present that inversion superiority for
faces in prosopagnosia results from a more complex combination of spared and lost
abilities.
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Paradoxical Configuration Effects for Faces
and Objects in Prosopagnosia2
Selective impairment in recognition offaces (prosopagnosia) has been advanced as an argument
for a brain module dedicated to face processing and focusing on the specific configural properties of
faces. Loss Of the inversion e#ect supposedly strengthened the argument (De Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, &
Degos, 1998; Farah, Wilson, Drain, 6' Tanaka, 19950. The present study Of prosopagnosic patient LH
reports that he has lost the normal pattern of superior performance with uprightfaces and objects and
shows instead paradoxical inversion effect for faces but also for objects. Experiment 2 investigated
whether LH's use of afeatures based routejor processing upright objects would be hindered by the
whole-based encoding when processing upright objects. Tile data show the same context e#ectfor
objects  as was  found  for  faces.  Therefore  the  inversion  effect  does  not  present  decisive  evidence for  the
existence ofaface module. Moreover, the importance Of confguration-based recognition known to be
crucial for face processing, must also be taken seriously for object recognition.
2 De Gelder, B., & Rouw, R. 2000. Paradoxical configuration effects for faces and objects in




Two contrasting views of the relation between disorders of visual object recognition
(visual object agnosia) and face recognition (either in the narrow or the wide sense of
prosopagnosia) are currently pursued with a variety of research methods. The search
for neuroanatomical substrates special to faces was the topic of animal studies using
single cell recording in the temporal cortex (Perrett, Rolls, & Caan, 1982; but see
Heywood & Cowey, 1992) and continues with recent fMRI and ERP studies (e.g. Ishai
& Sagi 1997; Jeffreys, 1996; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). At the core of the
debates in neuropsychology is the question whether prosopagnosia reflects the
existence of an autonomous processing system possibly based on a hard-wired face
module e.g. (Farah, Levinson, & Klein, 1995a; Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995c).
Support for the view that faces are unique perceptual stimuli has been provided by
studies of patients with brain damage that have established material specific
dissociations (for recent studies see Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Farah et al., 1995a; Grusser,
Kirchhoff, & Naumann, 1990; McNeil & Warrington, 1993). In the literature on normal
face processing arguments in favor of a specialized face processor are related to
special effects obtained in studies of face processing. These include the inversion
effect and the face context effect both explained by reference to the stimulus
configuration in the sense of the relation between the parts of a stimulus (Searcy &
Bartlett 1996; Davidoff, 1986; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes, Brake, & Atkinson,
1993) and special processing strategies like holistic encoding (Farah, Tanaka, & Drain,
1995b). An alternative view challenges the idea of a radical dissociation between a
processing route for faces and a separate one for other visual objects. Prosopagnosia
thus appears as an extreme manifestation of damage to the object recognition system.
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For example, prosopagnosia has been interpreted as a problem in discriminating
highly resembling items (Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982; Damasio, Tranel,
& Damasio, 1990; Mesulam, 1987), as when within-category discrimination is
required (see also Kosslyn, 1994). A similar prediction is that specific patterns of
performance (like the inversion effect or the context effect) found in studies of face
recognition also obtain in object perception given the right control stimuli and task
demands (De Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, & Degos, 1998).
The best known example of a characteristic pattern of performance linked to the
nature of the visual stimulus is the inversion effect (the relative loss of performance
with inverted as contrasted to upright faces). Yin (1969) showed that upside-down
presentation affected recognition performance for faces but much less so for other
mono-oriented stimuli such as houses. In a follow up study Yin (1970) asked whether
brain damage in areas thought to be critical for face recognition would have a
negative impact on the preferential treatment of upright faces. He observed that right
posterior brain damage eliminated the normal inversion effect. This finding fueled
the idea that the inversion effect presents a benchmark of normal face processing and
subsequently the inversion effect is absent after the loss of face recognition abilities in
adulthood.
Pursuing Yin's idea Farah and collaborators (Farah et al., 1995c) studied the
inversion effect in a prosopagnosic patient LH expecting that this effect would have
disappeared. They reached a very different conclusion since the patient was actually
better at matching upside-down faces. In an effort to explain this puzzling result the
authors argued that it is due to a continuing interference from an impaired but still
active face processor, and therefore constitutes conclusive evidence (an "existence
proof") for a face module. There are two major problems with this conclusion. The
first problem for such a strong modularist conclusion concerns the relation between
face and object processing, and the absence of an appropriate control task for fully
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intact object processing. The second is that this conclusion is too broad and leaves
entirely open what the pattern of spared and intact aspects of the face processor
might be.
As a matter of fact the study by Farah et al. reached somewhat strong
conclusions given that it did not use objects as control stimuli with an exemplar level
recognition task (Damasio et al., 1982; Damasio et al., 1990). It is well known that the
inversion effect though normally strongest with faces, has also been found with
objects. Inversion effects have been reported for visual materials like handwriting
(Bruyer & Crispeels, 1992), gundogs, but not landscapes or houses (Diamond &
Carey, 1986). A recent study by Donnelly and Davidoff (Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999)
used houses and scrambled houses and found clear evidence for the importance of
configuration in object recognition. The relevance of the appropriate comparison was
brought home by a recent study reporting that patient AD suffering from visual
object agnosia and prosopagnosia showed an inversion superiority effect not only for
faces but also for objects (De Gelder et al., 1998). The object category selected for the
comparison with faces in this study were shoes. Like faces, shoes have a similar shape
and are found in many exemplars. Shoes were also chosen because they had two
characteristics that allowed to maximize similarity between the object and face task.
Like faces, shoes have a canonical orientation, a relevant property for studying the
face inversion effect. Moreover, often in daily life visual search is aimed at recognition
at the exemplar level, as is the case in face recognition.
In this study our goal was to investigate patient LH who unlike patient AD was
known to be agnosic only for faces (Levine, Calvanio, & Wolf, 1980). Therefore we
expected to find a clear dissociation between his performance for face and object
stimuli equated otherwise for task and level of recognition. It is worth noting though
that a recent study of LH mentions without further detail that this patient does have
some problems in the domain of object and animal recognition (Etcoff, Freeman, &
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Cave, 1991). But since this patient is considered in the literature as a particularly good
case of prosopagnosia (Etcoff et al., 1991; Farah et al., 1995a; Farah et al., 1995c) our
prediction was that LH would show the paradoxical pattern of better performance
with upside down stimuli only for faces and not for objects. Such an outcome would
be in line with the strong assumptions about face modularity encountered in the
study by Farah et al. But if there is a similar impairment for faces and objects the
radical explanations of face modularity would not be supported. In contrast, such an
outcome would be consistent with theories that envisage a stage or a separable
dimension of visual processing related to the overall orientation and configuration of
both object and face stimuli. It might even be hypothesized that influence of
configuration needs to be studied in the light of external factors such as memory
involvement expertise, and similar exemplar recognition rather than stimulus class
(Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Mermelstein, Banks, & Prinzmetal,
1979).
The second problem with the idea of inhibition from an impaired face processor
is that the notion of a face processor seems too general and opaque to be helpful in
sorting out which aspects of face processing are lost and which ones are still intact
and thus for understanding which intact aspects if any inhibit which others. For
example, an explanation for inversion superiority envisaged by Farah and
collaborators is holistic processing or the notion that in face processing the face as a
whole is stored and that individual parts are not coded separately (Farah et al.,
1995b). The finding that the patient is unable to match upright faces and bases his
judgement on local similarities between face parts could be advanced in support of
the claim that faces are encoded holistically and that face parts are not represented in
any detail. A different explanation is that when presented with a face, intact
configural processing is still triggered and overrules or inhibits the patients' intact
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general (i.e. non face specific) processing routes, making it impossible for him to deal
with stimulus parts (Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997).
This brings us to the second issue. Studies of the inversion effect do not allow to
select the best of those two explanations of the face inversion effect because they only
provide insight into the role of face configuration in connection with canonical
orientation, and do not inform directly about the impact of configuration on the
ability to process parts of the face in isolation. This issue was the focus of a recent
study where the goal was to assess whether structural encoding of the face was still
intact in LH (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000). Those experiments centered on the face
context effect and tasks were selected because they encourage processing of the
separate face parts. The results showed that unlike normal viewers LH cannot attend
to the face parts even when the task explicitly requires it and that faces need to be
presented to him upside-down or scrambled before he manages to match parts. In
this study we investigate whether similar context effects as those found with faces can
be replicated and extended to objects. Since context effects have also repeatedly been
reported for objects the second question in the present study is whether the abnormal
context effect for faces will also be observed in a parts matching task for objects.
Experiment 2 focuses on that question.
Case presentation
Patient LH is a 46 year-old man who has been prosopagnosic since an automobile
accident 25 years earlier. Brain damage from the accident and subsequent surgery
consisted of bilateral occipito-temporal and right frontal and anterior temporal
lesions. (For additional neuropsychological information, see Etcoff et al., 1991; Farah
et al., 1995a; Farah et al., 1995c; Levine et al., 1980). Copying, drawing, reading and
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writing are normal. From these reports it appears that his recognition of real objects
and pictures is only mildly impaired. The authors mention that some informal testing
also included discrimination of common animals which is said to be impaired but no
data are provided (Etcoff et al., 1991). Testing of object recognition requiring only
category assignment (Farah et al., 1995a, Exp. 1) and within-category discrimination
using eyeglass frames (Farah et al., 1995a, Exp. 2) was normal. He is profoundly
prosopagnosic and unable to recognize friends, neighbors or even his wife and
children in the absence of other cues to identity besides the face.
Experiment 1. The Inversion Effect for Faces and Objects
The goal of this experiment was to investigate whether the superior performance with
upside down stimulus presentation which was previously reported in patient LH for
faces would also obtain when the patient was presented with a similarly designed
object matching task.
Materials and tasks
The material consisted of photographs of human faces and of shoes. These materials
were previously used in a study of normals tested with standard computer
presentation and short exposure times in order to provide a normal baseline
concerning the effects of inversion on recognition of these two materials (see De
Gelder et al., 1998, Exp. 1). The faces were those of eight young male adults, each
photographed once in frontal view and once in 3/4 orientation. For shoes, eight
exemplars were similarly photographed once in upper front view, i.e. with the tip of
the shoes pointing toward the camera, and once in 3/4 orientation. The photographs
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were taken with a Canon Still Video Camera RC-560 and stored on videodisc VF-50.
They were presented manually as 7x7 cm black and white laser prints.
The experiment used a 2AFC task. Three pictures of the same type (faces or shoes,
upright or inverted), one target and two probes, were presented simultaneously
(Experiment la) or sequentially (Experiment lb). The target picture was always a
front view one, and the positive probe was the 3/4 profile view of the same
person/shoes, while the negative probe represented a different person/pair of shoes.
Twenty combinations with shoes and 16 with the face stimuli were created. The target
picture was presented above the two probe pictures shown side by side below. The
patient was instructed to indicate the positive probe by verbal response. In
Experiment la the stimuli were shown in free vision. In Experiment lb the pictures
were shown for 3 s followed after a 2 s interval by the probe pictures. Testing was
always run in separate and equivalent blocks of trials, with the same number "same"
and "different" trials for the different type of material. Blocks alternated between faces
and shoe stimuli, and between upright and inverted presentation. The experiment
was preceded by eight practice trials (two of each stimulus type).
Results
LH's identification performance was significantly better with inverted stimuli than
with upright ones for faces as well as for shoes (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). That pattern
obtained with simultaneous matching (faces: (%2(1, 160) = 22.6, p < .001; shoes: (%2(1,
128) = 13.6, p < .001), as well as with delayed matching (faces: (%2(1, 160) = 31.3, p <
.001; shoes: (%2(1, 128) = 9.9, p < .002). It will be noted that for both materials,
identification of upright items was at chance level. The pattern shown by LH is thus
very different from the normal one. The performance of normals tested previously
showed a clear advantage for upright presentations of faces but not of objects when
the stimulus pairs were presented simultaneously but with limited (500 ms)
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presentation time (De Gelder et al., 1998). However, in another study (De Gelder &
Rouw, submitted) where we used simultaneous matching (with the same paradigm
and stimuli as presented here), normal participants showed a face inversion effect
(869 ms and 95% correct for upright vs. 973 ms and 94% correct for inverted
presentation). Moreover, in this same study normals also showed an inversion effect
with the shoes when these were presented for 2500 ms and 2500 ms delay (729 ms
and 94% upright vs. 773 ms and 94% for inverted).
Table 2.1 Number (percentage) correct responses on faces and shoes in simultaneous
presentation.
upright inverted
faces 36/80 (45%) 65/80 (81%)
shoes 31/64 (48%) 51/64 (80%)
Table 2.2 Number (percentage) correct responses on faces and shoes in delayed presentation.
upright inverted
faces 34/80 (43%) 68/80 (85%)




We presented LH with a matching task that was designed to allow a close
comparison between the existence of an inversion effect for faces and for objects. Our
result shows that prosopagnosic patient LH had a similar pattern of performance in
the two cases, performing at chance with canonical upright oriented stimuli but
displaying a very good performance when the stimuli were presented upside down.
The finding by Farah and collaborators of better performance on inverted faces in
prosopagnosic patient LH is now replicated with new materials. LH's performance
with upright faces is poorer than was observed by Farah et al. (1995c) probably
because the present task required rrlatching across a change in viewpoint which
makes the present paradoxical inversion effect even stronger.
The new finding is that LH's paradoxical inversion effect for faces previously
observed by Farah et al. (1995c) extends also to objects. Poor performance with
upright objects compared with previous results may be due to task demands as well
as to peripheral factors like stimulus difficulty but we do not believe the latter can
explain the result. Our stimuli were more difficult than those used previously to
examine LH's visual object abilities. Stimulus difficulty may exacerbate a mild visual
object agnosia that goes unnoticed with stimuli that are less taxing or that are less
similar to faces like eyeglass frames (Farah et al., 1995a). Also, our task was more
difficult because it was designed to target specifically object identity recognition at
the exemplar level, a task that had not been administered to LH previously but which
is the critical one for a comparison between performance of face and object
recognition. Neither of these factors can however explain the dramatic difference
between performance with upright and inverted stimulus presentation. Unlike the
within category discrimination task using eyeglasses, our task did not just require
detection of physical similarity, but matching across a difference in viewpoint (Farah
et al., 1995a). When this task was presented to normal participants it did yield an
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inversion effect for objects which was less strong but similar to that obtained with
faces (De Gelder & Rouw, submitted). For the present results with LH, the size of the
inversion effect is not important as both objects and faces showed the unexpected
effect of improved performance after inversion. In conclusion, the fact that LH can
reliably match inverted but not upright stimuli suggests that a parts-based processing
route is intact but that there is interference on its application to upright stimuli from a
processing route that targets the whole stimulus and focuses on the configuration.
Experiment 2 was run in order to obtain evidence for the impact of object
configuration on such parts-based processes.
Experiment 2. The Role Of Context In Parts-Based Matching Of Objects.
In a previous study (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000) we reported that LH's performance
was strongly under the impact of the overall configuration even when explicitly
instructed to judge whether a separately presented face part was the same as the
corresponding face part presented inside a face. Here we report the experiment where
the critical context for the parts matching task was a house. The house stimuli
consisted of complete houses and of house parts and the stimuli as well as the task
requirements were designed to be very similar to the face stimuli used in the face
context task.
Materials and Procedure
Stimuli were grayscale front view pictures of houses, which had been computer
edited. One prototypical stimulus was selected to be used as the outer contour in
which different house parts (front door, two windows) taken from the other pictures
were inserted. With these materials a total of eight different house and house part
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stimuli were created (eight front doors and eight upper windows). Each full house
stimulus was paired with two part probes (its own and a different one), both for the
door and for the window, making a total of 16 trials. This procedure for stimulus
construction was identical to the one used for construction of the face stimulus
presented to LH in a study reported elsewhere (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000). Stimuli
were presented once upright and once upside down. Trials were blocked by
orientation. Each condition was presented twice resulting in a total of 64 trials. Half of
the trials of each block were presented followed by half of the trials of the other block
so that condition order was balanced. The Experiment was first run using
simultaneous presentation of the whole houses and the part probes (Experiment 2a).
The patient was instructed to respond as accurately and as fast as possible but was
given unlimited viewing time. Some months later the experiment was repeated with
delayed presentation (Experiment 2b). The complete stimuli were shown first for 2500
ms followed by a 2500 ms interval after which the two probes were shown for as long
as the patient needed to give his response.
Results and Discussion
The results of the simultaneous matching task show that LH is sensitive to the
canonical orientation of the stimulus since matching of the stimulus part is easier
when the stimulus is presented upside down than when it is upright (%2(1, 128) = 17.8,
p < .001). Likewise, the data of the delayed matching indicate that it is much easier for
LH to match a house part to the full stimulus kept in memory with an upside down
rather than a normally oriented house (%2(1, 128) = 31.0, p < .001). In other words, the
performance of patient LH in both tasks shows a context inferiority effect (see Table
2.3).
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Table 2.3 Number (percentage) correct responses on houses in simultaneous and delayed
presentation.
upright inverted
simultaneous 44/64 (69%) 62/64 (97%)
delayed 30/64 (47%) 59/64 (92%)
It is instructive to compare these results with data obtained with a group of normal
controls. Normal viewers were neither sensitive to orientation in the simultaneous
(1138 ms and 98% correct for upright vs. 1163 ms and 98% for inverted) nor in the
delayed (1081 ms and 84% correct for upright vs. 1070 ms and 84% correct for
inverted) matching task (De Gelder & Rouw, submitted, Exp. 4). The difference
between the pattern of normals and that of patient LH suggests again an exacerbated
sensitivity to the whole stimulus context in the canonical orientation just as was
found in Experiment 1. Moreover, unlike normal participants LH  can not overcome
the impact of the whole configuration. We return to this issue below.
We can also compare LH's results with data from another patient RP suffering
from prosopagnosia as a consequence of a very similar brain trauma (De Gelder &
Rouw, submitted). Patient RP also performed better with upside down than with
normally oriented houses albeit only in the delayed presentation condition. Finally
and most importantly, we can compare LH's results on the present object task with
previously obtained results on a very similar parts matching task using faces (De
Gelder & Rouw, 2000). The superior performance with objects presented upside
down mirrors the results obtained when LH was presented with a parts-based
matching task using faces. Taken together these data thus indicate that a whole
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stimulus context is detrimental for the prosopagnosic patients' matching
performances for objects just as was the case for face stimuli.
General Discussion
The goal of this study was to investigate to what extend the deviant patterns of
performance observed previously in a face inversion and a face context task would
now also be found in very similar object matching tasks. The results of Experiment 1
show that loss of the inversion effect and its replacement by superior performance
with upside down presented stimuli was replicated for faces and was now also found
for objects. In the same vein, Experiment 2 shows that the presence of a full stimulus
interferes with recognition of one of its parts and that this context inferiority effect
obtains as well for houses. Thus, these data replicate the previous reported "inverted
face inversion effect" and significantly extends the findings by revealing mandatory
configural processing with objects.
The first thing to note is that the result obtained with faces in Experiment 1
replicated the report of LH (Farah et al., 19950, of AD (De Gelder et al., 1998) and of
RP (De Gelder & Rouw, submitted). The fact that at least in some acquired
prosopagnosia patients the deficit manifests itself in such a dramatic reversal of the
normal pattern underscores the importance of the normal face configuration and thus
of the face inversion task as a benchmark for intact face recognition in patients in
whom face expertise was present before their brain injury. Interestingly, our study of
a developmental prosopagnosic patient revealed that his recognition performance
was insensitive to face orientation (Patient AV, De Gelder & Rouw, submitted). In this
context it is also worth noting that brain damage can lead to contrasts between
canonical and non-canonical stimulus presentation that are quite a bit stronger than
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those observed in normal viewers or than what is revealed by brain imaging studies
of normal viewers. For example, Jeffreys (1996) recorded ERPs from the scalp and
observed a similar pattern for upright and inverted faces (but see Rossion et al., 1999).
Kanwisher et al. (1997) reported that the brain area activated with presentation of
upright faces responded almost as well with inverted faces. However, these brain
imaging studies did not use a task that required full identity recognition as in
Experiment 1 here.
The second, more challenging aspect of our data concerns the extension of the
paradoxical inversion previously found for faces, to objects. It should be clear that
this novel finding undermines the conclusions drawn by Farah et al. about face
modularity. Our data might prompt an anti-modularist position, at least to the extent
that their argument for a face module was based on the inversion effect. But put in a
broader context, a paradoxical inversion effect for objects is not all that more
unexpected than one for faces. It should not come as a surprise that other visual
objects besides faces can also induce a configural processing style. Indeed,
configuration seems to play an important role in object recognition as well and a
normal inversion effect was obtained with the present object stimuli in some testing
conditions (De Gelder & Rouw, submitted). If processing of the whole stimulus is also
important for object recognition, a dominance of the configuration over feature-based
recognition can also occur in some cases of brain damage like LH. Moreover, it is
important to emphasize that studies of patients with brain damage can reveal aspects
of performance that are not manifest in the behavior of normal participants unless
parametrical studies and/or psychophysical testing would be run, which is rarely the
case. As we noted previously (De Gelder et al., 1998) patients with a visual deficit
may show an exacerbated version of a processing pattern that exists in normal
participants but only shows up in extreme testing conditions (for example, very short
exposure durations). In any event, the finding of paradoxical inversion effect for
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objects challenges the strong conclusions drawn from the paradoxical inversion
findings for faces. The existence of a hard-wired processor which is part of the strong
modularity notion of face specificity is difficult to apply to the case of shoes and
houses. In contrast, we would like to explain our data by pointing to the similarity in
processing operations between objects and faces (as suggested by many studies
showing that the inversion and the context effect are to some extent found with the
two stimulus categories). We cannot in the context of this single case report develop
further a general theory of object recognition nor even raise the major themes of the
extensive literature in this field. It should be clear though from the methodology we
adopted that it is our belief that face and object recognition raise very similar
problems. Our data substantiate a consistent theme in prosopagnosia research which
is that loss of face recognition goes hand in hand with a subtle loss of object
recognition ability (Damasio et al., 1982). Our conclusion that patient LH appears
equally impaired on an object and face inversion task is based on two experiments in
which object and face stimuli and tasks were equated. Our conclusions should not be
overstated though. In our task exemplar level recognition was required for faces as
well as for objects and the patient was impaired in dealing with both stimulus
categories. One might thus want to conclude from this result that at the level of
exemplar recognition this prosopagnosic patient does not show a category specific
impairment and that therefore face and object recognition can not be pulled apart. It
is unlikely that with the negative evidence for face specificity obtained in exemplar
matching the last frontier in the battle against face modularity has been won.
Ultimately the specificity of faces might have a different origin than the one that is
captured by higher order cognitive abilities of the kind at stake in exemplar level
recognition.
Another important issue is the convergence between the patient's anomalous
results on the inversion task and those on the object context task. Both results point to
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the importance of canonical orientation. But the context effect provides more specific
information as it specifies that the patient processes the whole stimulus rather than
just encoding on a feature basis. This finding offers an interesting contrast and
complement with the study by Davidoff and Landis (1990). Their prosopagnosic
patients had lost configural processing for faces but they had also lost that for objects.
In other words, the patients studied by Davidoff and Landis could only attend to
features and as a consequence one would not expect them to show either inversion or
context effects. In line with previous neuropsychological studies (McNeil &
Warrington, 1993) we have suggested a close link between configuration-based
processing and intact structural encoding of the stimulus. In other words, those
aspects of the object or face recognition process that are responsible for coding the
overall configuration and making the link with stored object representations appear
to be intact in these patients. One explanation of this similarity could be that face and
object processing systems share processing resources at least up to the stage of
encoding orientation and overall configuration. Separate routes for the two stimulus
classes would only be required to explain recognition of personal identity in the case
of faces. This explanation is consistent with the notion that matching of unfamiliar
faces and familiar face recognition are separable abilities (Ellis, Shepherd, & Davies,
1979). But given the results of Experiment 1 which did focus on matching of the
specific instances of unfamiliar faces the common processing resources would also
have to include mechanisms for coding token identity similarly for faces and objects.
The present results challenges a taxonomy of visual perception abilities based on
a contrast between whole-based and parts-based processing routes that correspond
respectively to faces and objects (Biederman & Kalocsai, 1997; Farah, 1991) and that
loss of the face specific system results in loss of configural processing but leaves intact
the feature-based route (Levine & Calvanio, 1989). This idea of two processing routes
was exemplified again recently in a study of patient CK suffering from visual object
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agnosia without prosopagnosia (Moscovitch et al., 199D. This study investigated a
situation that is the mirror image of the present one and asked whether it was indeed
the case that impaired object recognition was not reflected in at least some aspects of
face recognition. As an explanation for the important finding that CK has great
difficulty telling apart inverted faces, the authors argue that the latter is due to the
impairment of feature-based processing route proper to object recognition. But now
our result suggests that configuration plays a role in object recognition just as well.
This challenges the accepted view, whereby the face system is identified with
configuration-based processes and the object recognition system with feature-based
processes. Moreover, it does not seem to be the case, as is implied by the accepted
view, that loss of the special face recognition system leaves intact an autonomous
system for feature-based recognition (Moscovitch et al., 1997) which would then kick
in when the whole-based operations tailored for face processing are impaired or, vice
versa a whole-based system which would come to the rescue of a feature-based object
recognition system when this is impaired.
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Configural Face Processes in Acquired and
Developmental Prosopagnosia: Evidence for
Two Separate Face Systems?3
Configural face processes were  tested using face recognition and face detection tasks in a
comparison of acquired and developmental prosopagnosia. In the recognition task the two patients
show a very d(/ferent pattern. The developmental patient does not show an inversion effect while the
acquired prosopagnosia patient is better at matching inverted than normal stimuli. Moreover. there is
no effect of face context on matching features in the developmental case while the acquired
prosopagnosia patient  shows  a  strong  negative  effect  of context.  However,  in  a  speeded  face  detection
task both patients are similarly unimpaired. The results are consistent with the existence of two
separate face  systems, one involved  in face  detection and  the other  in face recognition.
3 De Gelder, B., & Rouw, R. 2000. Configural face processes in acquired and developmental




Recent brain imaging studies have provided evidence for a dedicated brain area for
faces but have not yet clarified its functional significance. It is unclear whether this
area is involved simply in detection of the presence of a face-like pattern, in
recognition of an individual face or in both. It is equally unclear whether configural
processing, which is the hallmark of face operations is hardwired and modular or
shaped by experience. Studies of prosopagnosic patients are crucial for drawing
attention to separate components of the face mechanism that may have a different
functional and neuro-anatomical basis but are difficult to pull apart in normal adults.
Best known are cases of prosopagnosia acquired in adulthood (AP). Of particular
importance, though little studied, are cases of congenital or developmental
prosopagnosia (DP), a face specific deficit following from anomalous brain
development. Cases of DP offer a window into the face system before it is fully
established (Ariel & Sadeh, 1996; Bentin, Delouell, & Soroker, 1999; Campbell,
Pascalis, Coleman, Wallace, & Benson, 1997; Duchaine, 2000; Temple, 1992; Young &
Ellis, 1989). Our study presents the first systematic comparison of a case of AP and
one of DP and it focuses on the critical ability of configural face perception.
The phenomenon which is best known for studying the face configuration is the
inversion effect (Yin, 1969), traditionally defined as the fact that normal adults are
better at matching upright than inverted faces (hereafter the 'face inversion inferiority
effect'). The standard explanation is that individual face recognition relies on
configural operations of a canonically oriented face and these operations become
ineffective when faces are presented upside down. AP patients who can no longer
recognize individual faces are expected to loose the inversion inferiority effect;
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however, recent data showed that the face recognition deficit of AP is not
exhaustively defined by loss of configural face processing. Some AP present the
opposite pattern and perform better with inverted than with upright faces (Farah,
Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995). Instead of the inversion inferiority effect of normal
viewers, they show an 'inversion superiority effect' (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a). Since
inversion superiority indicates the presence of configural face recognition its
persistence after loss of face recognition presents a problem for theories which
assume that face recognition and configural processes are closely linked. Instead, the
inversion superiority effect provides evidence that in AP a profound recognition
deficit coexists with preserved processing of the face as a configuration, therefore the
link is a counterproductive one. To understand this situation we turned to DP.
In a typical DP patient face recognition processes and the configural operations
normally associated with it do not develop. Thus one prediction is that such patients
will show neither normal nor paradoxical configuration effects. Another aspect of the
face mechanism less studied than recognition, at least in normal adults, concerns the
early operations of detection of a face-like stimulus. Newborn babies attend
selectively to face-like patterns, a preference that is likely to be based on crude and
possibly sub-cortical mechanisms since temporal-occipital areas involved in object
and face recognition are not yet sufficiently developed at birth and are presumably
established under the influence of exposure to faces (Johnson & Morton, 1991;
Valenza, Simion, Cassia, & Umilith, 1996). Johnson and Morton (Johnson & Morton,
1991) argued for two separate systems, one involved in same species recognition (the
'Conspec' system) and the other dedicated to individual recognition (the 'Conlearn'
system).
This two-systems view has not yet been applied to integrate the findings on
neonatal face preferences with adult face recognition skills and with the pattern of
deficits in AP and DP. Making this connection allows us to formulate some
83
Chapter 3
predictions on configural face operations involved in learned face recognition and in
simple face detection. If a detection system is the first stage of the face mechanism,
the same configural operations (or their deficits) should be similarly present in
detection and recognition tasks. However, the results presented in this paper can best
be explained by taking a different route and assuming two separate face systems and
two different notions of configuration. We shall argue that the contrast between the
AP and DP case in recognition performance is consistent with the role of experience
for configuration implicated in recognition but that the similarity between the two
cases argues for a different notion of configuration at stake in face detection.
Case Presentations
Patient RP is a 49-year-old man who suffered a closed head injury at 6 years old and
has not regained the ability to recognize faces since his accident. VA is a 42-year-old
man without any history of neurological disorders. As is to be expected in cases of DP
(see Ariel & Sadeh, 1996; Campbell et al., 1997; Duchaine, 2000; Temple, 1992; Young
& Ellis, 1989) and in AP caused by closed head injury (see for example CK;
Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997), an MRI scan did not yield evidence of
brain damage. An MRI scan of AV did not provide any indication of a lesion (for RP
see De Gelder & Kanwisher, 1999; and for AV see De Gelder, Rossion, De Volder,
Bodart, & Crommelinck, 1999). The two patients have an unproblematic educational
history and professional career. Intellectual abilities are well above average. They
have no visual deficits but are severely impaired in face recognition without any
clinical indication of object recognition difficulties. Both patients were examined with
clinical face and object recognition tests (see Table 3.1). Familiar face recognition was
studied with photographs, caricatures and cartoons and was severely impaired.
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Neither AV nor RP could recognize faces from caricatures (for example, Fidel Castro
from his beard). Both patients also failed to recognize well-known (Moscovitch et al.,
1997) cartoon characters (for AV 14/25 and for RP 2/15) but sometimes correctly
identified the animal on which the cartoon figure was based (for example, pig head
for Miss Piggy).
The clinical test data were complemented with more thorough information of the
patients' categorization skills obtained in a preliminary experiment. Depending on
the condition, participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible to the
presence of a face, a shoe or a house. Distractors consisted of faces, shoes, houses and
also cars. Participants were asked to press the rightmost key on the response box to
indicate presence of the target category and the leftmost key for any other stimulus.
As can be seen in Table 3.1, patients performed similarly to controls. Their




Table 3.1 Performance of patient RP and AV on standardized visual processing tasks.
RP AV
Low level visual processes
Benton Visual Form discrimination normal normal
Benton line orientation normal normal
Birmingham Object Recognition Battery normal normal
line lenght (test 2 normal normal
size (test 3) normal normal
orientation (test 4) normal normal
gap (test 5) normal normal
overlapping shapes (test 6) normal normal
minimal feature match (test 7) normal normal
foreshortened views (test 8) normal normal
object decision (test 10) normal normal
Object recognition
Boston Naming test 56/60 57/60




Benton 31/54 * 34/54
Categorization norrnals RP AV
Face 36/36 (429 ms) 17/18 (764 ms) 35/36 (579 ms)
Shoe 35/36 (459 ms) 16/18 (970 ms) 31/36 (581 ms)
House 35/36 (449 ms) 18/18 (759 ms) 36/36 (544 ms)
*severely impaired.
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Experiment 1: The Inversion Inferiority Effect
The face inversion inferiority effect is already observed at around 6 years of age,
although configural face processes continue to develop, as manifest by an inversion
inferiority effect that is stronger in older children (Carey & Diamond, 1994).
Therefore, if brain damage occurs at an age when the inversion inferiority effect is
already present as is the case in patient RP, there could be residual configural
processes and this would lead to a paradoxical configuration effect (as was previously
found for adult DP patients AD and LH). In contrast patient AV was never able to
recognize individual faces. Besides AV and RP, a group of 24 students (half of them
male) served as control participants and received credit for their participation.
Materials and Procedure
Stimuli consisted of photographs of 16 faces (half male) and 16 shoes. Viewing
distance was approximately 50 cm, so that the stimuli subtended between 7 and 8
degrees of visual angle for length and width. A stimulus consisted of three pictures (a
frontal view combined with two 3/4 pictures), one of the same and the other of a
different face or object. These triads were presented with either all pictures upright or
all inverted. Trials were blocked by stimulus class and orientation. The experiment
was repeated with reversed block order, making a total of 128 trials per experiment.
Participants were instructed to choose as fast as possible whether the left or right
face/shoe was the same as the one at the top by pressing the corresponding key. In the
simultaneous condition stimuli remained on the screen till key press. In the delayed
condition the target frontal picture was presented for 2500 ms and the two probes
were shown after a 2500 ms delay. RP was tested with the manual version of the task




Controls showed the expected pattern of better performance with upright than
inverted faces, both in accuracy (F(1, 23) = 17.81, p < .001) and in latency (F(1, 23) =
13.77, p <.001). They also show increased latencies with inverted compared with
upright shoes (F(1, 23) = 7.96, p < .01). For the delayed condition the face inversion
effects were equally significant in accuracy (F(1, 15) = 66.19, p < .001) and latency (F(1,
15) = 21.6, p < .001). Latencies were also shorter with upright than with inverted shoes
(F(1, 15) = 7.15, p < .018).
In the simultaneous matching condition patient RP was better at matching
inverted than upright condition as shown by faster (t (44) = 9.13, p < .001) and better
performance (%2(1) = 11.13, p < .001) with the inverted faces, as well as faster
performance with inverted shoes (t (60) = 2.82, p <.006). In the delayed condition RP
showed impaired face matching performance, with both slow responses and
considerable errors. There is an inversion superiority effect with the faces, both in
latency (t(44) = 7.53, p < .001), and in accuracy (%2(1) < 4.95, p =.039). RP was faster also
for matching inverted than upright shoes (t(54) = 5.88, p < .001).
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Table 3.2 Percentage correct and mean response time (RT) in ms in matching faces and shoes.
simultaneous delay
% Cor RT % Cor RT
AV face upright                   91         3563               81         1651
inverted                          88             3897                      70             1835
shoe upright                   97         2013               95         1217
inverted 100 1856           91      1172
RP face upright                   63 6661
*** 59 * 4425 ***
inverted                   91 *** 3847           84      3133
shoe upright                   97 2538 ***                88 2737
***
inverted                          97             2152                      88             2083
controls face upright                    96
*** 1363 ***             94 *** 834 ***
inverted                          92             1920                      81               959
shoe upright                    95           869 **             94           729 *
inverted                       94             973                    94             773
*p<.05; -p<.005; *** p < .001.
In contrast patient AV showed no inversion effect in simultaneous matching (Table
3.2). In the delayed condition he showed the same low accuracy as RP, but with
considerably faster responses and he shows no significant effect of orientation. AV




Control participants show the expected inversion effect both in accuracy and latency
even ina simultaneous matching task. The inversion effect for objects is consistent
with evidence for the role of canonical orientation on object recognition (Tarr &
Pinker, 1989; Jolicoeur, 1985) and with data showing the importance of configural
information in object recognition (Sanocki, 1993; Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999).
Patient RP displayed a better performance with inverted faces replicating
previous inversion superiority results obtained with LH (Farah et al., 1995; De Gelder
& Rouw, 2000a) and AD (De Gelder et al., 1998). In contrast patient AV showed
neither an inversion inferiority nor a context superiority effect. As noted previously
(De Gelder et al., 1998), the fact that the paradoxical inversion effect generalizes to
objects refutes the argument originally put forward by Farah et al. because it shows
that paradoxical inversion performance is not a sufficient basis for claiming face
specificity. However, it should be stressed that this debate concerns face
configuration as involved in recognition.
Experiment 2: The Role of Context in Part Recognition
1he results obtained with the paradigm of inversion superiority indicated whether or
not the upright face is still processed as a configuration but they could only provide
indirect evidence about the processing of parts. A paradigm suited for studying the
use of parts is that of the 'face context superiority effect', which is defined as the fact
that presentation of a face part in the context of a normal upright face facilitates
recognition of that face part (Homa, Haver, & Schwartz, 1976). We predicted that RP
would either not show this effect or that he might show the opposite pattern, a face
inferiority effect. This would mean that he would be inhibited by the normal face
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context but not by the context of an inverted face. Since in Experiment 1 AV showed
neither an inversion inferiority nor an inversion superiority effect we predicted that
here also he would not be sensitive to the configuration of the whole stimulus when
matching one of its parts.
Materials and Procedure
A total of 32 frontal view grayscale pictures of faces and houses were used. Part
stimuli consisted of either a pair of eyes or a mouth, or the door or upper window. A
trial consisted of a whole stimulus (one of 16 face images and eight house images)
combined with a set of two part stimuli, taken from the target image and from a
distractor. Participants were instructed to press either one of two buttons
corresponding to the left or right part probes. Stimuli were presented upright and
inverted, resulting in a total of 64 trials per experiment. Trials were blocked by
stimulus class and orientation. Half of the trials of each block was presented first
with reversed block order in the second half of the experiment. There were two
conditions (simultaneous and delayed matching) and duration of stimulus
presentation was identical to that in Experiment 1.
Results
Control participants recognized, in the simultaneous condition, face parts but not
house parts faster when presented upright than inverted (F(1, 23) = 8.12, p < .01). In
the delayed condition controls showed no effect. Patient RP was significantly faster
with inverted faces (for simultaneous matching t(59) = 4.10, p < 001; for delayed
matching t(41) = 13.14, p <.001). In delayed condition he was also slower with upright
than inverted houses (t(40) = 5.81, p < .001). AV did not show an effect of orientation
in either condition and responded equally accurately with in delayed presentation a
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trend for shorter latency to upright than to inverted faces (t(93) = 1.92, p < .06; Table
3.3). There was no difference between upright and inverted houses for AV.
Table 3.3 Percentage correct and mean response time (RT) in ms in matching faces and
houses.
simultaneous delay
% Cor RT % Cor RT
AV face upright                   75         3350              75         1680
inverted                       91            3372                   73            1875
house upright 100 2119          91       1424
inverted                     97          2330                 83           1445
RP face upright                   94 4347 ***        63 4189 ***
inverted                       97           3738                   72            2184
house upright     97  1522    59 3553 ***
inverted                       97           1618                   72            2404
controls face upright                   98         1773 *            81          1275
inverted                       97            1955                   81             1241
house upright     98  1138    84  1081
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Discussion
As predicted, normal participants showed face context superiority, indicating that the
presence of the face context facilitates parts recognition, at least in the simultaneous
task. In the delayed task participants can overcome the context effect and successfully
focus on the relevant face part. Patient AV is insensitive to the face context one way
or the other and performs at the same level in the two conditions. On the other hand,
RP shows the opposite of normal controls and is inhibited by the normal face context.
We thus find a difference between the DP and AP cases that is similar to that of the
previous experiment. The data of RP again underscore that there are residual
configural operations in the absence of recognition. The results also add a new
element by showing clearly that parts-based strategies do not automatically
compensate for the loss of face recognition contrary to what is often assumed
(Moscovitch et al., 1997). Consistent with the data from the previous experiment AV
only has parts-based strategies available and applies these indistinctly to upright and
inverted faces.
Our next question is whether RP's paradoxical recognition performance would
extend to a task which no longer requires face recognition but only speeded detection
of the presence of a face. Likewise, does AV's insensitivity to the face configuration so
far shown in recognition tasks also extend to face detection?
Experiment 3: Face Detection
Face and non-face stimuli were presented either under very short exposure
conditions followed by a mask or with unlimited viewing time. Both patients and a




A prototype face served as a frame into which one of a set of six pairs of eyes and one
of six mouths were put making for six different faces or scrambled faces. At a
viewing distance of 50 cm the stimuli extended approximately 7 x 9 degrees of visual
angle. Faces and scrambled faces were presented in random order. Stimuli appeared
randomly at one of 12 possible locations. In the unlimited time condition a trial
started with a warning signal, and after 500 ms the stimulus was presented until
response. In a second and third condition the same stimuli were presented once for
200 ms and once for 50 ms, immediately followed by a mask. Twenty-four trials were
presented in each condition. Order effects were avoided by running a repeated
presentation of each experiment in reversed order. RT was measured from stimulus
onset.
Results and Discussion
As expected controls performed very well in all conditions (Table 3.4), and there was
no main effect or interaction effect of condition. AV performed at ceiling with
unlimited viewing time and was still very good at 200 rns. His RTs were also within
normal range. Since 200 ms is not enough to search for separate features and their
location, AV's good and fast performance on these conditions indicates that in this
decision task, in contrast with the recognition task, he uses the face configuration. At
50 ms presentation, AV's performance dropped but was still far above chance. RP
showed good performance with 200 ms and even with 50 ms presentation time, but in
the unlimited time condition latencies sharply increased for RP and accuracy
decreased. On inspection it appears that this very poor performance is specific for the
normal face condition.
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Table 3.4 Percentage correct and mean response time (RT) in ms in face detection.
unlimited 200 ms 50 ms
% Cor RT % Cor RT % Cor RT
AV norrnalface          92 809 100 616         92   576
scrambled face 100 795         96   689         46   839
RP normal face                 42 9305 100 1728 100 1280
scrambled face 100 1911          92  1603         75  1212
controls norrnalface          88    573         91   551          92   505
scrambled face           98      556              95     520              92     574
The finding that both patients show overall good performance on the speeded
detection task indicates responses coming from a configural face system (Purcell &
Stewart 1988). In contrast, RP showed longer latencies and decreased accuracy with
unlimited presentation and unmasked faces suggesting that with long exposure times
his impaired face recognition system is activated. This interpretation is consistent
with the results of Experiment 1 and 2 where RP showed an interference of normal
configuration whereas AV did not.
General Discussion
We studied configural face operations in a DP and an AP case with face recognition
and face detection tasks. In the recognition tasks the DP showed neither an inversion
superiority nor an inferiority effect. Neither did he show facilitation or an inhibition
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from the face context when matching face parts. But the AP case showed a strong
influence of residual configuration both as an inversion superiority effect and as a
context inferiority effect. In contrast, both patients show evidence of normal use of
configuration in the face detection task except that with unlimited exposure duration
RP can no longer perform the task.
Our data are consistent with a two systems model of the face mechanism based
on the distinction between a hardwired detection system ('Conspecifics') and a
learned recognition system ('Conlearn') along the lines of the developmental model of
Johnson and Morton (Johnson & Morton, 1991). We would like to argue that a two
systems model is not only useful for studying the development of the face mechanism
but can also account for patterns of breakdown. Once the recognition system is in
place, it is difficult in normal adults to pull the two systems apart. But the primitive
detection system may still be present in prosopagnosia, whether AP or DP, and be
activated normally even if the recognition system is impaired (as in RP) or absent (as
in AV). This hypothesis of separate systems is different from an explanation based on
the notion of a breakdown of configural processes within one and the same face
system (Farah et al., 1995).
In our view a single notion of configuration corresponding to a single system
responsible both for detection and recognition cannot account for the present data,
since AV shows a configuration effect in detection but not in recognition. Likewise,
RP has normal face detection but a negative effect of configuration in recognition.
Moreover, the two systems approach provides possible explanations for the
paradoxical inversion superiority and context inferiority effects observed in
recognition tasks with AP patients (see also De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a; De Gelder &
Rouw, 200Ob) but not with the DP patient. Since these two effects were found in
recognition tasks they indicate that face learning is important for configural processes
in recognition but not in detection. A further possibility is that those paradoxical
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effects ill recognition result from the interaction between configural processes of
intact face detection with impaired face recognition. On this picture the intact
configuration sensitive operations at the basis of face detection activate face
recognition system (if present), and thereby prevent that the face stimulus is analyzed
by alternative feature-based operations.
Studies of the neuro-anatomical basis of face processes are not incompatible with
the notion of two separate face systems. Cells responding to the presence of a face
have been found in other brain areas besides the fusiform gyrus (Purcell & Stewart
1988) and may implement a much more crude and experience-independent
mechanism responding to the presence of a face outline. On the other hand recent
evidence indicates that the area in the fusiform gyrus activated to face recognition is
very close to areas found for recognition of a variety of control objects. Thus the
detection system may be more face-specific then the recognition system.
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Impaired Face Recognition does not
Preclude Intact Whole Face Perception4
We studied intact and impaired processes in a prosopagnosic patient (RP). In Experiment 1, RP
showed an inversion superiority €#ect with bothfaces and objects, with better performance when
stintuti were presented upside down than in normal upright orientation. In Experiment 2, we studied
the effect of face configuration directly by comparing matching performance with normal us. scrambled
faces. RP was worse with normal than with scrambled faces, whereas normal controls showed an
advantage of a good face context. In Experiment 3,  RP showed interference from external face features
on the evaluation of internal face features. These results indicate that while RP is impaired in face
recognition and.face matching, he does still encode the whole.face rather than relving completely on
parts-based procedures. Secondly, RP has a deficit at the level of the configural processes involved in
finding subtle differences between individual faces, as his performance is worse ·when presented with a
normalface configuration than with scrambled or inverted»es.
4 Accepted for publication: Rouw, R., & De Gelder, B. Impaired face recognition does not




Prosopagnosia is a rare disorder in which a patient is selectively impaired in
recognizing familiar faces. Prosopagnosic patients have not lost the ability to
recognize a person per se: they are still able to recognize a person by voice or a
particular piece of clothing. This impairment in face recognition can extend to a
problem with unfamiliar face matching as well. The specificity of the face impairment
(Bodamer, 194D has raised the intriguing question of what is "special" about
recognizing faces.
One explanation of prosopagnosia is based on the notion that face recognition
depends strongly on certain face specific processes, which function differently and
independently from other visual recognition processes. By definition, a deficit of
these processes then impairs the recognition of faces much more than the recognition
of other (object) stimuli. One such proposal garah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998;
Biederman & Kalocksai, 1997) hypothesizes that faces are represented in a relatively
holistic manner (representations have little part representation), while object
recognition is more parts-based (parts are explicitly represented). In this view,
impaired face recognition reflects impaired "holistic" representations, while objects
can still be recognized by alternative (parts-based) processes.
An older proposal states that prosopagnosia is caused by a general loss of
"configural processing" (Levine & Calvanio, 1989). The ability to recognize individual
features is contrasted with an inability to get an overview of sufficient features of a
stimulus to allow the structuring of a coherent percept which is specifically reflected
in impaired face processing.
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A different explanation of prosopagnosia is based on the assumption that the
processes involved in face recognition depend on particular stimulus properties
rather than on stimulus class. Thus, faces are only special in their particular
combination of stimulus properties. Damasio, Damasio, and Van Hoesen (1982)
advanced what Moscovitch, Winocur, and Behrmann (1997) called the "individuation
hypothesis". According to this hypothesis, prosopagnosic patients are impaired at
making fine discriminations necessary to see the subtle differences between
exemplars of the same category. Therefore, prosopagnosics are impaired at
recognizing individual faces, but can still differentiate between object-classes (e.g. a
chair from a table). The proper control task for individual face recognition would
therefore be one requiring individual object recognition. Studies on prosopagnosic
patients' performance on within-class recognition of stimuli other than faces led to
mixed results. Some studies report that prosopagnosic patients did show a problem
with recognition of birds (Bornstein, 1963), or cows (Bornstein, Sroka, & Munitz,
1969). Other reports, however, show prosopagnosic patients with unimpaired
recognition of sheep (McNeil & Warrington, 1993), cows and dogs (Bruyer et al., 1983)
and common objects such as chairs and glasses (Farah, Levinson, & Klein, 1995a).
In another version of the "stimulus properties" explanation there are two main
factors that underlie the processes involved in face recognition, not only the factor of
within-class recognition but also the expertise we hold for faces. Carey and Diamond
(1994; Diamond & Carey, 1986) distinguish first-order relational information (the
spatial relations between parts) and second-order relational information (variations of
these spatial relations relative to the common face configuration). Due to specific
properties of facial stimuli, namely our expertise with faces combined with the fact
that faces have a shared configuration, second-order relational information is of
crucial importance in face discrimination and identification. This notion is in line with
the argument (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000;
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Damasio et al., 1982) that the specificity of processes involved in face recognition does
not relate to the stimulus class, but rather results from the combination of subordinate
(within-class) level matching task combined with a sufficient degree of expertise the
observer holds for the stimuli. In this line of thought normal observers use their
expertise with the face configuration in order to achieve good performance in making
the subtle discriminations between different individual faces. Furthermore,
prosopagnosia occurs when this ability is somehow not available.
In this report we did not set out to study the degree to which processes involved
in face recognition are special to this stimulus class only. Rather, we examined in
more detail which processes are involved in face recognition and which of these
processes were spared or impaired processes in prosopagnosic patient RP. An
intriguing insight on spared and impaired processes in prosopagnosia is provided by
recent reports on prosopagnosic patients who show not just a loss of the normal
pattern of performance, but an effect opposite from the effect found with normal
controls. Farah, Wilson, Drain, and Tanaka (1995b) presented prosopagnosic patient                1
LH with upright and inverted faces. Normal controls show in this task faster and                       1
better matching of upright than inverted faces. Prosopagnosic patient LH, however,
paradoxically performed better at matching inverted faces than upright faces. Farah
et al. reasoned that LH has intact parts-based processing with objects, while
mandatory holistic face processes were impaired. Therefore, LH applies impaired                    I
holistic processes when presented with faces. Disturbing the face configuration (by
inverting the face) provides LH with the possibility to rely on (intact) parts-based
processes.
The reasoning described above explaining prosopagnosia as a deficit in making
subtle within-class discriminations provides a different explanation for the findings
by Farah et al. LH tries to apply configural processes normally involved finding the
subtle differences between normal (upright) faces as well as individual objects. These
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processes are particularly useful for normal controls, but LH fails. In support of this
explanation, we recently studied LH (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a) and not only
replicated Farah's finding with inverted and upright faces, but also found an
inversion superiority effect in a within-category matching task with objects (shoes
and houses).
As becomes clear from the descriptions provided above, there seems to be a
general consensus on the specific importance of "configural" (or "holistic")
information for face recognition, while objects can also be recognized in a parts-based
or featural manner. In fact the very good performance normally shown with
recognizing or matching a face stimulus is often discussed as if it were the same issue
as that of relative dependence on a certain manner of processing. But in this paper we
set out to examine separately on the one hand the influence of a face configuration on
matching performance and on the other hand the issue of relative dependence on
"whole-based" vs. "parts-based" processes. We will first specify the terms used in
this paper, and specify what these terms refer to, as different terms and definitions
co-exist in the literature.
We use the terms "whole-based" vs. "parts-based" to refer to a manner of
processing. Note that if a stimulus is processed as a whole rather than in terms of its
parts, this still provides no information of what constitutes the "whole". Thus,
"whole-based processing" (as contrasted with "parts-based processing") can mean
that there is relatively little parts representation ("holistic") of the stimulus, or
alternatively, that rather than information on the parts themselves, the relations
between the parts ('configural' information, 'first order relational' information) are
critical. To avoid confusion, we reserved the term "configuration" to refer to the
presence of a specific stimulus property (namely, a normal face configuration). We
will study both issues in prosopagnosic patient RP. First we will study how the
presence of a face (as compared with very similar stimuli but lacking the right
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configuration) influences his performance level. Second, we study whether RP's
impaired face recognition performance implies that only parts-based processing is
still intact.
In the first experiment, we present prosopagnosic patient RP with a face inversion
task similar to that of Farah et al. (1995b), and include object stimuli as was
previously done with AD (De Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, & Degos, 1998) and with LH (De
Gelder & Rouw, 200Oa). The task was also presented to normal controls. The normal
controls are tested with the same task to ascertain that the expected effects can be
obtained with our materials and task settings. However, we do not compare normal
performance and RP's performance on each separate condition. Understandably, a
patient with brain damage can show overall slower and worse performance than
normal controls but we examine the pattern of performance that emerges from
comparing the different conditions in one experiment.
In all experiments both accuracy and latency were measured. In many clinical
studies, accuracy but not latency is reported which entails the problems that effects in
response time and possible trade-off effects cannot be detected. Carefully chosen
instructions are important to find the right balance between these two measurements.
Therefore, instructions stressed both speed and accuracy and indicate that the
measuring of response times still implies that RP (and controls) should at all times try
to find the right answer.
Case Description
Patient RP is a 49-year-old man who has lost the ability to recognize faces as a
consequence of a head trauma that occurred when he was seven years old. His
intellectual abilities are above average and he does not suffer from any known visual
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dysfunction. As is to be expected in cases caused by closed head injury (see for
example CK; Moscovitch et al., 1997) an MRI scan did not yield evidence of brain
damage (see De Gelder & Kanwisher, 1999). As can be seen in Appendix B, RP's
problem in visual recognition is specific to faces and extends to problems with
unfamiliar faces. RP obtained a low score (31/54) on the Benton -Van Allen face test
(Benton & Van Allen, 1968) and on the Warrington test (32/50) (Warrington, 1984).
Object recognition is unimpaired: RP showed good performance on the Boston
Naming test (56/60) as well as on the Snodgrass and Vanderwart picture naming test
(1980), 115/120.
RP also failed to recognize well-known stimuli cartoon characters (2/26) but four
times correctly identified the animal on which the cartoon figure was based (for
example, pig head for Miss Piggy) (Moscovitch et al., 1997).
Experiment 1: Normally Oriented and Inverted Faces
RP's performance on matching upright stimuli was compared with his performance
with inverted stimuli (presented upside down). The experiment consisted of a whole
stimulus matching task and a whole-to-part matching task. While in the whole
stimuli matching task a strategy of looking at the whole stimulus seems most
efficient, presenting a whole-to-part task encourages a parts-based strategy.
The tasks were designed such that the level of categorization is the same with face
and object stimuli; matching exemplars of unfamiliar faces (exemplars of the category
"face") and matching of unfamiliar objects of the same category (e.g. exemplars of the
category "shoe"). In both tasks, the faces and objects were presented in upright as
well as inverted orientation. Stimulus presentation and data acquisition were
performed with a computer. Latency as well as accuracy were recorded, such that a
105
Chapter 4
possible speed-accuracy trade-off can be detected.
In line with earlier findings (De Gelder & Rouw, 200Ob) we expected that RP
shows worse performance with normal face configuration than with stimuli in which
this configuration is disturbed. In contrast if RP's face recognition problem is
accompanied by parts-based processing, little effect of configuration is expected.
Participants. 16 Students from Tilburg University received course credit to serve
as normal controls.
Materials. The stimuli consisted of faces and pairs of shoes (Experiment lA) and
faces, face parts, houses and house parts (Experiment lB). 32 Faces (16 male) were
photographed with a Canon Still Video Camera RC-560 on a Video Floppy Disc VF-
50. Photographs were prepared as grayscale pictures with an image processing and
production program (Aldus Photo Styler) for presentation on a monitor.
Faces of 16 (eight male) models were photographed in frontal view and 3/4
orientation. 16 Models (eight male) were photographed only in 3/4 orientation to
serve as distractor stimuli. Similarly, 16 pairs of shoes (eight male shoes) were
photographed in frontal view (i.e. with the tip of the shoe pointing toward the
camera) and in 3/4 orientation (tip turned in horizontal plane to the side of camera).
Another 16 pairs of shoes were photographed only in 3/4 orientation.
With the same apparatus, frontal view photographs of houses were taken and
subsequently computer edited to grayscale pictures. One prototypical picture of a
house was selected to be used as framework. Only the roof and outer contour was left
intact the rest of the house was filled with an uniform gray color. With the computer
image-editing program, eight different houses were created by placing different sets
of inner features (a door and two windows) from eight other photographed houses in
the outer contour. The features were always in an identical configuration such that
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house contour and location of the three inner house features were always the same.
Thus, eight house stimuli differed only in which features were used as three inner
features. For Experiment lB, part stimuli were created by presenting the
door/window (for the houses) and the eyes/mouth (for the faces) in isolation. The
same stimulus material and a similar design was used in previous studies (De Gelder
et al. 1998; De Gelder & Rouw, 200Ob).
Viewing distance was approximately 50 cm, so that the stimuli subtended
between 7 and 8 degrees of visual angle for length and width. In all experiments
stimuli were presented to RP on a 12" screen of a Pentium laptop PC (Compaq
Armada 4150), and to the normal participants on the 14" screen of an Olivetti desktop
(M4 74 modulo). Stimulus presentation and response recording was piloted by Me12
software allowing for millisecond timing.
Experiment lA: Wholes Matching Task
Design. Pictures of faces and pairs of shoes served as stimuli (see Appendix C and
Appendix D for an example). Eight Male and eight female faces, and eight male and
eight female pairs of shoes were combined with the 3/4 view of that same face/shoe
and a different face/shoe. The 16 face and 16 shoe stimulus combinations were
presented both in upright and in inverted orientation. Presentation was blocked by
the two within-subject factors: stimulus class (face vs. shoe) and stimulus orientation
(upright vs. inverted), with random trial presentation within a block. The experiment
(four blocks) was presented two times in opposite block order to normal controls.
Although the effects were significant with the controls, we feared that presenting
only 32 trials per experiment to RP (since in this case there is only one participant)
would create a too small range of possible errors (16 for guessing and 32 perfect
score). Therefore, the experiment was presented a third time to RP.
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Thus, RP saw a total of 192 (48 per condition) trials, and the normal controls saw
a total of 128 (32 per condition) trials. For both normals and RP a block presented for
the first time (first experiment) started with four practice trials with feedback.
Procedure. Before the start of each block, both accuracy and speed were stressed.
A trial started with a warning signal, followed after 500 ms by presentation of the
frontal pictures for 2500 ms. After a 2500 ms delay (during which the screen was
black), the 3/4 view target and 3/4 view distractor were presented. RP and the control
participants were instructed to choose as fast as possible whether the left or right
face/shoes was the same as the one they had seen previously, and to indicate their
choice by pressing the corresponding key on the response box in front of them.
Probes disappeared at key press. After 600 ms the next trial started.
Resit its. Latencies more than 2,5 times standard deviation from the mean RT were
treated as outliers for both RP (3.1% of data) and normal controls (maximally 6 per
person, which is 4.7%). A maximum response time of three seconds was set for
normal controls.
Controls performed much better with upright than inverted faces, both in
accuracy (F(1, 15) = 66.19, p < .001) and latency (F(1, 15) = 21.6, p < .001). Interestingly,
they also showed faster performance with upright than inverted shoes (F(1,15) = 7.15,
p <.05). As Table 4.1 shows, RP shows a pattern of impaired upright face matching as
compared with inverted face matching in accuracy though this effect is not-significant
(32/48 vs. 37/48, (%2(1) = 1.29, p = .26), and further RP showed a non-significant face
inversion superiority in latency (3431 ms vs. 3377 ms; t(1, 67) = .09, P = .93). Similarly,
inverted shoes were matched faster (2220 ms vs. 1727 ms; t(1, 85) = 1.36, p = .18) and
slightly better (44/48 vs. 43/48 correct) than inverted shoes, but again these effects did
not reach significance.
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Table 4.1 Percentage correct and mean response time in ms (RT) in matching: upright and
inverted faces and shoes.
% Cor RT
RP face upright                                        67                3431
inverted                                                    77                     3377
shoe upright                                        92                2220
inverted                                                    90                     1727
controls face upright                                            95 " 834 **
inverted                                                    81                       959
shoe upright                                        93                 729 **
inverted                                                    93                       773
Note: Comparisons significant at p < .05 are indicated with **.
Experiment l B: Wholes to Part Matching Task
Design. Stimuli were the faces, face parts, houses (see Appendix E for an
example), and house parts as described above. Each of the eight faces was combined
with two eye probes, as well as with two mouth probes. One probe was the same pair
of eyes or mouth and the other part probe was pair of eyes or mouth from another
face. Similarly, the houses were combined with the same attic window or door, and
another attic window or door. These 16 face and 16 house stimuli combinations were
presented both in upright and in inverted orientation. Thus there were, as in
Experiment lA, two within-subject factors: stimulus class (face vs. house) and
stimulus orientation (upright vs. inverted). Presentation was blocked by stimulus
class and orientation, with random trial presentation within a block. Further details
on the design were as in Experiment lA.
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Procedure. In this task we wished to encourage parts-based matching rather than
whole-based matching. Therefore, we presented RP with a whole-to-parts matching
task. Further, in the previous experiment we presented shoes as they might resemble
faces in the fact that individual shoes can be distinguished on the basis of general
shape information. In the next experiment, we presented object stimuli with clearly
discernable and identifiable parts. Therefore, we used the houses, as described above,
that have a similar house outline and only differ in two features: attic window and
door.
Whole stimuli were pictures of faces and houses (appendix E) while part stimuli
were the eyes or mouth presented in isolation without the face context or the door or
upper window without the house context (see also description of materials).
In ExperimentlA, a frontal view target was followed by * view probes, as
rotation of the face requires some global shape information and therefore would
encourage whole-based rather than parts-based processing. For this same reason,
Experiment lB necessarily presents both whole target and part probes in frontal view.
This way, a strategy of analyzing the target by selectively processing a feature (eyes
and mouth) is encouraged as it would lead to optimal performance.
Again, the target appeared for 2500 ms, followed after a 2500 ms delay by the two
part probes. Further materials, procedure and design were as described in
Experiment lA.
Results. As in Experiment lA, for both normal controls and RP responses longer
than 2.5 standard deviation from the mean of the experiment were treated as outliers.
Control participants had maximally four outliers per experiment (3.1%) and RP had
four outliers (2.1%). In this experiment controls did not show an effect of orientation,
neither for faces nor for houses. Patient RP shows an advantage with inverted stimuli.
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Table 4.2 Percentage correct and mean response time in ms (RT) matching: upright and
inverted faces and houses.
0/m Cor RT
RP face upright                                       46
** 2270
inverted                                             71                   2497
house upright                                       58 ** 3645
inverted                                         77                 3285
controls face upright                                    81               1275
inverted                                             81                   1241
house upright                                    86              1081
inverted                                             83                   1070
Note: Comparisons significant at p < .05 are indicated with **.
RP had a significantly better (22/48 vs. 34/48, %2(1) = 6.17, p < .025) performance with
inverted than upright faces. The difference in response time is non-significant (a
difference of 228 ms while Standard Deviations are 1274 ms and 1330 ms) as indicated
by a t-test (t(1, 54) = 0.64, p = .53). RP further showed an interesting effect in accuracy
(see Table 4.2) of better performance with inverted than upright presented houses
(28/48 vs. 37/48 correct %2(1) = 3.86, p < .05) Responses were also slower with upright




In contrast with controls, RP did not show the normal inversion inferiority effect.
Instead, RP showed an inversion superiority effect; a better performance when faces
are presented upside down than when they are upright. These results indicate clearly
that RP does not simply rely on parts-based analysis. Indeed, if RP would completely
disregard the whole stimulus and depend only on analysis of the separate face parts,
similar performance would be expected on upright and inverted faces. Farah et al.
(1995b) concluded that a similar finding in an inversion study with prosopagnosic
patient LH indicated mandatory use of a malfunctioning "face module". This idea on
the special case of faces rests on what is probably a too strong division between object
and face recognition processes, as we found that prosopagnosic patient LH also
shows inversion superiority with objects as stimuli (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a). With
this new case of prosopagnosic patient RP, we again find inversion superiority with
faces as well as with objects (houses). Rather than proposing an impaired face
module, we suggest that the inversion superiority effect reflects impaired use of
configural processes which are involved in face recognition as well as recognition of
certain classes of objects.
In our next experiments, we wished to further explore the ideas described above
on spared and impaired visual processes in prosopagnosic patient RP. There are two
factors in Experiment 1 that need clarification. The first concerns the comparison
between the two tasks. RP showed a pattern of inversion superiority in both tasks,
but it only reached significance in the task encouraging parts-based processing rather
than the task encouraging wholes-based processing. As it seems logical to expect that
the influence of configuration is stronger in the task encouraging whole-based
processing, this finding seems unexpected. However, a direct comparison of
performance level between the tasks is not valid given the settings and materials of
Experiment 1. In this experiment, whole faces were completely different. Thus while
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there are several cues in the wholes matching task (a mole, hairline), in the whole-to-
part matching task the right answer can only be found in either the eyes or the mouth.
Perhaps this additional information aided performance in the upright face condition,
decreasing the difference between upright and inverted condition. In the next
experiment, we will adapt the materials such that the two tasks are more comparable.
The second factor concerns the comparison between upright and inverted face
performance. We used this comparison to study the influence of face configuration on
task performance. Although this is a widely excepted paradigm, there might be an
additional effect of rotation influencing matching performance with inverted faces
(for example, a face might be'mentally righted' before it can be recognized; Rock,
1974). A similar effect of rotation might influence matching performance with
inverted face parts. In our next experiment, we take out this factor of rotation and
present upright whole faces and face parts. The configuration of the faces is disturbed
in the "scrambled faces" where face parts are put at the wrong location. Comparing a
'good' and 'bad' face configuration allows us to directly examine the influence of face
configuration on matching performance.
Experiment 2: Face Context Effect with Whole or Part Probes
Striking demonstrations of the influence of stimulus configuration on the perception
of its constituent parts are the'word superiority effect' and the 'object superiority
effect'. These reflect respectively, better recognition of a letter in the context of a
word (Reicher, 1969), and better recognition of a line in context of a good form
(Weisstein & Harris, 1974). Homa, Haver and Schwartz (1976) found superior
recognition performance when face parts were presented in the context of a normal
whole face, as compared with the context of a scrambled (displaced features) face.
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These effects are not just obtained under threshold conditions, as Davidoff and
Donnelly (1990) extended superiority effects to normal exposure conditions. In our
previous experiment we found that RP showed a specific disadvantage when
presented with a normal face configuration as compared with a stimulus in which
this configural information is assumed lost (inverted face). In our next experiment we
will try to replicate this finding by comparing a normal face configuration with a
stimulus in which only this configuration has been disturbed, by displacing the face
features (scrambled face). Thus, our first hypothesis is that an intact face
configuration has a detrimental effect on RP's recognition performance.
Tanaka & Farah (1993) presented either a whole stimulus or a stimulus part in a
recognition task, and found that face recognition, as compared with object (houses)
recognition specifically profits from the presence of a whole stimulus. Indeed, these
authors state that what separates face recognition from object recognition is relative
little part representation with faces, as compared with objects. In a recent study,
Donnelly and Davidoff (1999) examined the advantage of presenting a complete
probe (wholes matching task) over a part probe (wholes-to-part matching task) with
both face and house stimuli. They found a Complete Probe Advantage (CPA) with
both faces and houses, and concluded that both kinds of stimuli were processed as a
whole rather than in terms of their parts. Here we will examine the issue of whole-
based vs. parts-based processing separately from the effect that an intact face
configuration has on recognition performance.
First we study the face superiority effect which is the advantage (better
performance) provided by the presence of a good face configuration. Therefore, we
present facial stimuli differing only in face parts (eyes and mouth) and compare
recognition performance when stimuli present a good (normal face) vs. a bad
(scrambled face) context. Normal controls are expected to show the advantage with
the normal face configuration as compared with the scrambled faces, as found
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previously by Davidoff and Donnelly (1990). RP, on the other hand, is not expected to
profit from the good face context. In Experiment 1 RP showed better recognition
performance if the face configuration is made less accessible (by inverting the face). In
this experiment we directly disturb the face configuration by dislocating the face
features. We expect to replicate the finding that RP's performance level decreases
when presented with a "good"(normal) face configuration.
Furthermore, we presented both a whole-to-whole matching task (WW) and a
whole-to-part matching task (WP). In both tasks, performance with normal face
stimuli is compared with performance with scrambled face stimuli. A second
question, then, is whether we will find a CPA such as reported by Donnelly and
Davidoff (1999). However, as these authors state, the presence or absence of a CPA
might depend on several task (e.g. presentation time) and stimulus (e.g. complexity of
the stimulus) settings. We did not vary these determinants and therefore cannot draw
conclusions on what constitutes the CPA. The difference between WW and WP task
performance is simply seen as an indication of relative whole-based vs. more parts-
based processing, but the experiment was not set up the examine the conditions in
which a CPA might appear or disappear.
Control participants and RP performed the same experiment. Again (see
Experiment 1) we are interested in RP's pattern Ofperformance as compared with the
pattern of performance of normal controls, rather than a direct comparison between
RP and normal controls on each condition.
Participants. 20 students from Tilburg University received course credit for
participating in the experiment. As in Experiment 1, we tested a group of control
participants, to establish what effects were obtained with these materials and to
replicate findings as reported in the literature.
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Materials. A prototype face outline was created from a black and white
(photographic quality) picture of a young Caucasian male. One of six pairs of eyes
and one of six mouths were digitally inserted into the face template, either at the
correct positions creating six normal faces (for an example see Appendix F) or with
the eyes located at the position of the mouth and vice versa, creating six 'scrambled'
faces (see Appendix G). Thus, the "whole faces" stimuli differed only in eye and
mouth. The six pairs of eyes and six mouths could also be presented in isolation. Each
(normal, scrambled) face measured 6 x 8 an. The viewing distance was 50 cm; thus
the faces subtended approximately 7 x 9 degrees of visual angle.
Design. A two-alternative forced choice matching task was used. In the wholes
matching task (WW task) a whole face target was followed by two whole face probes,
one identical and one different from the target. In the whole-to-parts matching task
(WP task) presentation of the whole face was followed by that of two pair of eyes or
two mouths; one same and one different to the face parts presented in the whole face
target.
As described above, we created six different faces by placing one of six eyes and
one of six mouths in a standard face framework. Each face was combined with the
correct probe (same face/face part) and an incorrect probe (one of the five other
faces/face parts). We presented each of these combinations of target/probes (five
incorrect probes for each of the six faces), making 30 trials per condition. In 15 out of
these 30 cases, the correct probe was on the left side.
We studied the effect of within-subject factor stimulus type (normal vs. scrambled
face) in both the wholes matching as the whole-to-part matching task. Trials were
blocked by task and stimulus type, with random trial order within a block. Each block
was split in two and block order was balanced within-subject. The block started with
4 practice trials, but only the first time a certain condition was presented.
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Procedure. A trial started with an 800 ms warning signal. The test stimulus
appeared for 1000 ms, followed after a 1000 ms delay by a two-alternative forced
choice of two part probes or two whole probes presented side by side. Normal
participants responded by pressing the rightmost or leftmost key on a response box.
The next trial started after a key press.
RP and normal controls were tested with the same procedure and materials, but
RP indicated his choice by pressing one of two labeled keys on the keyboard,
indicating "left" ("q") or "right" ("}"). These keys were chosen as RP indicated them
as most comfortable. All blocks started with an instruction, presented both on the
computer screen and read aloud to RP by the experimenter (to ascertain that RP
understood the task). As in Experiment 1 both speed and accuracy were stressed.
Results. One participant showed chance performance in two out of four
conditions and was excluded from analyses. All other normal controls showed at
least 67% correct per condition. Some of RP's latencies were much longer than his
average response times. We excluded latencies more than three times the standard
deviation from the mean from analysis (excluding 4% of the responses).
Repeated measure analyses showed that normal controls showed the expected
face context effect: controls recognized normal faces faster than scrambled faces in the
wholes matching task (F(1,18) = 4.57, p < .05). This effect was not significant in the
whole-to-part matching task (F(1,18) = 0.53, p = .48). The effects in accuracy are very
small (indeed, normal controls made very few errors) and an ANOVA on the effect of
stimulus type (normal vs. scrambled) provides an F value of less than 1 for both tasks.
An indication of whole-based processing was provided by an overall advantage of
wholes matching (WW) task, both in latency (F(1,18) = 25.77, p <.001) and accuracy
(F(1,18) = 30.59, p < .001) over the whole-to-part matching (WP) task (see Table 4.3).
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Table 4.3 Percentage correct and mean response time in ms (RT) in context effect in a wholes
matching task and whole-to-part matching task.
% Cor RT
RP whole-whole normal                                           80 1676 **
scrambled                                      87                 1210
whole-parts normal                                       63                1824
scrambled                                      67                 1356
controls whole-whole normal                                           90                  995 **
scrambled                                   91                1055
whole-parts normal                                       83               1219
scrambled                                   81                1199
Note: Comparisons significant at p < .05 are indicated with
**
Interestingly, RP also showed significantly better performance on the WW (50/60)
than on the WP (39/60) task (%2(1) = 5.26, p = 0.02). The answers were also faster but
this effect was non-significant (t(87) = 0.7, p = .48). As can be seen in Table 4.3, this
pattern of more errors and longer latencies in the WP versus WW task was found in
each stimulus condition (both normal and scrambled faces). RP did show a context
effect but in contrast with normal controls RP showed no normal face configuration
advantage. Instead, performance with normal faces was slightly worse, and
significantly slower (separate variances t-test for equality of means: (t(69) = 2.23, p <
.05) than scrambled face performance (see Table 4.3). Analyzing the two tasks
separately shows that the context effect was just significant in the wholes matching
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(WW) task (t(48) = 2.0, p = .05), but not in whole-to-part matching (WP) task.
Accuracies with normal vs. scrambled faces were not significantly different
(respectively 24/30 vs. 26/30 in WW; 19/30 vs.20/30 in WP).
Discussion
As in Experiment 1, RP showed a pattern of performance opposite to that of normal
controls. Control participants showed the same effects as reported previously by
Davidoff and Donnelly (1990) and Donnelly and Davidoff (1999), better recognition
with normal than with scrambled face context. RP, on the other hand, showed a
paradoxical pattern of worse performance with normal than scrambled faces. This
worse performance with normal faces could not have been found if RP depends on
parts-based procedures. Normal and scrambled faces only differ in the location of the
features, therefore RP's differential performance on normal vs. scrambled faces
indicates processing of "whole-based" or "relational" information.
In contrast with the previous experiment in this experiment the tasks were more
similar in overall difficulty as little extra information was given in the WW as
compared with the WP task. This was done to make possible a better comparison
between tasks. A surprising finding is that RP still shows the advantage of the wholes
matching task over whole-to-part matching task, just as normals did. One possible
explanation is that more information is present in wholes-matching, as both a
different eye and different mouth are present in the foil distractor, while only one
feature probe is present in the WP task5 Another, a bit counterintuitive, explanation is
an advantage of whole-based over parts-based processing for RP. Logically, the
ability to process the whole stimulus is more important in the wholes matching task
than in the whole-to-part matching task. At the moment we cannot conclude whether
RP's performance indeed is better with whole-based rather than parts-based
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processes. We can conclude, however, that RP shows a face disadvantage effect using
whole-based rather than parts-based procedures. Normals show, as expected, that the
face superiority effect is present in the wholes matching task but not in the whole-to-
part task. For RP, in this experiment the face inferiority effect was significant in the
wholes matching task (encouraging whole-based procedures) but not in the whole-to-
part matching task. While an alternative explanation can be given for RI"s overall
better performance on the wholes matching task than on the whole-to-part task, this
does not explain why his normal face disadvantage would be found in a task
encouraging whole-based processes rather than in a whole-to-part task encouraging
parts-based procedures.
Prosopagnosic patients are expected to have a problem with "the whole face" and
would instead rely on "parts-based analysis", but RP's case does not conform to this
expectation. His pattern of performance suggests that the presence of a normal face
configuration disturbs rather than improves his performance, indicating whole-based
rather than parts-based procedures. In the General Discussion we will return to these
issues in relation to ideas and findings presented in face recognition literature. In the
next experiment we will try to find further support for RP's intact "whole face
encoding". Furthermore, we will examine what is included in the "whole face".
Experiment 3: Encoding the Whole Face
In this experiment, we studied RP's "whole face processing" in a new and different
manner by examining whether both external and internal facial features are included.
We designed a task in which only the inner face features are to be compared, while
hair and hairline should be ignored. Thus, the relative importance of the whole face
5 We thank N. Donnelly for pointing out this alternative explanation to us.
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as compared with some inner feature registration can be contrasted. If RP relies on
analysis of inner features, differences in hair should not disturb his matching
performance. However, if RP encodes "the whole", and this whole picture includes
both the internal and external features, hair and hairline will influence his recognition
of inner face features.
Materials. Black and white pictures of photographic quality from 12 faces (six
male and six female) served as the basis. These were the same pictures used to create
the  stimuli of Experiment  1.  Each  face was paired  with a same-sex other  face  that
differed only minimally in easy cues such as hairstyle and overall face shape. With a
photo-editing computer program (AdobePhotoshop), hair of the two faces in a pair
was switched, thus creating two'new' faces from each face pair. The resulting sets of
four faces each resulted in a total of 24 face stimuli. As can be seen in Appendix H,
the "swapped hair" faces were carefully edited to look like natural faces.
Design. There were six sets of four faces (two original faces and two "swapped
hair" faces) each. In a trial, each face was combined with each of the four faces in its
set, creating 16 trials per set and 96 trials in the whole experiment. A target face could
be followed by itself, the other (paired) face, the same face but with different hair, or a
different face with the same hair. Thus there were two within-subject factors, answer
category ("same" or "different" face) and hair congruency ("congruent" or
"incongruent" with the correct answer). The four combinations per target face were
presented for each of the 24 faces, therefore there were 24 trials in each condition. The
total of trials was divided in two blocks: participants first saw a block with male faces,




Procedure. Participants received an explicit instruction, to ignore the hair and
respond to the inner face only. Two faces, presented in sequence, were compared.
Two keys of a response box (keys on the keyboard for RP as in the previous
experiments) were labeled "same" and "different". A trial consisted of 1 s
presentation of a face, followed, after a l s delay, by the face probe. The second face
disappeared after key-press. After 800 ms, the next trial started.
Several measures were taken to ascertain that the instructions were understood
by RP. Instructions were read aloud, and RP was encouraged to ask questions. It was
stressed that only the face itself should be compared. Without mentioning that the
hair had been swapped, it was said that hair was unimportant in reaching the right
answer and should be ignored. Furthermore, both for RP and the control participants
the experiment started with 16 practice trials (4 from each condition) with feedback.
Participants were seated approximately 50 cm from the computer screen, (size of
the faces subtended a visual angle of 5.1 degrees horizontal by 6.3 degrees vertical)
and responded by pressing one of two keys of a response box, labeled "same" and
"different". As in the previous experiments, instructions encouraged to provide an
answer as fast as possible, while it was stressed that at all times participants should
try to find the correct answer.
Results. Normal controls showed an interfering effect of hair and hairline, when it
was incongruent with the right answer, in latency (F(1, 19) = 79.34, p <.001) as well as
in accuracy (F(1, 19) = 38.10, p < .001). The interference effect is particularly manifest
in "same" response condition (see Table 4.4): if the whole face probe is the same,
mean percentage correct is 96%, but this percentage decreases to 76% correct if the
hair is different (F(1, 19) = 40.16, p < .001). The effect of incongruent hair was also
measured in longer response times, both in "same" (F(1, 19) = 39.84, p < .001) and in
"different" (F(1, 19) = 4.5, p < .05) trials.
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Table 4.4 Percentage correct and mean response time in ms (RT) in interference from
incongruent hair.
response category hair congruency % Cor RT
RP sarne face congruent                    96
" 1457
incongruent                          54              2011
different face congruent                    71          1816
incongruent                          54              2261
controls sanne face congruent                                  96
** 877 **
incongruent                          76              1044
different face congruent                                     94                    922 "
incongruent                          92               958
Note: Comparisons significant at p < .05 are indicated with
**
As with the normal controls, incongruent hair disturbed RP's performance. Overall,
this effect is significant in accuracy (%2(1) = 9.50, p = .002) but not in latency (t(64) =
1.44, p = .15). As can be seen in Table 4.4, "same" responses were fast (1457 ms) and
had high accuracy (96% correct) if the whole face was same. A difference was found
between this same face/same hair condition and the condition of same face/different
hair, as the latter condition showed non-significant longer response times (2011 ms,
1(34)=1.88, p = .07) and more errors (54% correct (%2(1) = 11.11, p < .001)). A disturbing
effect of hair was observed, but was not significant (%2(1) = 1.42, p = .23) in the
"different" trials: congruent hair gives quite good performance (71% with 1816 ms
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mean response time), while a different face with same hair results in chance
performance (54% with 2261 ms mean response time).
Discussion
Our position that RP still encodes "the whole" stimulus rather than relying
completely on "face parts analysis" is supported again with this different paradigm.
The findings furthermore indicate that both internal and external face features are
included in this "whole face processing" by RP. An incongruent external feature does
disturb his performance, even when explicitly instructed to match internal features
only.
One might argue that RP performs worse with incongruent external features
because he did not follow instructions and based his judgments on hair instead of on
the inner face features. However, this explanation is highly unlikely. First we
provided extensive instructions and practice trials to ensure that RP would be looking
at the inner features of the face. Second, if RP judged the hair instead of the face, RP's
performance would approach zero percent correct in incongruent trials (judging the
hair and therefore providing the wrong answer for the face). This effect was not
found: in those cases where inner and outer features provided conflicting answer
categories RP's performance dropped to chance but did not approach zero. This
chance performance was in sharp contrast with his quite good performance if external
and inner features had congruent answer categories. Another alternative explanation
might be that RP processes features separately, but cannot focus on (or attend to) the
inner features due to a dominating role of the hair (e.g. "more" or "easier"
information). However, judging outer features would again lead to a zero percent
rather than a fifty percent score on incongruent trials. We conclude that RP's patterns
of results show interference from hair, rather than judgement based on hair. An
explanation based on a problem in directing attention is also not plausible given RP's
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further pattern of performance, particularly his good performance on tasks examining
low-level visual processes (see Appendix B). Finally, note that in this as in the
previous experiments RP is compared with himself rather than directly with normal
controls. All alternative explanations on possible differences between RP and controls
based on RP's generally worse performance cannot explain RP's pattern of
performance: a clear advantage of "congruent hair" trials over "incongruent hair"
trials.
General Discussion
In Experiment 1 RP showed, in contrast with normal controls, worse performance
with upright faces than with faces presented in inverted orientation. Furthermore,
this "inversion superiority effect" was observed not only with faces but also with
object stimuli, as found previously with agnosic patient AD (De Gelder et al., 1998)
and prosopagnosic patient LH (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a). RP's impaired
performance when presented with a normal face configuration was repeated and
extended in Experiment 2. RP showed in»ior performance finding subtle differences
between faces in a good (normal) face context as compared with a disturbed
(scrambled) face configuration. Normal controls, however, did show superior
performance with the good face context. This contradicts the older notion (e.g. Levine
& Calvanio, 1989) that impaired face processing is accompanied by dependence on
parts-based analysis. Experiment 3 confirmed this notion and furthermore showed
that both internal and external features are included in this "whole face"
representation. In a task of matching inner face features, an incongruent external




Face Conjiguration vs. Whole-based Processing
The results from these three experiments converge in showing that RP does still
process the whole face. But at the same time the presence of a face configuration
disturbs rather than improves his performance. This seems contradictory, as in the
past the two notions "whole-based processing" and "face configuration" have often
been looked upon as closely connected or even as two ways to describe the same
intact face mechanism (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Therefore, the main conclusion from
these findings with prosopagnosic patient RP is that a strict division between "whole-
based" face recognition processes on the one hand, and "parts-based" object
recognition processes on the other hand does not provide a correct picture.
The distinction between "whole-based" information vs. "face configuration"
information described above, calls to mind Carey and Diamond's description of "first
order relational information" vs. "second order relational information" (as described
in the Introduction). First order relational information specifies the relations between
the stimulus parts and is contrasted with information of the isolated face parts. First
order relational information is assumed sufficient to recognize a stimulus category (.a
car" or "a face"). Recognition of individual faces, however, depends also on second
order relational information (specifying an individual by describing how it relates to
the shared configuration of all faces). This description of two different kinds of
"configural" information related with face recognition is very valuable. Indeed,
patient RP provides for the first time a prosopagnosic case description that clearly
supports this distinction between two kinds of information. RP's performance suffers
from the presence of second order relational information: worse performance with
normal than inverted (Experiment 1) or scrambled (Experiment 2) faces.
Simultaneously, RP shows no disturbance of first order relational information (RP
does not depend on parts-based processing). The important difference between the
previous (Carey and Diamond) model and our findings lies in the fact that RP's
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"whole-based" processing is found in tasks at the level of individual face matching,
rather than face detection or categorization. Thus, also for face recognition
(identification), relative dependence on the whole face or face parts, should be
examined separately from the influence of an intact vs. impaired face configuration.
We studied the degree of parts-based processing on a task of individual face
matching as we had strong indications that the processes involved in the two tasks,
face detection or categorization vs. individual face recognition, are not equal
(Schweich & Bruyer, 1993). For example, Ellis (1986) suggested that face decision, but
not face recognition, is based upon an automatic analysis. Furthermore, in an earlier
study we contrasted recognition performance of two prosopagnosic patients RP and
AV (De Gelder & Rouw, 200Ob). While patient RP showed worse performance with a
normal face configuration, patient AV showed no effect of face configuration (equal
performance with upright and inverted faces) and seemed to depend on parts-based
processes. In contrast both patients were excellent on a face categorization and face
detection task, even in a speeded face detection task that did not allow a featural
analysis. These findings suggest that the functioning of "whole-based" vs. "parts-
based" processes should be examined separately in the case of face decision and the
case of face identification.
RP's impaired face recognition
Our matching experiments were designed such that good matching performance
would depend on the ability to find subtle differences between individual faces.
Indeed, RP showed a specific disadvantage with a "good face configuration",
suggesting that the configural processes involved in this discrimination were
impaired. The finding of an inversion superiority effect with objects indicated that
these processes are also involved in recognition of certain classes of objects. So far, we
have given little theoretical consideration of what representation or processes
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underlie the processing of the'good face configuration' of unfamiliar faces. We did
not test one model of face recognition against another. Whether faces depend on
configural relations as compared with a face norm (Rhodes, Brennan, & Carey; 198D,
or are stored as exemplars in "face space" (Valentine, 1991), or are individuated
relative to their'prototype', or shared configuration (Diamond & Carey, 1986), does
not make a difference for the conclusions drawn from our results. The results do
indicate that RP's worse performance with a good face configuration is related to
making subtle within- category comparisons, rather than to "face specific" processes.
Furthermore, the within-category comparison rather than the expertise we hold
for faces seems an important factor in RP's deviant pattern of performance. An
explanation based merely on the expertise we hold for faces does not provide an
explanation for our findings, as the inversion superiority effect was also found with
objects. These stimuli were new to RP and he had no specific expertise for shoes or
houses.
It is interesting to contrast our findings with those of Davidoff and Landis (1990),
who found no difference between prosopagnosic's performance on normal vs.
scrambled faces. The authors concluded that the patients had a general (not face-
specific) impairment in forming integrated temporary representations. These
temporary representations were contrasted with representations formed'through
object specific routines'; thereby forming integrated higher level representations for
objects (or faces), but not for scrambled objects. As Davidoff and Donnelly (1990)
noted, the difference between a scrambled face and a normal face is that only the
latter can use this 'higher order' information. In contrast with the patients studied by
Davidoff and Landis, RP's problem does not lie in temporary representations, which
would mean a similar problem with faces, objects, and non-objects (scrambled or
inverted stimuli). RP, however, has a clear disadvantage with stimuli containing the
"higher order" information of face class, and showed better performance with non-
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objects than with faces or objects. Another difference between our study and that of
Davidoff and Landis is that as we separated the influence of "face class" from the
relative dependence on whole vs. parts-based processing, we did not expect a wholes
matching advantage for faces only. We have made clear that RP's problem with face
recognition is not dependence on parts-based processes. A next question is then of
course what underlies RI"s impaired face processing.
It is important to note that in this case prosopagnosia is not only a problem in
familiar face recognition ("Face Recognition Units" in the model of Bruce and Young;
1986). RP is also significantly impaired in unfamiliar face matching. We studied what
visual processes underlie this deficiency and found that RP has a problem with those
processes involved in finding subtle differences between individual unknown faces.
Though it seems obvious that his problem with unfamiliar faces is related to his
problem in storing and processing of familiar faces, this study does not examine all
processes involved in familiar face recognition in RP.
One possibility is that besides from his deviant pattern of performance in
matching faces, there is a problem in the storage of familiar faces. Another possibility
is that RP has an additional visual problem, which is specifically disturbing for
recognition of faces as compared with other objects. Such additional problem could
for example be a difficulty in surface recognition or curved lines (Kosslyn, Hamilton,
& Bernstein, 1995). Finally, an intriguing idea is that RP's specific problem with faces
results from the combination of both factors described in this study. RP has impaired
ability to make subtle comparisons within a stimulus class. Normal participants are
aided by the fact that this is a well-known category and depend on their knowledge
of what individuals in this class roughly look like. RP, however, has an impairment in
using this knowledge. Furthermore, he still processes these stimuli in a whole-based
manner, just as normals do. Therefore, his normal use of the face or object
configuration is impaired, while simultaneously the alternative route of analyzing
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parts is blocked. This interaction of two factors might lead to specifically bad
performance. For now, the exact interaction between these processes remains
speculation.
What the results do show, in conclusion, is that severely impaired face
recognition does not mean dependence on parts-based analysis. RP can and does still
processes the whole face. Vice versa, intact encoding of the whole stimulus does not
mean intact face expertise: clearly RP is impaired in face recognition. We propose that
at the level of face identification a distinction should be made between whole-based
vs. parts-based processing on the one hand, and processes related to stored
information on the face (or object) class on the other hand.
Acknowledgments
We thank Andries van der Ark for advice on statistics and Bruno Laeng for bringing
us in contact with RP. We thank RP for his collaboration and patience. We gratefully
acknowledge comments from N. Donnelly and M. Craigie. We thank M. Moscovitch
for providing the stimuli of the cartoon test.
References
Benton, A. L., & Van Allen, M. W. (1968). Impairment in facial recognition in patients with
cerebral disease. Cortex, 4, 344-358.
Biederman, I., & Kalocsai, P. (1997) Neurocomputational bases of object and face recognition.
Philosophical Transactions Of the Royal Society London: Biological Sciences, 352, 1203- 1219.
Bodamer, J. (1947). Die prosop-Agnosie. Archiu fiir  Psychiatrie  und  Nervenkrankheiten,  179,  6-53.
Bornstein, B. (1963). Prosopagnosia. In L. Halpern (Ed.), Problems Ofdynamic neurology.
Jerusalem: Hadassah Medical School.
Bornstein, B., Sroka, M., & Munitz, H. (1969). Prosopagnosia with animal face agnosia. Cortex,
5, 164-169.
Bruce, V., & Young, A. W. (1986). Understanding face recognition. British Iournal of
Psychology,  77,305-327.
130
Impaired face recognition does not preclude intact whole face perception
Bruyer, R., Laterre, C., Seron, X., Feyereisen, P., Strypstein, E., Pierrard, E., & Rectem, D.
(1983). A case of prosopagnosia with some preserved covert remembrance of familiar
faces. Brain and Cognition, 2, 257-284.
Carey, S., & Diamond, R. (1994). Are faces perceived as configurations more by adults than
by children? Visual Cognition, 1, 313-348.
Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Van Hoesen, G. W. (1982). Prosopagnosia: Anatomic basis
and behavioral mechanisms. Neurology, 32, 331-341.
Davidoff, J·, & Donnelly, N. (1990) Object superiority effects: Complete versus part probes.
Acta Psychologica, 73, 225-243.
Davidoff, J., & Landis, T. (1990). Recognition of unfamiliar faces. Neuropsychologia. 28. 1141-
1161.
De Gelder, B., Bachoud-Levi, A. C., & Degos, J. D. (1998) Inversion superiority in visual
agnosia may be common to a variety of orientation polarised objects besides faces. Vision
Research, 38, 2855-2861.
De Gelder, B. & Kanwisher, N. (1999). Absence of a fusiform face area in a prosopagnosic
patient. NeuroImage, 9(6), S604.
De Gelder, B., & Rouw, R. (2000a). Paradoxical inversion effect for faces and objects in
prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 38, 1271-1279.
De Gelder, B., & Rouw, R. (200Ob). Configural face processes in acquired and developmental
prosopagnosia: evidence for two separate face systems? NeuroReport, 11(14), 3145-3150.
Diamond, R., & Carey, S. (1986). Why faces are and are not special: An effect of expertise.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 115, 107-117.
Donnelly, N., & Davidoff, J. (1999). The mental representations of faces and houses: Issues
concerning parts and wholes. Visual Cognition, 6, 319-343.
Ellis, H. D. (1986). Introduction: Processes underlying face recognition. In R. Bruyer (Ed.), The
neuropsychology offace perception and facial expression. ipp. 1-27). Hillsdale, N. J.:
Laywrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.
Farah, M. J., Levinson, K. L., & Klein, K. (1995a). Face perception and within-category
discrimination in prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 33, 661-675.
Farah, M., Wilson, K., Drain, H., & Tanaka, J. (1995b). The inverted face inversion effect in
prosopagnosia: Evidence for mandatory, face-specific perceptual mechanisms. Vision
Research, 35(14), 2089-2093.
Farah, M. J., Wilson, K. D., Drain, M., & Tanaka, J. N. (1998). What is 'special' about face
perception? Psychological Review, 105(3), 482-498.
Gauthier, I., & Tarr, M. J. (199D. Becoming a "Greeble" expert: Exploring mechanisms for face
recognition. Vision Research, 37(12), 1673-1682.
Gauthier, I., Skudlarski, P., Gore, J. C., & Anderson, A. W. (2000). Expertise for cars and birds
recruits brain areas involved in face recognition. Nature Neuroscience, 3(2), 191-197.
Homa, D. B., Haven B., & Schwartz, T. (1976). Perceptibility of schematic face stimuli:
Evidence for a perceptual gestalt. Memory and Cognition, 4, 176-285.
Kosslyn, S. M., Hamilton, S. E., & Bernstein, J. H. (1995). The perception of curvature can be
selectively disrupted in prosopagnosia. Brain and Cognition, 27(1), 36-58.
Levine, D. N., & Calvanio, R. (1989). Prosopagnosia: A defect in visual configural processing.
Brain and Cognition, 10, 149-170.
131
Chapter 4
McNeil, J., & Warrington, E. (1993). Prosopagnosia: A face-specific disorder. Quarterly journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Experimental Psychology, 46A(1), 1-10.
Moscovitch, M., Winocur, G., & Behrmann, M. (1997). What is special about face recognition:
Nineteen experiments on a person with visual object agnosia and dyslexia but normal
face recognition. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,  9,555 - 604.
Reicher, B. M. (1969). Perceptual recognition as a function of meaningfulness of stimulus
material. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 81, 275-280.
Rhodes, G., Brennan, S., & Carey, S. (198D. Identification and ratings of caricatures:
Implications for mental representations of faces. Cognitive Psychology, 19,73 -794.
Riddoch, M. J., & Humphreys, G. W. (1993). Birmingham Object Recognition Battery. Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Hove, UK.
Rock, I. (1974). The perception of disoriented figures. Scienti» American, 230, 78-85.
Schweich, M., & Bruyer, R. (1993). Heterogeneity in the cognitive manifestations of
prosopagnosia: the study of a group of single cases. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 10(6),529-
547.
Snodgrass, J. G., & Vanderward, M. (1980). A standardized set of 260 pictures: norms for
name agreement, image agreement familiarity, and visual complexity. Journal
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 6, 174-215.
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (1993). Parts and wholes in face recognition. Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 46A, 225-245.
Valentine, T. (1991). A unified account of the effects of distinctiveness, inversion, and race in
face recognition. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 43A, 161-204.
Warrington, E. K. (1984). Recognition Memory Test. NFER, Windsor, Nelson.
Weisstein, N., & Harris, C. S. (1974). Visual detection of line segments: An object superiority
effect. Science, 186, 752-755.
132
Chapter 5
How Face Recognition becomes Special:
Configural Recognition of Faces and
Objects in Children and Adults6
We studied  the development  of configural processes  in six experiments presenting both face
stimuti and objects. Children were less e#icient in judging only internalfeatures (Experiment 1 and 2).
However, this does  not mean  that  theirface recognition  is only based on feature matching,  as both  age
groups  recognized fragmented faces better with divided face features  than  with face features kept  intact
(Experiment 3). Performance was better with upright than inverted presentation condition
(Experiment 4 and 5), and even three-andfour-year-olds showed that matching whole stimuli was
performed better than whole-to-part matching (Experiment 6). Only adults showed that these latter
two configural effects were larger for faces as compared with respectively objects (shoes) or non-objects
(scrambled»es). We conclude that what develops with age is not configural processing itselfbut the
interaction between manner ofprocessing and stimulus class.




The degree to which face recognition processes are "special" and thereby different
from general object recognition processes is much debated in face recognition
research. One particularly compelling argument is provided by neuropsychological
reports on prosopagnosia (the clinical condition of selectively impaired face
recognition, see Bodamer, 1947). Furthermore, behavioral findings show a different
pattern of performance with faces as compared with other stimuli (Yin, 1969; Tanaka
& Farah, 1993), and brain imaging studies showed that certain brain areas might be
specifically involved in face recognition (Kanwisher, Mc Dermott & Chun, 199D.
Developmental studies have found that newborns (as young as 9 minutes) show a
particular sensitivity to face over non-face stimuli. (Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975;
Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991). Traditionally, adult recognition of faces
is assumed to depend more on configural information than recognition of objects.
Although it has been suggested that the development of face recognition ability
depends on the development of configural processing, few studies have
systematically studied the child vs. adult use of configural information in processing
both face and object stimuli. In this study we contrast configural information with
featural information, and study relative dependence of children on these two sources
of information in both face and object processing. Unfortunately there is not yet
consensus on the use and definition of the term "configuration- in adult face
recognition. We will therefore first discuss what has so far been proposed in literature                
on the kind of information processes involved in face recognition.
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What information  is retrieved»mface stimuli?
Although in literature a special dependence on "configural information" has been
proposed for face recognition processes, different authors have attached different
meanings to "configural information", meaning 'relational' or 'holistic' and
sometimes the term is left undefined (Levine & Calvanio, 1989; Tanaka & Farah, 1993;
Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). A clear model has been provided by Farah (1990),
based on a dichotomy between face recognition as depending more on'holistic'
(whole-based) information and object recognition as depending more on featural
information. In support of this model, they found that it is relatively harder to
recognize a single part from a face than from a control stimulus (Tanaka & Farah,
1993). A similar proposal based on a single distinction between "face" vs. "object"
recognition processes was made earlier by Levine and Calvanio (1989). These authors
suggested that prosopagnosia is caused by impaired configural processes, leaving the
parts-based processes applied for object recognition intact. Thus, in these models the
relative dependence on configural information is related to the specific stimulus class
of faces. In alternative models not stimulus class itself, but rather a combination of
stimulus properties is suggested to underlie the separation between recognition
processes. Two characteristics that are assumed to be of particular importance here
are the expertise we all hold for faces and the fact that recognition or matching of
individual faces requires within-class discrimination. In this line of research, two
models provide a description of the kind of information of importance to face
recognition. Rhodes (1988) described first-order properties (appearance of face
features as eyes and mouth) and second-order properties (how the features relate to
each other, e.g. position of eyes, distance between face features). Diamond and Carey
(1986) proposed to distinguish first-order relational information vs. second-order
relational information. First-order relational information reflects the location of
features both relative to the whole face and to each other. The second-order relational
135
Chapter 5
information describes how the configural information of an individual member of the
stimulus class deviates from the mean (or prototypical) shared configuration of the
class. While first-order relational information can be used for any discrimination,
second-order relations can only be used if exemplars within a stimulus class share a
similar configuration. Both models (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes & McLean,
1990) have suggested that extraction of this "norm-based" (second order relational)
information is an important component of expertise with within-class discrimination
of a homogeneous stimulus class (i.e. where the members share a configuration), as is
the case in face recognition.
Development Ofprocesses involved inface recognition
Thus, there is a general consensus in literature on the importance of configural
information in face recognition ability. In line with that view, the finding that young
children are relatively poor in face recognition (Flin, 1980; Ellis, 1992) has been
attributed to imperfect configural processing, possibly related to later development of
a right hemisphere specialization of configural processes (Yin, 1970; Leehey, 1976).
This issue has however not been settled yet de Schonen and collegues found
indication of specific face-processing mechanisms in the right hemisphere in infants
(de Schonen, Deruell, Pascalis, Mancini, 1993, de Schonen & Mathivet 1990, de
Schonen, Gil de Diaz, & Mathivet, 1986), while inter-hemispheric integration of visual
information merges only about 24 months of age (Liegeois, Bentejac, & deSchonen,
2000). Still. at least some sysem for recognition of faces is present at birth (Pascalis, de
Schonen, Morton, Deruelle, & Fagre-Grenet (1995). While studies with newborns have
indicated presence of face recognition system, studies with older children (mostly
from 5 or 6 years on) provided evidence that face recognition processes continue to
develop until teenage years (Carey & Diamond, 1977; Flin, 1980; Ellis, 1992). This
contrast has been explained by different developmental patterns of two separate face
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processing mechanisms (Morton & Johnson, 1991). The notion that the development
of face recognition goes hand in hand with the development of configural processes
seems to find empirical support in absent (Carey, Diamond, & Woods, 1980) or
smaller (Goldstein, 1965) inversion effects observed with children as compared with
adults (as we will discuss later, these findings might however have been the result of
methodological inaccuracies in the experiments). The findings were interpreted as
indicating that children depend more on featural than configural or whole-based
processes. Only with age, configural processes develop and with that optimal levels
of face recognition performance can be reached (Carey & Diamond, 1977).
Recent reports suggest that this view needs to be adjusted. Firstly, there is some
evidence that both children and adults use configural face information (Baenninger,
1994). The small effect of inverted presentation was caused by the children's overall
worse performance level causing a floor effect (Young & Bion, 1980; Young & Bion,
1981). Indeed, in some studies children showed worse performance (like normal
adults) with inverted than upright oriented faces (Carey, 1981; Flin, 1985; see also
Valentine, 1988). This worse performance with inverted than upright faces has been
termed an "inversion inferiority effect" (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000c), as an opposite
pattern of inversion superiority has been found with prosopagnosic patients (De
Gelder & Rouw, 2000a). Secondly, Carey and Diamond (1994) suggested two sources
of influence on the development of configural processes. There is age-independent
"holistic encoding" as reflected in the "composite effect". For children like for adults,
recognition of only one of two halves of a face is impaired if the two upright halve
faces are aligned (Young et al., 1987). Then, there is a "mystery factor" causing
increased reliance on configural information with age. This "mystery factor" refers to
the finding that the inversion effect increases with age. When tested with either
familiar or unfamiliar face stimuli, 6-year-olds showed a smaller inversion inferiority
effect than 10-year-olds, who were in turn less effected than adults. Since Carey and
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Diamond relate effects of configuration at least partially to effects of expertise
(Diamond & Carey, 1986), in this line of reasoning the larger inversion effect shown
by adults logically follows from the development of greater expertise with faces.
In a study by Tanaka, Kay, Grinnell, Stansfield and Szechter (1998) recognition of
a face part was tested either with the face part presented in isolation or in the context
of the whole face. 6-Year-olds showed with faces a "whole probe advantage" or better
performance in a whole face matching task than in a task matching a whole face to its
parts. This'holistic' advantage remained stable from age 6 to age 10, and reflected
face processing since it was only found with upright and not with inverted
presentation. In contrast with Carey and Diamond, these authors proposed a very
different explanation. A different performance between children and adults is found
if absolute effects are measured while similar patterns of performance are found if
relative effects are measured. Thus, upright face recognition of children is worse than
upright face recognition of adults (absolute effect), but the whole probe advantage
does not increase with age (relative effect). This explanation supports the authors'
argument that there is one process of configural or "holistic" recognition processes.
This process is stimulus rather than expertise dependent and bound to the stimulus
class of faces.
Development ofconfigural processes inface and object recognition
The studies described above represent two classes of explanations relating configural
effects either to the stimulus class of faces (Biederman & Kalocsai, 1997; Tanaka &
Farah, 1993) or relate configural effects to the fact that all faces have a similar
configuration (shared configuration) and the expertise we hold for faces (Diamond &
Carey, 1986; Rhodes & Mc Lean, 1990; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). Yet both in "expertise"
and face "module" explanations, the age-dependent inversion effect and increased
face recognition ability with age is explained as increased use of configural processes
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with age. We designed experiments to examine the development of configural
processes, and their relation to the stimulus class of faces. Note that different theories
have used different terminology, and we do not partial to one or the other theory. For
example, "configural" and "holistic" information processing has been proposed with
partially overlapping definitions, and from very different theoretical backgrounds.
Therefore, we do not differentiate between whole-based vs. relational configural
information, but we do contrast this kind of information with featural or parts-based
information. The first question, then, is whether the development of face recognition
goes hand in hand with the development of configural (or whole-based) information.
Our second question relates to the "relative vs. absolute" hypothesis described above
(Tanaka et al., 1998). We looked at the relative pattern of performance by making
comparisons within age group. We compared their patterns of performance with both
face and object (non-face) stimuli. Our studies supported two main conclusions.
Firstly, what changes with age is not availability of configural processes, as even
three- and four-year-olds showed configural rather than piecemeal processing.
Secondly, configural processing depended on stimulus class for adults but not for
children. Thus, what develops with age is not a manner of processing but rather the
interaction between the manner of processing and stimulus class.
Experiment 1 - 2: Do Children look at Non-Facial Cues or Inner Face Features?
A well-known study by Carey and Diamond (1977) presented evidence that children
might process faces not only less efficiently but might even use a qualitatively
different manner. They found that children showed no effect of inverted presentation
on recognition performance (while adult performance is severely impaired with
inverted presentation of a face), and that children were easily misled by
139
Chapter 5
paraphernalia (e.g. a hat or a different expression). The latter result was taken as an
indication that recognition of inner face configuration is not yet as fully developed in
children as it is in adults, and therefore children predominantly process external or
non-facial cues instead. However, deSchonen and colleagues show that even 4- to 5-
month old infants are able to recognize their mother's face from the internal face
features (de Schonen, Gil de Diaz, & Mathivet, 1986; de Schonen & Mathivet 1990).
In our first two experiments, we will examine whether children judge external
features rather than inner face features. One possibility is that children show a pattern
of judging primarily the external features as was found by Carey and Diamond.
However, we believe that children are able to see the face configuration and therefore
are able to judge inner face features, if they have a good understanding of what the
task is.
We did not present faces with paraphernalia such as hats. Instead, we switched
the hair and hairline of faces. In this manner, we avoided testing whether children are
more directed towards facial vs. object cues. Previous studies have shown that this
relative importance might depend on similarity of the faces used (Flin, 1985). Instead,
we tested whether children can judge the inner face features or if this ability is so
undeveloped that they depend on judging the hair.
In a second testing session, we repeated the experiment with familiarized faces.
First familiarization might diminish the effect of hair on the judgement of inner
features for adults, as previous findings have indicated that adults recognize familiar
faces better from internal than external features (Ellis, Shepherd, & Davies, 1979).
Further, children might base their answer more on external and adults more on
internal features when presented with famous faces (Campbell & Tuck, 1995) and
familiarized faces (Campbell, Walker, & Baron-Cohen, 1995). Therefore, a better
insight in the adults vs. child preference is provided by presenting results obtained
with unfamiliar and familiarized faces.
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Experiment 1
Participants. We tested three age groups: 20 first graders (7- and 8-year-olds) 21 six
graders (12-year-olds) and 20 adults (students). These participants saw Experiments
1, 2 and 3, however a few times the children or students did not see the whole
experiment and could not be included in the experiment either because of computer
failure or because a child refused to continue. In Experiment 1, two participants of the
youngest age group were excluded for this reason.
Materials. Six male and six female faces with a neutral expression were
photographed in frontal view with a Canon Still Video Camera RC-560 on a Video
Floppy Disc VF-50. Photographs were prepared as grayscale pictures with an image
processing and production program (Aldus Photo Styler) for presentation on a
computer monitor. First we selected pairs of faces with a more or less similar overall
outline (face shape). The picture editing computer program was used to switch the
hair and hairline of two paired faces, creating two extra faces for each face pair. The
"switched hair" stimuli stilllooked like perfectly normal faces (see Appendix H). The
target and probe face were always of the same set. The inner face features could be
either "same" or "different", and both these response categories could be presented
with hair that was congruent or hair that was incongruent with the correct answer.
This resulted in four conditions: 1) "same iace" that is identical to the preceding
picture, 2) "same face" with different hair, 3) "different face" that is totally different
(i.e. the other person), 4) "different face" with same hair. Each face was presented
with each of the four faces of the set (thus one for each condition). This results in a
total of 16 face presentations for each face pair, and a total of 96 presentations.
Experiments 1 to 3 were run with a Pentium Olivetti desktop. Stimuli were presented
on the 14' computer screen and subtended a visual angle of 7.3 degrees. Stimulus
presentation and response recording was piloted by Me12 software in all experiments
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presented in this paper. This software and the accompanying serial response box
allow for millisecond timing.
Procedure. Participants were seated at approximately 50 cm distance from the
computer screen. They were asked to judge as fast and accurately as possible whether
two successively presented stimuli depicted the same individual, judged from the
inner features. Two buttons on a response box were labeled "same" and "different",
and button correspondence (left/right) was balanced between participants. A trial
consisted of the presentation of a face stimulus for 1 s, followed by another face after
a 1 s delay. The second face disappeared when a response was given or after 10
seconds. After 800 ms delay the next trial started. With 24 trials in each of the four
conditions there was a total of 96 trials. The trials were presented in random order,
except that male face trials were presented first, followed after a small break by the
female face trials. Several precautions were taken to make sure that the task was well
understood. The experiment started with instructions presented on the computer
screen. For the youngest age group the instructions were read aloud by the
experimenters. To make certain that they understood that the face itself rather than
hair should be judged, in the instruction the explicit example was given: if someone is
presented with a different wig but the face itself is same, then the correct answer is
"same". The experiment started with 16 practice trials (two male and two female
trials from each of the four conditions) on which feedback was given. Moreover, after
eight practice trials the experimenter presented four trials (one of each condition)
manually. If an error occurred in these trials, the right answer was given while the
pictures were shown simultaneously and the instruction to "judge the face itself" was
repeated. Thus, though no reference to the switching of hair was made, it was
clarified to each participant that the hair was to be ignored to come to the right
answer. The instructions on the computer screen were presented again, before
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continuing with the last 8 practice trials. The experiment continued if the participant
had no further questions. At the start of the experiment indeed each participant
indicated understanding the instructions.
Results. In all experiments we analyzed data by entering errors and correct
response times (RT) in separate ANOVAs, and an alpha level of.05 was used for all
statistical tests. In Experiment 1, hair (congruent, incongruent) and response category
(same, different) were within-subject factors, and age group was between-subject
factor. Errors showed a very strong interference effect of incongruent hair (F(1, 56) =
157.96, p < .001). This effect was visible in each age group, but stronger for children
than for adults (F(2, 56) = 4.71, p = .013). The effect of hair was stronger in "same" than
"different" trials (F(1, 56) = 93.2, p < .001), and as can be seen in Table 5.1 this effect
was present in all age groups. Response times reflect the same pattern as errors. There
is an interference effect if the hair is incongruent with the right answer (F(1, 56) =
52.86, p <.001) and a non-significant finding of bigger interference with younger
participants (F(2,56) = 2.4, p = .11). Furthermore, there was a main effect of response
category (F(1, 56) = 12.99, p = .001) which interacted with age group (F(2,56) = 5.43, p =
.007), as children but not adults were faster with "same" than -different- responses.
Response category interacted with the (in) congruency of hair (F(1, 56) = 16.83, p <
.001) as the interference of incongruent hair was much stronger in "same" trials. This
effect was present in all age groups. Overall, both children and adults showed worse
and slower performance if hair was incongruent with the correct answer.
Furthermore, this effect seemed to be stronger for children than for adults. As
previous studies have indicated that the pattern of internal vs. external feature
judgement might differ between familiar and unfamiliar faces, we repeated the
experiment with familiarized faces.
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Table 5.1 Mean response time (RT) and standard error (SE) of the mean (in ms) and
percentage correct for the three age groups on the different trial types (congruency of
hair and response category) in Experiment 1.
congruent incongruent
age group correct response RT      SE    % Cor RT SE % Cor
adults "same" 877    45   96      1044    54   76
"different" 922    51   94       958    47   92
12-year-olds "same" 1123    56   93      1284    72   65
"different" 1313    75   84      1371    79   74
7- or 8-year-olds same 1412    85   82 1714 118   53
" ..
"different" 1636    89   73      1719    97   62
Experiment 2
Participants. The same test was repeated, but participants were familiarized with
some of the face stimuli. One of the young children had an extreme response bias
with a perfect score with "same trials" and only two correct answers in "different"
trials and was excluded from analysis. Included were 19 7-and 8-year- olds, 20 12-
year-olds and 19 adults.
Learning thefaces. Participants were familiarized with two male and two female
faces from the face set described in Experiment 1 using the following procedure. A
face was presented on the computer screen for 3 s. This was followed by 3 s
presentation of the fictional name of the person (e.g. 'this is Anna') or fictional
biographical information (e.g. 'Anna likes to ride a bicycle'). Finally, the face was
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again presented for 3 s. This procedure was repeated three times for each face, the
first time always with presentation of the name and the other two times with one of
the 4 pieces of biographical information of that face. These three presentation trials
were followed by three trials of the other face of the same sex. The male and female
face blocks were repeated in total four times each, with a short pause between blocks.
After familiarization, a test was administered in which participants were asked to
name aloud faces presented to them. Each of the familiarized faces was presented
three times, in random order. Participants were then tested on recognition of three
quarter view faces. Participants indicated whether a face was one of the learned faces
or not. In two blocks (one male and one female) eight trials were presented in random
order, each familiarized face was presented two times with four unfamiliar faces.
Only if the participant had zero errors in this test he or she continued with the test
session. If the number of errors was between 1 and 5, the three quarter view test was
repeated. A score of more then 5 errors was taken as an indication that faces were not
learned well enough, and the familiarization program was then repeated.
Procedure. After the participants had performed a task with the familiarized faces
(presented as Experiment 3, see below) the face matching task of Experiment 1 was
repeated. The experiment started with 16 practice trials. After 8 practice trials, and
before starting the experiment the instructions were repeated. In the instructions it
was explained that participants again had to judge whether two sequentially
presented stimuli depicted the same or a different individual, and that the hair
should be ignored. It was added that while some of the faces would now look
familiar, the task remained the same. Each of the familiar faces was presented one
time in each condition. The unfamiliar face pairs were also presented only one time in
each condition, making a total of 48 experimental trials.
145
Chapter 5
Results. First all trials were analyzed together to see if Experiment 1 was
replicated. Errors and correct response times were entered in separate ANOVAs with
hair congruency (congruent incongruent) and response category (same, different) as
within-subject factor and age group as between-subject factor. More errors were
made on incongruent than congruent hair trials (F(1, 55) = 91.18, p < .001). This was
effect was stronger with younger participants (F(2, 55) = 4.55, p = .015). Hair
congruency interacted with response category (F(1, 55) = 88.16, p < .001), as
particularly many errors were made with incongruent hair in "same" trials. Due to
these errors, performance was overall worse with "same" trials than "different" trials
(F(1, 55) = 4.81, p = .033). Hair incongruent with the right answer slowed response
times (F(1, 55) = 93.67, p < .001) and more so with younger age (F(2, 55) = 12.16, p <
.001). Furthermore, response times showed again that incongruent hair disturbs
"same" trials much more than "different" trials F(1, 55) = 6.0, p = .018. This effect does
not interact with age-group.
Familiarity. A separate analysis was performed to test the hypothesis that the
effects found in Experiment 1 would be found with familiar faces. This was done as
some trials were ambiguous with regard to familiarity (e.g. if an unfamiliar face is
matched with an unfamiliar face with familiar hair, is this a "familiar" or an
"unfamiliar" trial?). Therefore, we made a second analysis but only on trials with a
familiar face target. Thus, the learned (familiar) face was followed by a face from one
of the four conditions: the same face, same face but different (unfamiliar) hair,
different (unfamiliar) face and different face with same hair.
As there were fewer measurements in a cell, three children (7- and 8-year-olds)
could not be included in response time analysis due to empty cells. The familiar face
selection showed the same main effects as reported above and in Experiment 1.
Responses were slower (F(1, 52) = 35.39, p <.001) and more errors were made (F(1, 55)
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= 54.80, p < .001) if the hair was incongruent with the right answer. The latter effect
was stronger with the young children (F(2,55) = 3.54, p = .036). Both latency (F(1, 52) =
18.01, p < .001) and accuracy (F(1, 55) = 30.26, p < .001) indicated that the effect of
incongruent hair was much stronger in "same" trials than in "different" trials. Due to
this strong interference performance in "same" trials was overall better (F(1, 55) =
13.5, p < .001) than performance in "different" trials.
Discussion
Children could judge the inner face features as adults could, but both children and
adults are disturbed by incongruent hair. This interference of incongruent hair shows
that neither children nor adults completely switched to an analysis of inner face
features only. However, some difference between the age groups does exist as we did
find that the interference was stronger for children than for adults. We further found
that congruent hair interference was stronger on "same" than "different" trials,
independent of age group. The effects were replicated in the second experiment, and
even a separate analysis on a smaller set of trials with a familiar face target manifests
the same pattern. All results indicated that children, as compared with adults, are less
skilled in inner face feature recognition.
Carey and Diamond (1977) suggested that children are more impaired by
paraphernalia as they cannot access configural face information. As we will argue
below, our results do not indicate that children depend on perception of external
features (hair) only. Still, it can be maintained that children process the face in a
featural manner and sometimes pay more attention to the hair and sometimes judge
an internal feature. For example, the distinctiveness of the face might play a decisive
role on the impact of external features (see Flin, 1985; Baertninger, 1994). The second
possibility is that children do not depend on featural analysis and process the whole
face (inner and outer features) of each face instead. In this case, the children might not
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be as efficient as adults in selectively judging inner features of this face. These two
alternatives will be explored in our next experiment.
In our study, familiarization of the face did not result in different pattern of
external feature interference. As with unfamiliar faces, children and adults are
impaired if hair is incongruent with the right answer, and this interfering effect is
stronger with "same" than in "different" trials. Furthermore, familiarization did not
provide an alternative strategy for children: again the interference of incongruent hair
is stronger with children than with adults. Apparently, both for children and for
adults learning a face included external features, as presenting the same face but with
different hair and hairline were hard to recognize as "same face".
Our results indicate that children had not exclusively judged the hair features.
The performance level in incongruent hair trials was above chance for both age
groups and thus shows confusion from, rather than judgement of, the external (hair)
features. Another clear indication that both age groups did not simply judge the hair
is provided by the finding that the interference effect is much stronger with "same"
trials than with "different" trials. Responses based solely on the hair could not have
provided this difference between the two response categories. Detailed inspection of
the results gives some insight in the strategy used by children and by adults. First
"same" answers were provided faster than "different" ones. Young children might
have narrower "concepts" (less exemplars in a class) which creates a tendency for
overdiscrimination for children whereas adult errors reflect overgeneralization (Saltz
& Sigel, 1967). However, we found the faster response of "same" answers was
particularly strong with the young children, indicating that they quickly saw the
overall similarity of two faces. This indicates that both adult and children used a
"generalizing" manner (quickly finding overall similarity) more efficiently than the
"discrimination" (finding differences) manner, which was supported by the finding
that incongruent hair interfered more strongly in "same" than in "different" trials.
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Looking at overall similarity (inner and outer features together) makes two face
pictures look very different when they are presented with different hair. In contrast a
different face is already "different", even if the hair is the same. As can be seen in
Appendix H, indeed a "same" face looks very different if presented with different
external features (hair and hairline). The fact that stronger interference of incongruent
hair in "same" than in "different" trials was found equally with children as with
adults therefore seems to indicate that children also looked at overall similarity, and
did not depend on featural analysis.
As we said at the beginning of this discussion, there are two possible
interpretations of these results. Either the children analyzed separate face features.
However, we propose that children do not depend on featural analysis (as also
argued by Tanaka et al., 1998; Carey & Diamond, 1994). Furthermore, we wish to
explore a distinction between age dependent and age independent configural
processes. In our next experiment we directly test whether children are more than
adults impaired if access to featural information is disturbed.
Experiment 3: Do Children Depend on Analysis of Face Features?
Experiment 3 presented a direct test on the role of face features (such as eyes, mouth
and ear) in both adults and children. Participants learned to recognize the faces, and
were then presented with a recognition task using face pictures fragmented in either
"natural parts" (face features intact) or "unnatural parts" (face features are divided).
In line with our previous assumption we did not expect that the children, as
compared with adults, would depend more on featural analysis. Thus, we do not
expect the fragmentation condition to interact with age. In fact if we are correct in
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assuming that both groups use configural processes the advantage of "natural parts"
condition will be small or even absent for all participants.
Experiment 3
Participants. In this experiment 19 7- and 8-year-olds, 21 12-year-olds, and 20
students participated.
Materials. The same face stimuli were used as in Experiment 1 and 2. The frontal
view of these two male and two female faces had been familiarized. 22 Faces not
shown in the previous experiments were used as unfamiliar faces. Stimuli were
fragmentized in "natural" and -unnatural" parts. In a preliminary test 11
participants were asked to draw lines on printed pictures of 11 faces and 11 pairs of
shoes. Participants were asked to indicate what the parts of the face/shoe were, by
marking separate pieces on the pictures. For each picture, lines were put either such
as "keeping the parts intact", or "crossing through the parts". Results were consistent
with the anticipated finding of what are "the parts of a face", namely the inner,
nameable features (eyes, nose and mouth). No such coherence was found with the
shoe pictures, apparently no consensus existed in this case on what the "natural
parts" are. For the faces, participants never drew a line through one or both eyes.
Next important were the mouth and nose, and third the hairline and ears. These
results were used as guideline to creating the stimuli in which the face images were
divided in 3,4 or 5 "natural" or "unnatural" parts. Natural parts stimuli always had
both eyes intact while unnatural parts stimuli had at least one of the eyes divided.
Next, at least one of the other two important features was divided in the unnatural
parts faces while these were all intact in the natural parts faces (see Appendix J for an
example). In the five parts condition, also ear or hairline could be divided in the
unnatural condition while left intact in the natural condition. We took care to
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minimize the possibility that either natural or unnatural parts were easier to judge
due to other stimulus properties, e.g. part size or part orientation. Therefore the
overall variability in fragmentized stimuli was made as big as possible (e.g. including
the 3,4, and 5 parts conditions). Furthermore, in creating the stimuli natural and
unnatural fragmentation was alternated. The two stimuli, one in the natural condition
and one in the unnatural condition, were made as similar as possible in terms of sizes,
shapes and orientation of the parts. The four familiar faces were presented mixed
with 22 unfamiliar faces and subtended a visual angle of 7.3 degrees.
Procedure. Participants were seated at approximately 50 cm from a computer
screen. The fragmentized face stimuli were presented on the computer screen one ata
time and disappeared at response (or after 6.5 s if no response was given).
Participants were asked to answer as fast and accurately as possible, and to press the
button marked "yes" if they saw one of the familiarized faces, and "no" if it was an
unfamiliar face. After a delay of 700 ms., the next trial started. Each of the familiar
faces was presented once in each of these presentation conditions, resulting in 24 (4
by 6) "familiar" trials. An equal number of "unfamiliar" trials were presented. The
total of 48 trials was presented in random order, but with 24 male face trials followed
after a short break by 24 female face trials. Button correspondence (left/right) was
balanced between participants.
Results. Participants clearly did understand the instructions, and had no problem
discerning the familiar and unfamiliar faces as the groups never showed chance
performance. The 7- and 8-year-olds made 17.5% errors, the 12 -year-olds made 13%
errors, and the students made 6% errors. Data were entered in an ANOVA with
familiarity and fragmentation (natural, unnatural) as within-subject factors and age
group as between-subject factor.
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Table 5.2 Mean response time (RT) in ms, standard error of the mean (SE) and percentage
correct of the age groups on the different trial types in Experiment 3.
stimulus stimulus
age group familiarity fagmentation RT SE % Cor
adults unfamiliar natural 1081       74      95
unnatural 1063      74      97
familiar natural 1030      57      93
unnatural 1076      53      90
12-year-olds unfamiliar natural 1541       68      88
unnatural 1506      58      91
familiar natural 1736 110      84
unnatural 1633      70      86
7-or 8-year-olds unfamiliar natural 1913 118      84
unnatural 1867      98      88
familiar natural 1885 129      79
unnatural 1762 102      78
The analysis of errors only showed that more errors were made in familiar face trials
than in unfamiliar face trials (F(1,57) = 8.86, p = .004). Response times were longer if a
face was fragmentized in natural parts than when it was fragmentized in unnatural
parts (F(1, 57) = 4.38, p = .04). As can be seen in Table 5.2, this was the case in all
groups and all conditions, except with the familiar faces in the adults group. This
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interaction between familiarity and fragmentation in the students group was however
not significant. Further, there was an interaction between familiarity and age group,
(F(2,57) = 3.24, p = .047), due to a faster response to familiar faces by the youngest
children, slower response to familiar faces by the older children, but little difference
for the adults.
Discussion
In accordance with our previous hypotheses, these results show no evidence that
children depend on parts-based processes. Children did not even show a relatively
stronger dependence on parts-based processes since like the adults they showed in
fact an advantage of unnatural parts condition. This can be interpreted as dependence
on relations between the face parts, as we will discuss below. Further, as found in the
previous experiments, learning the face did not interfere with "configural" or whole-
based processes. If anything, adults rather than children use a more featural approach
with familiar faces.
The reversed effect of an "unnatural parts" advantage was not expected.
However, in retrospect it does not seem illogical, as fragmentation keeping the face
features intact logically means that the areas in between the features are in separate
stimulus fragments. This between-features information is relatively spared in
"unnatural parts" condition. Thus, the "unnatural parts" advantage might very well
reflect the processing of spatial relations between the parts.
Although these main findings were found equally with familiar and unfamiliar
face trials, some additional interaction effects were found with the factor familiarity.
There is an advantage for unnatural parts division in all groups and conditions, with
the interesting exception of adults judging familiar faces. This could reflect that for
familiar face recognition adults rely more on internal features (see Ellis et al., 1979;
Young, Hay, McWeeny, Flude, & Ellis, 1985; De Haan & Hay, 1986).
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Our studies indicate presence of configural processing in children as much as in
adults. In the following experiments we extend these findings in three ways. First we
use a well-known paradigm to measure relative importance of the face configuration,
by measuring the size of the "inversion effect" in children and adults. If children
process stimuli in a more feature-based manner, inverted performance is as good as,
or only minimally different from, upright performance. Second, as explained in the
introduction, the experiment will be designed such that both relative and absolute
differences can be measured. We expected to find not only better performance with
upright faces for adults than children, but also a stronger inversion effect with
increasing age (relative effect). Both faces and objects are presented in upright and
inverted orientation to children and to adults. This design allowed us to measure not
only whether children differ from adults in the degree to which they depend on
featural as opposed to configural processes, but we can also relate manner of
processing to stimulus class. Finally, the previous experiments were delayed
matching tasks or involved recognition of learned faces. In order to study the early
(perceptual) stage of recognition, in the next experiment we present a simultaneous
matching task that involves little memory involvement.
Experiment 4-5: Do Children Differ from Adults in the Use of Configural
Information?
The most well-known effect reflecting configural processes in face recognition is the
inversion effect. Previous findings have provided smaller inversion effects with
children as compared with adults (Carey & Diamond, 1977), but also showed that if
floor effects were controlled for an inversion effect can be found even with young
children (Carey, 1981; Fagan, 1979). If the hair interference from the previous
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experiment reflects that children do process the face configuration we expect that
they will show a clear face inversion effect.
Furthermore, in this study we will contrast the two hypotheses presented in the
introduction, and in addition propose a third alternative. First if the use of
configuration is bound to the stimulus class, then the inversion effect will always be
bound to face rather than object stimuli, independent of age. The second hypothesis
says that use of configuration is acquired with age, and therefore predicts increased
inversion effect with age. The third possibility we wish to introduce is that the
relationship between configural information processing on the one hand, and face vs.
object recognition processes on the other hand, changes with age. For both the
children and the adults, we examined the use of configural information in face stimuli
as compared with the use of configural information in object stimuli. In this manner,
it is possible to not only examine use of configuration in children, and face-specific
configural effects in children and adults. Moreover, we are interested to see whether
the interaction between use of configural information and stimulus class is the same
in adults as in children.
In the next two experiments children and adults performed a matching task with
object and face stimuli presented either in upright and inverted orientation.
Furthermore, we presented two separate tasks, wholes-matching and whole-to-part
matching. The first was set up to encourage whole-based processing while the latter
encourages parts-based processing.
Experiment 4
Participants. 20 6-year-old classmates (10 male) were tested in their school
environment. 24 Students (12 male) from Tilburg University received course credit for
participation in the experiment.
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Materials. 32 Faces and 32 shoes served as stimuli. Black-and-white photographs
were taken with a Canon Still Video Camera RC-560 on a Video Floppy Disc VF-50.
Pictures were edited (with "Aldus Photostyler") for presentation on the computer
monitor. 16 Faces (8 male and 8 female) were photographed once in frontal and once
in 34 view and 16 models (8 male) were photographed only in 3/4 orientation to serve
as distractor stimuli. Similarly, 16 pair of shoes (8 male shoes) were photographed in
frontal and 3/t view, and another 16 pair of shoes were photographed only in 3/4
orientation to serve as distractors (for an example of the face and shoe pictures see De
Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, & Degos, 1998). For shoe stimuli, frontal view was defined as
the view were the tip of the shoe is pointing towards the camera, and 3/4 View
photographs were taken with the tip turned in horizontal plane. Different views were
presented as we expect that matching over view encourages viewpoint independent
processing of the whole stimulus. Faces and shoes were presented in upright as well
as inverted orientation.
A trial consisted of a triad of pictures, all of the same type (face or shoes; upright
or inverted; male or female). The target was presented at the top, with two probes
side by side below. The positive probe was the 34 profile view of the same
person/shoes, while the negative probe was the 34 view of a different person/pair of
shoes. Each target-probes combination was presented twice: the positive probe was
once on the right side and once on the left side. Furthermore, each combination was
presented both in upright and inverted condition. Stimuli extended a horizontal and
vertical angle of 4.6 degrees.
An Olivetti desktop computer was used for testing (both adults and children),
with the stimuli appearing on the computer screen. As children needed to be seated a
bit closer to the computer screen, visual angle was 9.15 degrees.
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Procedure. Presentation was blocked by the two factors stimulus class (face and
shoe) and orientation (upright and inverted). Each participant saw each of the four
blocks, with 64 randomized trials for adults and 16 randomized trials for children in
each block. Block order was balanced between participants.
A trial started with a 500 ms warning signal. The target and two probes were
presented simultaneously. Participants were asked to indicate as fast as possible
which of the two pictures, left or right was the positive probe by pressing the
corresponding key on a response box. The next trial started after key press.
Results. As we were interested in the relative pattern of performance, thus the
effect of orientation found with adults and the effect of orientation found with
children, separate ANOVAs were run for adult and child participants. The factors
were stimulus class (face or shoe) and orientation (upright or inverted). Adults
showed more errors (F(1, 23) = 14.44, p = .001) and slower responses (F(1, 23) = 18.78, p
< .001) in the inverted as compared with the upright presentation condition. Latency
scores showed slower responses to faces than to shoes (F(1, 23) = 70.90, p < .001).
Furthermore, an interaction was found between stimulus class and orientation, both
in accuracy (F(1, 23) = 12.34, p =.002) and in latency (F(1, 23) = 8.36, p = .008). As can
be seen in Figure 1, adults show a stronger inversion effect with faces than shoes.
Children show faster (F(1, 19) = 80.44, p < .001) and more accurate (F(1, 19) = 12.32, p =
.002) responses to shoes than to faces. Again, responses to upright stimuli were faster
(F(1, 19) = 10.03, p <.005) and more accurate (F(1, 19) = 12.15, p = .002) than responses
to inverted stimuli. In contrast with the adults, children showed no interaction




Figure l Child and adult mean accuracies in face and shoe matching tasks.
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Experiment 5
Again upright and inverted face and object stimuli were presented to adults and
children. However, adjustments were made to encourage a parts-based strategy in
this experiment. Firstly, instead of whole stimulus matching this experiment required
matching isolated stimulus parts of faces or objects. Secondly, in the previous
experiment a frontal view target was accompanied by three quarter view probes.
Rotation presumably encourages encoding of global shape information. Experiment 5
presents both whole target and part probes in the same (frontal) view. This way, a
strategy of analyzing the target by selectively processing a feature (eyes and mouth)
is encouraged and could improve performance. Finally, as the present experiment
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was designed to encourage parts-based analysis, we presented object stimuli with
clearly discernable and identifiable parts. We use the houses that have a similar house
outline and only differ in two features (attic window and front door) described above.
Participants. The same participants as tested in Experiment 4 saw this Experiment
with order balanced between participant.
Materials. Black-and-white photographs of faces and houses served as the basis
for stimuli. The 16 frontal view pictures of faces (eight male) described in Experiment
4 served as whole face stimuli. The eyes or mouths from these faces, presented in
isolation, served as face part stimuli. Photographs of houses were taken with the
same apparatus as described in Experiment 4, and subsequently computer edited to
grayscale pictures. One prototypical picture of a house was selected to be used as
framework. Only the roof and outer contour was left intact the rest of the house was
filled with a uniform gray color. Eight different houses were created by placing inner
features (a door and two windows) taken from eight other houses in this contour. The
features were always in a standard configuration: house contour and location of the
three inner house features were always the same. Thus, eight house stimuli differed
only in the features used as three inner features. House part stimuli were the attic
window or door features of these houses presented in isolation. As we wish to
encourage parts-based processing in this experiment the parts presented were
exactly same as the parts in the whole stimuli (e.g. no difference in viewpoint). Faces
and face parts, and houses and house parts were presented in upright or in inverted
orientation.
Triads of pictures were made as described in Experiment 4. The only difference is
that the whole stimulus presented at top is now accompanied by two part probes
(side by side) below. The visual angle for whole stimuli was 4.6, and for the part
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stimuli between 0.5 and 2 degrees. Further materials and procedure were as described
in Experiment 4.
Results. Analyses were as described for Experiment 4, and we will first discuss the
results of adult participants. Overall, responses were slower (F(1, 23) = 8.72, p = .007)
with inverted as compared with upright presentation condition. More errors were
made (F(1, 23) = 34.94, p < .001) and responses were slower (F(1, 23) = 155.53, p < .001)
to faces than to houses. Furthermore, latency showed an interaction between stimulus
class and orientation (F(1, 23) = 6.04, p =.022). As can be seen in Table 5.3, there is a
clear result of stronger inversion effect with faces than houses. Children showed
faster responses (F(1, 19) = 26.87, p < .001) and made less errors (F(1, 19) = 30.40, p <
.001) with houses than with faces. In this experiment for children neither latency nor
accuracy showed a significant effect of orientation. The contrast between child and
adult performance in Experiment 4 and 5 is represented in Table 5.3.
Discussion
Adults show slower and worse performance with inverted as compared with upright
presentation condition, independent of task. Children, however, showed slower and
worse performance with inverted stimuli in the wholes matching task, but no effect of
orientation in the whole-to-parts matching task. Furthermore, another revealing
difference between age groups was found. In Experiment 4, where both age groups
show inversion effects, adults showed a stronger effect of inversion with faces than
with object stimuli. This relative effect of inversion (also found in normal adults by
Yin, 1969) was not found in the performance pattern of 6-year-olds, whose inversion
effect was equally strong with face as with object stimuli. Thus, two separate results
were obtained of configural information in face vs. object recognition in children and
adults. First children and adults showed an equally strong overall effect of inversion.
Second, adults but not children showed a larger inversion effects for faces than
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Table 5.3 Mean correct response time (RT) in ms, standard error of the mean (SE) and
percentage correct in each stimulus condition in Experiment 4 and Experiment 5.
age group stimuluscondition RT           SE        % Cor
Experiment 4 adults face upright 1363       96      93
inverted 1920 152      89
shoe upright 869       39      91
inverted 973       40      90
children face upright 3451 242      82
inverted 3903 292      77
shoe upright 1792 113      91
inverted 2144 139      85
Experiment 5 adults face upright 1773      86      95
inverted 1955      96      94
house upright 1138      40      97
inverted 1163      35      98
children face upright 3199 243      81
inverted 3242 230      84
house upright 2411 160      95
inverted 2305 125      95
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objects. While adults' inversion effect has developed to become tied to face stimuli,
children's inversion effect depends more on task than on stimulus class.
In contrast with Tanaka's proposal, these results cannot be explained by the
development of a single (face-specific) dimension of configural process. Instead the
data indicate that configural processes are already present in children, and can be
used with faces as well as object stimuli. These results are thus consistent with the
explanation suggested in the discussion of the previous section (Experiment 1 to 3)
that children process the face configuration and do not simply process separate
features. Before we turn to the implications of these findings, note that our design
addressed the problem of unequal levels of absolute performance by comparing
relative rather than absolute performance. The counter argument (Flin, 1985; Carey,
1981) that children's inversion effects were obscured by their generally poorer
performance (i.e. a floor effect) cannot explain our findings. First of all, inversion
effects could have easily been found in latency. Furthermore, note that a floor effect
did not interfere with our accuracy scores as children's performance was far from
chance.
One important finding in these studies is that children do show an effect of
inversion, suggesting again that configural processes are present at 6 years. Previous
models (Carey & Diamond, 1977) suggested that configural processes develop with
age (possibly related to increasing expertise). This would underlie children's worse
performance on face encoding tasks as well as the small or absent (Carey et al., 1980)
inversion effect. Our findings, however, indicate that the difference between children
and adults face recognition performance does not lie in feature-based processing of
the former and configural processing of the latter. Age-dependent availability of
configural processes would have resulted in a small or even absent effect of inversion
with the children. Our conclusions supplement to Carey and Diamond's (1994) recent
notion of an increased inversion inferiority effect with age. Our results add to this
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finding that this increased inversion effect is not a general increased use of
configurational information. Instead, we suggest that the difference between children
and adults lies in the interaction between manner of processing and stimulus class.
In our next experiment we extended these findings in two ways. We studied
whether a parts-based manner of processing would appear in very young children, as
6-year-olds might already have acquired a considerable level of face recognition
performance and experience. Furthermore, we studied whole-based vs. part-based
processes with a more direct approach, by contrasting and comparing a wholes
matching task with a task where the whole target is matched to part probes. In
designing the experiment particular care was taken to make the results of the two
tasks comparable. The relative importance of whole-based processing as indicated by
an advantage of the wholes matching task over the whole-to-part matching task was
measured with both adult and child participants. The two tasks were performed not
only with faces and objects (houses) stimuli, but were also presented with non-objects
(scrambled faces). These latter stimuli have exactly the same constituents as a face,
but are not part of the "face class" (or any other stimulus class stored in memory).
This manner we could examine the influence of presence or absence of within-class
discrimination.
Experiment 6: How do Younger Children use Configural Information?
Experiment 6 was set up to test the main conclusions from the previous experiments,
in a different manner and with different face stimuli. Similar to the design used by
Tanaka and Farah (1993) and Tanaka et al. (1998) we presented adult and child
participants with a wholes matching and a whole-to-part matching task. Tanaka and
Farah propose a close link between face processes and configural processes, and did
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indeed find that the face part was recognized better in the context of a whole face
than in isolation (face-specific "holistic" processes). In contrast children in our study
did have the ability to use configural information but this was not dependent of
stimulus class. We examined the advantage of wholes matching task over whole-to-
part matching task with faces, non-faces and object stimuli. This design allows
separate examination of the two factors emerging from our previous experiments.
First the influence of stimulus class as shown in different performance level with
faces as opposed to scrambled faces or objects. Second, an advantage of wholes
matching over whole-to-part matching would indicate the use of configural as
opposed to featural (parts-based) processing. Importantly, we can also examine the
interaction between these factors. Our hypotheses are in line with the findings of the
previous experiments and thus in contrast with the proposal of Tanaka and Farah
(1993) and Tanaka et al. (1998). We expect that even these young children show an
effect of task, since we propose that children can use configural information. Our
second hypothesis is that for adults the wholes matching advantage is much stronger
with face stimuli than with scrambled faces or objects. Our third hypothesis is that
children do not show an interaction between effect of task and stimulus type.
Experiment 6 directly tested the influence of configural information on different
stimulus types. Furthermore, we examined whether our previous findings could be
extended to young children. Therefore, this experiment was presented to children
much younger than those reported previously, namely three- and four-year-olds.
Experiment 6
Participants. In a pilot study we found that the youngest age group we could
present this matching task to and observe adequate performance levels were 3-year-
olds. Children were tested either at home or in a daycare center. To ascertain that all
children understood the task and were able to perform it children were only tested if
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they succeeded in the initial paper test and the first trials of the computer test. Sixteen
children saw the whole experiment. Two children were excluded from analysis
because their mean score with the face stimuli was below chance. Mean age of the 14
children (4 male) was 3 years and 8 months, ranging from 3 years 2 months to 4 years
and 5 months. In addition, 14 students from Tilburg University participated.
Materials.
Simplified pictures of faces and houses were created from computer-
editing black-and-white photographs (houses were similar to those used in
Experiment 5). Prototype face and house pictures served as framework, in which one
of a set of six pairs of eyes/ one of six attic windows were put making six different
faces and six different houses. Scrambled faces were made by switching the eye and
mouth locations. A stimulus consisted of three pictures with one target at top and two
probes side by side below. In the whole-to-part matching task (WP), a whole face
target was presented simultaneously with two pair of eyes, one identical and one
different from the eyes in the target. Similarly, a whole house was presented
simultaneously with one identical and one different window probe. In the wholes
matching task (WW), the target and probes were whole faces or whole houses. The
distractor whole face or whole house differed from the target (correct probe) only in
the eyes in the case of faces (see Appendix K for an example) and only in the window
in the case of houses. Thus, the critical difference between target and foil probe was
the same in both tasks. To further equalize the two tasks, participants were always
informed that the answer could be found by comparing the eyes (in the faces), or
window (in the houses). Both adults and children were tested by use of a Pentium
laptop PC Compaq Armada 4150 computer, with stimuli presented on the 12" screen.
With participants seated at a distance of approximately 30 cm from the computer
screen, a whole stimulus subtended a visual angle of 2 degrees.
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Procedure. Each participant saw both tasks with presentation blocked by stimulus
class (normal face, scrambled face and house). In each block participants saw 2
practice trials followed by 6 experimental trials. After the first 48 trials, a second set of
36 trials (no practice trials) followed. As young children's scores might be particularly
susceptible to presentation order effects, this experiment was presented in two halves,
allowing within-participant balancing of task and block order. Furthermore, the
number of child and adult participants was equalized, so that the exact same design
of balancing could be used for child and adult participants.
A trial started with an 800 ms warning-tone, followed by simultaneous
presentation (until response) of target and two probes. Participants were instructed to
indicate as fast and accurate as possible their choice of left or right probe by pressing
the corresponding button on a response box.
Before the experiment started, children saw a paper test with easy pictures,
presenting a wholes matching and a whole-to-part matching task. Testing was
continued only if the paper test and the initial block of computer test showed that the
children were able to perform the task, and understood instructions. Each block
started with two practice trials with feedback. The experimenter was seated next to
the child with one hand on the response box. As soon as a child indicated the answer
by pointing at it on the screen, the experimenter pressed the corresponding key.
Further materials and procedure were the same as presented to adult participants,
but as it is hard for children this young to concentrate for a prolonged time, children
were tested on two separate days.
Results. The much better and faster performance with houses as compared with
face stimuli raises the problem of a possible floor effect. Errors and correct response
times (RT) were entered in separate ANOVAs, with task (WW, WP) and face stimulus
(normal, scrambled) as within-subject factors. We will first report results of the
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adults. Performance was faster in the WW (whole probes) than the WP (part probes)
task (F(1, 13) = 9.65, p = .008). This advantage of wholes matching task was bigger
with normal faces than with scrambled faces (F(1, 13) = 9.0, p= . 01) (see Table 5.4).
There was no main effect of normal vs. scrambled face. No significant effects were
found in accuracy measurement. A separate ANOVA showed that less errors were
made with houses on the WW then on the WP task, but this effect did not reach
significance (F(1, 13) = 3.22, p = .096).
Similarly to adults, children were much faster and more accurate with the houses
than with the faces. No effect of task was found either in accuracy or latency.
Unfortunately, this finding is difficult to interpret given the fact that trials with
houses were much easier to perform as compared with the normal or scrambled faces.
Correct response times and errors on face stimuli were entered in separate ANOVAs
(as described for adult participants). Response times showed faster performance in
the WW task than in the WP task (F(1, 13) = 6.65, p = .023). As the task was relatively
difficult for these young children, effects were found in accuracy rather than latency.
The wholes matching task was performed better than the whole-to-part matching task
(F(1, 13) = 6.15, p = .028). There was a better performance with normal faces than with
scrambled faces (F(1, 13) = 20.06, p < .001). No interaction was found, rather children
simply showed an added effect of the two factors, with normal face in wholes
matching tasks showing best and scrambled face in whole-to-part matching task
showing worst performance (see Table 5.4).
Consistency. Because of this new design of comparing a child's pattern of
performance with the pattern of performance of an adult, and because the children
were very young, we were concerned about the consistency of the child data. We
were interested to see if there were important differences between the children, e.g.
based on age or sex. However, we did find great consistency between the children. By
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looking at the pattern of each of the 14 children individually we found that no child
showed a disadvantage of normal as compared with scrambled face, and only 2
children showed a disadvantage of WW over WP task. Furthermore, we compared
the youngest four with the oldest four children, and found that these two child
groups showed only a slight overall worse performance for the youngest age group.
An ANOVA with the added between-subject factor of these two child groups showed
that this factor did not interact with any of the main or interaction effects.
Table 5.4 Mean correct response time (RT) in ms, standard error of the mean (SE) and
percentage correct for both adults and children in both the wholes matching and whole-to-
part matching task in Experiment 6.
whole - whole whole - part
age group stimulus class RT        SE      % Cor RT         SE      % Cor
adults normal face 1210      79     88       1390     96     86
scrambled face 1312          73         85             1393          93         84
house 872     32     99        911      45     96
children normal face 7482 552     79 7984 579     68
scrambled face 7699 607     68 8522 690     62
house 5477 399     95 5412 262     96
Discussion
Both adults and children showed a general advantage of whole-based over whole-to-
part processing, indicating that even 3- and 4-year-olds use configural rather than
featural information. Adults showed an interaction between stimulus class and task
indicating that faces rather than scrambled faces profit from the presence of the whole
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face configuration. The three- and four-year-olds did not show the interaction
between these factors. Interestingly, this does not mean that children make no
difference between faces and non-faces. The children did show an effect of intact face
configuration (as adults did), with better performance in the "good face" condition
than in the "scrambled face" condition.
As in the previous experiments, floor effects cannot explain the different pattern
of results between adults and children's performance. For children to show an
interaction effect as adults did, the difference in accuracy between the two worst
stimulus conditions (WW scrambled and WP scrambled) should have been smaller
rather than larger. These results provide clear support for our previous proposition.
Children depend on whole-based rather than partial information, regardless of
stimulus condition. Again we find that the difference between adults and children
lies in the interaction between the influence of configural information and stimulus
class.
Unfortunately, the house stimuli appeared to have been too easy and have likely
influenced the comparison of the two tasks with house stimuli. The absence of an
effect of task might be the result of floor effects but it is also possible that certain
stimuli (e.g. these houses) draw as much on general parts-based processes as on
general configural processes. Possibly this depends on the task or stimulus settings.
In contrast with the study of Tanaka and Farah (1993) use of configural information in
object recognition has been indicated in a study showing CPA (Complete Probe
Advantage) with both face and object stimuli (Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999) and in a
finding of inversion superiority effect with objects (De Gelder & Rouw, 200Ob).
One important finding in this study is the wholes matching advantage found
with the young children. indicating use of configural rather than featural information
even in three-and four-year-olds. Alternative explanations for the performance levels
on these two tasks can be contrived but would predict the opposite pattern of results.
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One such explanation is to relate different performance level on the two tasks to an
effect of (selective) attention or scanning strategies. Indeed, young children find it
more difficult than adults to direct attention (Maccoby, 1967) and or are less
systematic and thorough in visual search (Vurpillot 1968). However these differences
would lead to better results in a task presenting only the relevant feature (eyes) as
compared with a task in which the relevant feature needs to be searched in the whole
stimulus. Another explanation is related to a difference in visual information in the
two tasks. However this would again lead to an opposite pattern of performance as
presenting part-probes implies that less information needs to be encoded in the
whole-to-parts task. Instead, our findings indicate an age-independent advantage in
wholes matching, thus less (or less complicated) computations are needed to make
the comparison between whole faces than to compare a whole face to face parts. This
means that even at this young age, children have encoded the face as a whole.
General Discussion
We explored the development of configural (as opposed to featural) information
processing using face and object stimuli. The major findings of these experiments are
the following. First we found that children, as compared with adults, show less
efficient use of inner face features. However, secondly even young children rely on
configural information to process faces. Thirdly, this use of configural information
was found similarly with unfamiliar as with familiarized faces. Fourthly, we found
that children also apply these configural processes when presented with objects.
Finally, the opposite pattern was found for adults who showed a selective use of
configural information with face stimuli but much less with object stimuli. Taken
together, these findings indicate that children use configural information independent
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of stimulus class whereas in adults the configural manner of processing is tied to the
stimulus class of faces. The increased use of configuration with faces but not other
stimuli presents us with the main result of this study. What develops with age is not
configural processing itself but the interaction between manner of processing and
stimulus class. As we will argue below, findings with patients suffering from
impaired face recognition ability (prosopagnosia) throw light on these data and
interpretations.
Configural processes in children
In Experiment 1 and 2 we found that incongruent external features impair inner
feature recognition performance for adults as well as for children. Children were
however more impaired by incongruent hair than were adults. As proposed by Carey
and Diamond (1977) we expected less efficient use of inner features for the children,
but we did not hypothesize an inability to use configural information. In the next
experiment (Experiment 3) we confirmed that children do not depend on featural
analysis. We presented fragmented face pictures and found that neither children nor
adults had an advantage if face features were intact (e.g. eyes, mouth). In fact both
adults and children preferred "unnatural parts" condition, were face features were
cut across. Configural information processing of children was further indicated by
their worse performance with inverted as compared with upright stimuli (Experiment
4 and 5). We found that the overall inversion inferiority effect was equally strong in
children as in adults. Finally, even very young children provided evidence for
processing of the whole stimulus rather than its parts, as reflected in an advantage of
wholes matching over whole-to-part matching (Experiment 6). Thus the different
paradigms all showed that children do not merely depend on featural or parts-based
processing. Although the exact nature of configural influence in children might not be
determined with this set of experiments (we will return to this issue below) we do
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suggest it is based in category-independent visual processes. We found configural
influence both in tasks requiring memory involvement (recognition of familiarized
faces, delayed matching tasks) as in tasks with little memory involvement
(simultaneous matching of unfamiliar faces). Furthermore, the children showed
configural processing not only with faces and objects but also with non-objects
(scrambled faces). This further strengthens the conclusion that this influence of
.configuration is based on a manner of encoding rather than related to "higher order
recognition processes.
This conclusion seems in contrast with the study from Schwarzer (2000) showing
analytic rather than holistic processing with young children, but not with adults.
However, this study used recognition of the face class rather than face matching or
identification (recognition of the individual face). As argued convincingly by Morton
and Johnson (1991) two separate systems might underlie the development of
detection of the face class vs. recognition of the individual face. The exact role of
configural vs. featural processes in face detection needs to be further explored. The
separate influence of configuration on face detection vs. face identification was shown
in a study of two prosopagnosic patients (De Gelder & Rouw, 200Ob). While both
patients had intact use of configuration in face detection and categorization, one
patient showed no influence of configuration (developmental prosopagnosic case)
while the other patients showed impaired use of configuration (acquired
prosopagnosic case) when matching individual faces.
Our results indicate that the development of face recognition ability does not go
hand in hand with a switch from featural to configural manner of processing (Carey
et al., 1980; see also Flin, 1985). The manner in which children are able to process
configural information is reminiscent of the use of "first order relational information"
proposed by Diamond and Carey (1986). Unfortunately, the exact use of this
information and properties of this kind of information processing has not yet been
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fully explicated. The present study makes a more specific proposal. First the
configural information used by children can be applied to both faces and objects (as
also proposed by Diamond and Carey) but moreover, this effect of configural
processing can be found with non-objects. Therefore, this use of configuration reflects
category-independent visual processes. Second, all effects were found with
identification tasks, and therefore the divergent pattern between adult and children
does not relate to a dichotomy between recognition of the individual face vs.
recognition of the face class.
Current results are not entirely sufficient to establish the exact nature of the
configural information extracted by children. As explained before, the notion of
"configural processes" has been used in the literature with different definitions and
from different theoretical backgrounds. Some indication on the kind of configural
processes used by the children is given in Experiment 3. We found an advantage of
"unnatural" over "natural" parts condition with both children and adults. As we
suggested before, this seems to indicate the importance of information on the
relations between parts (such as the "first order relational information" proposed by
Diamond and Carey, 1986) as information on distances between face features is
relatively spared in the "unnatural parts" condition. Still, at present we cannot draw
definite conclusions whether these age-independent configural processes are either
'relational' or'whole-based', or perhaps even involving both these kinds of
information.
Finally, we presented the children both with unfamiliar and familiarized faces.
Results indicated that the factor of familiarity had no influence on the effect of
configuration in children. Experiment 1 and 2 showed that incongruent hair interferes
with judgement of the inner face, and this effect was also found with familiarized
faces. Thus, learning the face did apparently not mean that ignoring irrelevant
information becomes easier. Experiment 3 showed that both with familiar and
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unfamiliar faces, children (and adults) show an advantage of "unnatural parts"
condition over "natural parts" condition. These results indicate that the configural
processes we found with children and adults depend on stimulus class of faces itself
rather than recognition processes related to familiar face recognition.
Age-dependent configural processes
The first conclusion, as explained in the previous section, is that children can and do
use configural information. What does change with age, however, is a stronger
influence of configuration with faces than with non-face stimuli. Only for adults was
it found that the inversion inferiority effect (Yin, 1969) and whole probe advantage
(Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999) was present with faces but not with objects. Children
showed configural effects independent of stimulus class. Thus one could say, what
changes with age is not that faces are processed configurally but that other stimuli are
not! Therefore our second conclusion comprehends that what develops with age is
not configural or whole-based processing itself, but the interaction between manner
of processing and stimulus class. We will return to this issue below.
Our data do not indicate whether the age-dependent use of face configuration is
bound to the stimulus class of faces, or is bound to the expertise we hold for faces.
Note however that these two explanations, while theoretically from a very different
origin, might in reality not diverge that much. So far, few appropriate control objects
have been reported, and it is very difficult to find control objects with the same
necessary combination of characteristics as face stimuli. If indeed there are only few
object classes where members share a configuration and in addition are participant of
expertise, the distinction between the two theories becomes blurred. When processes
involved in face recognition are exceptionally involved with objects of the same
critical combination of stimulus properties, should they be called a subset of a general
object recognition system or a specific face recognition system?
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The notion that configural processes are strictly linked to the stimulus class of
faces was not confirmed. Only with age develops a particular interaction between
manner of processing and stimulus class. What could underlie this age-dependent
face specific effect? One way to explain these findings is by interpreting an effect of
age as an effect of increasing expertise. An interpretation of our results can be found
in the notion of the second-order relational information proposed by Carey and
Diamond (1994). They relate the increased inversion effect with age to an expertise-
dependent "mystery factor". More specifically, Diamond and Carey (1986) write: "We
suggest that increasing age brings about a gain in expertise, expressed in ability to
exploit the distinguishing second-order relational features faces afford". As explained
in the introduction, these second-order relational features describe how an individual
face deviates from a "face norm" (for similar proposals of a "face prototype" or "face
norm" see Rhodes, Brennan, & Carey, 1987; Rhodes & McLean, 1990;Valentine &
Bruce, 1986a). This notion is similar to the development of a "face schema" proposed
by Goldstein and Chance (1980). They argue that the developed face schema
improves upright own-face recognition, but decreases flexibility causing worse
discrimination of little-encountered cases of inverted faces and other race faces. In
support of this view, they found evidence that the effect of inversion and race
increases with age (Chance, Turner, & Goldstein, 1982; Goldstein, 1975; Goldstein &
Chance, 1980; see also Valentine, 1988).
Effects of distinctiveness and caricatures supported the view that individual faces
are stored as deviations of the face prototype (Rhodes et al., 1987; Valentine & Bruce,
1986b). Increased use of this kind of information with age is supported in a study by
Ellis (1992). The author found no recognition advantage for atypical faces in six- and
seven-year-olds, and increasing recognition accuracy for typical faces with increasing
age. Similarly, Inn, Walden and Solso (1993) showed in a task of recognizing
previously learned faces that the number of false alarms on a prototype face increased
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with increasing age. These findings support the notion of increased use of "second
order relational feat:ures" with increasing age.
However, two additional remarks need to be made here. First although the effect
of age might be interpreted as an effect of expertise, this does not mean that
configural sensitivity depends on expertise with visually similar objects (Gauthier &
Tarr, 1997). We do not propose configural processing simply depends on sufficient
expertise, just as it does not depend simply on the special case of face recognition.
Both these explanations are not in line with our finding that children showed
configural processing of objects and even non-objects. Second, although our results
are consistent with the development of a configural face representation with age, this
model still does not explain an important contrast between child and adult
recognition performance. Children showed an effect of configuration with faces,
objects and even non-objects, while adults showed in all tasks an effect of
configuration with faces but showed a much smaller or even absent effect of
configuration with other stimuli. Thus, we need not only explain why adults process
faces in a configural manner, but moreover why this development precludes
configural processes in other stimuli. Apparently there is an age-dependent effect,
tying configural processes to face stimuli but blocking this manner of processing with
other stimuli. Clearly, our findings support an additional proposal, i.e. what changes
with age is the interaction between manner of processing and the represented stimulus
class.
A final consideration concerns the influence of familiarity. We found that our
effects were related to stimulus class rather than familiarity with the faces. We found
the age-independent effect of configuration with both familiar and unfamiliar faces.
The adult effect of configuration was found with unfamiliar faces and is therefore also
related to stimulus class of faces itself, not recognition of famous or familiarized face
stimuli. This is in accordance with the literature describing impact of configural
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information for adult participants in different settings, identification as well as
matching tasks, and with both familiar and unfamiliar faces. (Tanaka & Farah, 1993;
Young et al., 1987; Hole, 1994; Yin, 1969; Yarmey, 1971).
Findings with the children were interpreted as an influence of early visual
processes, unrelated to stimulus class. Findings with adults, on the other hand,
suggest an age-dependent influence of configuration bound to a certain stimulus
class. One explanation of these findings would be a single influence of configuration,
changing with age. However, this would mean that with age the influence of
configuration does not only change but also changes properties from stimulus-
independent to stimulus-dependent which seems not entirely convincing. Another
explanation of the results can be given by proposing two influences of configuration,
one early visual and independent of stimulus class, and the other developing with
age and related to increased knowledge of stimulus class. As we will discuss below,
this latter explanation gains further strength over the first explanation when
examined in the light of recently reported neuropsychological findings.
Comparison with Prosopagnosia
Children showed full impact of configural information, suggesting that the
development of face recognition ability does not depend on the development of
configural processes. We recently studied the relationship between configural
processes and face recognition ability in prosopagnosic patients. Prosopagnosia is a
disorder where the patient has impaired face recognition ability but is still able to
recognize a person through other cues as voice and clothing (Bodamer, 1947). In line
with the notion that development of face recognition ability depends on the
development of configural processes, it has been proposed that loss of face
recognition ability in prosopagnosia is caused by impaired configural processes
(Levine & Calvanio, 1989). We studied configural processing in prosopagnosic patient
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RP with similar tasks and stimuli as described here (Rouw & De Gelder, in press). As
the children in the present study, also patient RP showed that face recognition ability
does not simply depend on the ability of configural processing. Though severely
prosopagnosic, RP still showed intact configural processing ability in a "wholes
matching" advantage, very similar to that found with children in Experiment 6. In the
inversion experiments, RP again did not show dependence on featural information,
which would mean equally bad performance with upright as with inverted faces.
Moreover, RP showed an impaired use of face configuration, as he showed inversion
superiority effect, thus better performance with inverted than upright presented faces.
The inversion superiority effect though counterintuitive, has been reported in a
number of studies and with different patients (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995;
De Gelder et al., 1998; De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a). RP's impaired performance with a
normal face configuration was confirmed in a face inferiority effect (worse
recognition of face parts in a normal face than a scrambled face context) whereas
normal controls show the opposite pattern of face superiority. Such a pattern of
disrupted performance is not necessarily found in prosopagnosia. We contrasted a
case of developmental prosopagnosia (patient AV) where no difference between
upright vs. inverted presentation was found, with cases of acquired prosopagnosia
(patients RP and LH) who showed inversion superiority (worse performance with an
upright than inverted face). Interestingly, the inversion superiority effects in
prosopagnosia were found both with face and with object stimuli (De Gelder &
Rouw, 200Ob). Two clear conclusions from this latter finding are that the anomalous
use of configural information in the prosopagnosic patients can not be explained as
an impaired "face module" and second, it does not reflect impaired "expertise
processing". Thus, the same conclusion arises was drawn from the findings with
children: the use of configural information is not strictly bound to one particular
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stimulus class (faces) nor is it restricted to stimuli with which the observer has
expertise.
A clear parallel is found between these neuropsychological studies and the
present developmental study. For RP (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000c) and LH (De Gelder
& Rouw, 2000a) an object or face (thus a member of a known stimulus class) still
elicits a configural manner of processing (the second influence of configuration
described in the current study) but in RP and LH is defective. AV however has no
manner of processing related to stimulus class, and thus can choose an alternative
(featural) manner of processing independent of type of stimulus. Presumably,
acquired prosopagnosic patients in this case suffer from their "normal start" in which
a (now defective) manner of processing was tied to normal (upright) stimuli.
Finally, the results with prosopagnosic patient RP support a dual rather than a
single influence of configuration on recognition processes, as he shows both spared
and intact use of configural information. He shows spared use of configural
information in terms of better performance in a wholes matching than whole-to-part
matching task. The children, tested with a very similar paradigm and stimuli, showed
this same effect. Then, there is an age-dependent influence of configuration, as adults
but not children showed a relative stronger effect of configural information (the
inversion effect found with faces but not with objects). Tested with a very similar
paradigm, RP shows impaired use of the face configuration in terms of inversion
inferiority effect and face inferiority effect (worse performance with normal faces than
inverted or scrambled faces). Thus, this second influence of configuration leads to
decreased performance level in RP.
Of course an intriguing question is how RP's prosopagnosia relates to these intact
and impaired configural influences. Though no definitive conclusion can be drawn,
there are two possibilities. One, his prosopagnosia results from a defect separate from
configural processes, such as inaccessibility to an area selectively storing (familiar)
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face information. This latter explanation assumes separate storage of face information
from information on objects, which has received evidence in brain imaging studies
(Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997). One question that
arises with this explanation is however why the additional selective defect to stored
face information is not present in his performance on matching experiments. Another
possibility is that RP's prosopagnosia is related to disturbed configural processes as
measured in the inversion superiority effects. This could be the case if his post-injury
exposure to faces has resulted in selective impaired use of face representations, in a
manner similar to adults' selective use of configural representations for faces in a
constructive manner. Of course, it is very likely that a combination of these accounts
is true. RP does have some additional problem that particularly impairs face
recognition while at the same time his dependence on impaired configural processes
blocks a featural alternative.
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Categorization vs. Recognition of Own-
Race and Other-Race Faces7
We studied the use of con,figural information in processing own-race and other-racefaces. In the
first section  of this study (Experiment  1  - 4), we presented Taiwanese and Dutch participants  with
both Taiwanese and Dutchfaces in either upright or inverted orientation. The task was either matching
wholefaces (Experiment 1 and Experiment 4) or matching a wholeface to face parts (either eyes or
mouths; Experiment 2 and Experiment 3). Two di#erent presentation times were used, 200 ms
(Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) or 750 ms (Experiment 3 and Experiment 4). The own-race
advantage was clearly present in all matching experiments, but did not necessarily coincide with a
larger inversion Eectfor own-racefaces. In the second set qf experiments Taiwanese and Dutch
participants were presented with stimulus class categorization tasks, again using Taiwanese and
Dutch faces. Participants judgedfaces, shoes, and houses as yace' or 'non-face' (Experiment 5) and as
'shoe or non-shoe' (Experiment 6). In thefinal set Ofexperiments, participants decided whether a
stimulus was aface ('yace") or not ("invertedface"). In thesejace decision tasks (Experiment 7 - 9) the
stimulus was presented at 50 ms, 200 ms, or unlimited timing condition. In contrast with the
matching tasks, the tasks at the level of stimulus class categorization andface decision showed no e#ect
of race of.face.  These results indicate thotfirst, superior recognition performance with own-racefaces is
not based in configural processes only. Second, own-raceface advantage at the level Of processing
individualfaces is not mirrored by better performance with own-racefaces in a task at the level of
stimulus class recognition.




A well-known (and sometimes embarrassing) phenomenon in our social interactions
is the effect of a relative greater difficulty recognizing individuals from another ethnic
background whose facial appearance differs substantially from the own. The
phenomenon has been termed the "own-race bias" or "cross-race deficit" and has
long been known in the literature (Feingold, 1914; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969).
Laboratory as well as field studies have consistently shown that people recognize
individual faces of their own races more accurately, more quickly, and more
confidently than they recognize "other-race" faces (Brigham & Malpass, 1985;
Bothwell, Brigham, & Malpass, 1989; Valentine, Chiroro, & Dixon, 1995; for reviews).
American white and black children and students found it more difficult to remember
own- than other-race faces (Feinman & Entwistle, 1976; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969;
Galper, 1973), and both British and Rhodesian adults showed better recognition
memory of own-race faces (Shepherd, Deregowski, & Ellis, 1974). White students
showed an own-race advantage when tested with white and oriental faces (Chance,
Goldstein, & McBride 1975).
However, sometimes the effect was not found. In a matching task with white
American participants no consistent advantage was found for Caucasian over
Ja anese faces (Goldstein & Chance, 1976; Goldstein & Chance, 1978). Interpretation
of this finding brings us at an essential consideration in studying the cross-race
deficit. If only a single participant group is included in the study, it is always possible
to propose an alternative explanation based on the hypothesis that face stimuli from
8 For convenience we will adopt the term  "race". Note however that we do not yet know  what
factors underlie the "own race advantage", nor is it clear what defines one "race" as opposed
to another.
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the one condition are simply more difficult to differentiate than the face stimuli in the
other condition. Therefore a true cross-race deficit is that performance level with one
vs. the other race faces depends on participant group. Still, in general it would seem
that the cross-race recognition deficit has been confirmed repeatedly in a wide variety
of participants (for reviews see Anthony, Cooper, & Mullen, 1992; Bothwell, Brigham,
& Malpass, 1989).
As Valentine (1991) point out the theoretical basis of this effect is not yet clearly
understood. For example, it has been proposed that some face type is inherently more
difficult to recognize. However, as we have already explained, the different studies
do not converge in pointing at one face type as more difficult than another.
Furthermore, this proposal cannot explain the own-race advantage measured with
two cross-race participant groups (Shepherd et al., 1974). A very different kind of
explanation relates the cross-race deficit to racial prejudice, but again this explanation
has not found empirical confirmation (Lavrakas, Buri, & Mayzner, 1976). There is
mixed evidence for the hypothesis that people have different processing strategies for
own- and other-race faces (Chance & Goldstein, 1981; Devine & Malpass, 1985), as
well as for the hypothesis that worse recognition is related to less contact with the
other group (Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Carroo, 1986; Ng & Lindsay, 1994). One
recent and interesting proposal, supported by a series of experiments, was put
forward by Levin (in press). He suggested that the relative worse performance with
cross-race faces is a consequence of selective processing styles, with cross-race
processing based on specification of race at the expense of individuating information.
Whatever the explanation, better recognition of the own-race face than other-race
of face points at more efficient processing of the own-race face stimulus. This suggests
that the "own-race advantage" is at least partially based in more efficient visual
processing. This assumption is supported in tasks specifically designed to test
perceptual skills in matching own- and other-race of faces. Lindsay, Jack, and
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Christian (1991) found an own-race advantage in tasks with tachistoscopic
presentation of a sample face, requiring matching rather than identification of the
faces. Goldstein and Chance (1978; experiment 4) found no own-race advantage using
a perceptual task. But in this study only white participants were tested, allowing an
alternative explanation that the Japanese faces were intrinsically easier (see Lindsay et
al.). Lindsay et al. did test both groups of participants in a visual matching task with
both races of face, and indeed the own-race advantage was obtained.
The experiments presented in the present study are specifically designed to
examine the visual processes involved in own- vs. other other-race recognition. This
allows us to study the functions underlying own- vs. other face recognition, as well as
the broader question what visual processes are involved in face recognition.
Functions involved in face recognition 7
One clear account of what functional difference underlies the processing of own- vs.
other-race faces was proposed by Rhodes, Brake, Taylor, and Tan (1989). The authors
started with the notion, put forward by Diamond and Carey (1986), that an important
component of expertise with faces is the ability to encode "second-order relational
properties". Since all faces share a basic configuration, the recognition or
discrimination of individual faces is based on variations on this basic framework. Tile
second-order relational properties are thus subtle variations of the basic configuration
of features. This information is contrasted with "first-order relational information"
which is simply the relations between the parts, and is useful if the configuration is
not fixed (e.g. discriminating a stool from a chair). Rhodes et al. referred to the
information assumed essential for face recognition ability (second-order relational
information) simply as "configural information". The own-race advantage, then, is
based at better or more efficient use of this configural information for faces with
which we have expertise (our own race).
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A well-known effect reflecting the particular importance of relational (configural)
information in face recognition is the "face inversion effect", or the finding that
presenting a stimulus upside down impairs recognition of faces more that recognition
of other stimuli. This effect is explained by the relative greater difficulty retrieving
configural as opposed to featural information from stimuli in inverted orientation.
Diamond and Carey (1986) presented upright and inverted face and dog stimuli
and found inversion effects equally strong with dogs and face stimuli, but only for
dog experts. The authors thus supported their claim of a relation between the use of
configural information and expertise with a certain stimulus class (if the members
share a configuration). The inversion effect then reflects the use of "second-order
relational information", information used with stimuli sharing a configuration with
which the observer has expertise. Similarly, Rhodes et al. (1989) hypothesized that
"configural" coding is possible only for faces with which the participants have
expertise. This assumes a relationship between greater experience (expertise) with
own-race faces and the use of configural information.
Studies testing this explanation of the cross-race deficit by measuring the
inversion effect in own and other-race faces have reported mixed results. Sometimes a
larger inversion effect was found with the other race of face, such as a larger
inversion effect with black as compared with white faces by white participants
(Valentine & Bruce, 1986). In contrast Burgess (1998) did not find a larger inversion
effect with own- than with other-race of face. However, neither study presented the
face stimuli to cross-race participant groups, allowing an alternative explanation of
some coincidental differences in stimulus difficulty. Rhodes et al. (1989) presented
both European and Chinese participants with a study set of European or Chinese
faces followed by a recognition test of the sets in either upright or inverted
orientation. Both groups were better with European faces. A greater inversion effect
was found for the own race, but this effect was stronger for Chinese participants. In
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Experiment 2 the authors tried to avoid ceiling or floor effects, and increased
difficulty by presenting not only randomly paired target and foil probes but included
a matched (similarly looking) probes condition as well. Randomly paired faces did
indeed show a larger own-race than other-race inversion effect. For matched pairs, all
participants showed a larger inversion effect for Chinese than for European faces.
Rhodes and colleagues argued that expertise in face recognition is associated with the
ability to use configural information (as argued by Diamond & Carey, 1986). The
critical effect of a larger own-race than other-race inversion decrement was found, but
the effects were not always strong and apparently were dependent on precise
conditions of the recognition test. In this study we will examine whether such a larger
inversion effect with own-race faces is found in visual matching tasks.
Unfortunately, the study by Rhodes et al., does not provide information
concerning the relation between own-race advantage and the size of the inversion
effect. Although the authors hypothesize that the better performance with own-race
faces should be accompanied by a larger inversion effect the own-race advantage
was not reported in the experiments. Thus, in the present set of experiments we
report both effects so that it becomes clear whether the own-race advantage is
necessarily accompanied by stronger dependence on configural information in own-
race as opposed to other-race faces.
Next the findings of Rhodes et al. suggest that it is possible that relative
dependence on configural information depends on precise settings of the matching
experiments. The question, then, is if the presentation of faces necessarily induces
configural encoding. The use of processing route could depend on the task at hand.
For example in previous studies with prosopagnosic patients we found that the two
patients showed very different patterns of impaired performance in tasks of matching
individual faces, but both were similarly unimpaired in discriminating faces from
non-faces. We suggested (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a) that recognition of the
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individual face (subordinate level) might use a different route from recognition of the
stimulus class "face" (at superordinate level). The other-race effect presents us with
an excellent opportunity to further study this proposal. The own-race advantage
reflects more efficient visual processing of the own race than the other race in
matching or recognition of individual faces. Does this advantage influence visual
processes involved in categorization or detection tasks at superordinate level? If face
recognition at the individual (subordinate) and stimulus class (superordinate) level
share representations and processes, one would expect that the visual expertise with
own-race faces enhances performance at detection and categorization tasks as well.
The present study
The purpose of the present study was twofold. First we studied the "own-race
advantage" and its dependence on configural information (as measured in the
inversion effect) in visual matching tasks. We presented Dutch and Taiwanese
participants with matching tasks with Dutch and Taiwanese faces in both upright and
inverted orientation. In line with previous research we expected that the own-race
advantage need not be found exclusively in identification of previously learned faces,
but would also be present in visual matching tasks with unfamiliar faces. We
therefore expected that Dutch participants show better performance with upright
Dutch faces as compared with upright Taiwanese faces, and a reversed pattern of
better performance with upright Taiwanese faces than upright Dutch faces for
Taiwanese participants. The consistency of this effect was examined by performing
four experiments, using two different tasks and two presentation times.
An equally important issue is whether the inversion effect is stronger with own-
than cross-race faces. If the own-race advantage depends on the use of configural
information, the occurrence of an own-race advantage is expected to be accompanied
by a larger inversion effect for own-race faces. However, if there is not such a strict
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relationship between expertise with the own race and the use of configural processes,
the better performance with own-race faces needs not be accompanied by increased
inversion effect.
The second issue concerns the distinction between processes involved in
recognition of the face class (face categorization or face decision) as opposed to
processes underlying recognition of the individual face. Does the advantage with
recognition of own-race faces spill over to better detection or categorization of an
own-race face as a "a face"? As explained above, in previous neuropsychological
reports we found indications of separate information processing functions underlying
recognition of the individual face vs. recognition of the face class (De Gelder & Rouw,
2000a). Related to these findings of divergent use of the face configuration in
categorization or decision vs. recognition of individual faces in prosopagnosia (De
Gelder & Rouw, 2000a), we expect that the advantage with own-race faces in task at
the level of the individual faces is not mirrored in better performance in tasks at the
level of face class recognition.
Face Matching Experiments
Four different matching experiments were designed, using two different tasks and
two different presentation times. Presentation time was either 200 ms, which allows
only a single glance and no time to examine the stimulus in detail, or 750 ms
presentation which still is sufficiently difficult to counter ceiling effects but also
allows examination and re-examination of the stimulus. Further, we presented a task
matching whole stimuli across viewpoint, which was assumed to encourage a whole-
based approach (Experiment 1 and Experiment 3), while processing of individual face
parts is promoted by whole-to-parts matching task (Experiment 2 and Experiment 4).
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The variations in task and presentation time were included to encourage different
processing strategies and convey the robustness of obtained effects (such as own-race
advantage and inversion effects). We expect to find a better performance with own-
than other-race faces, and a better performance with upright than inverted faces. If
only use of configural processes underlies the own race advantage, these two factors
should interact: the better performance with own-race faces is always accompanied
by increased inversion effect. However it is also possible that in fact both feat:ural and
configural processes are involved in the own race advantage.
Participants. Participants were 16 students from Tilburg University, Tilburg, The
Netherlands and 16 students from the National Yang-Ming University in Taipei
Taiwan. A participant saw all matching experiments.
Materials. Digital photographs were taken of 14 male students of Yang-Ming
University and 14 male students of Tilburg University. Models were photographed in
frontal view and in 34 view with a neutral expression. None of the faces had
distinctive non-facial cues such as facial hear or glasses. Background or clothing cues
were removed with a photo-editing computer program. There were 14 face images in
each Face Type (Taiwanese vs. Dutch), 8 of which served as target stimuli and 6 as
distractor stimuli. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 the targets and distractors were
whole face pictures (for an example of the Dutch faces see Appendix C, for an
example of the Taiwanese faces see Appendix L). Target faces were presented in
frontal view and the two probes were presented below in 34 view. Matching over
viewpoint was included in this experiment as it seems that understanding of global
shape is necessary to make such transformation. Besides making the task more
difficult this is assumed to encourage a strategy of processing the whole face
configuration rather than the single face features. In Experiment 2 and 4 the same
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whole face targets were matched to part probes; either the eyes or mouth presented in
isolation. In all four experiments stimuli were presented either with target and probe
stimulus in normal orientation ("upright" condition) or with all stimuli rotated 180
degrees ("inverted" condition). A face picture measured 7.5 by 7.5 cm, and from a
distance of approximately 40 cm the stimuli subtended a visual angle of 10.6 degrees.
Stimuli were presented on a 16. computer screen. Stimulus presentation and
response recording was piloted by Me12 software in all experiments. This software
and the accompanying serial response box allow for millisecond timing.
Procedure. A target face was presented at the top of the screen for 200 ms,
followed after a 1000 ms delay by two probes presented side-by-side at the bottom of
the screen. Probes were presented until key press, or disappeared at 3200 ms if no
response was given. The next trial started after 600 ms. The probes were whole face
probes in Experiment 1, and part probes in Experiment 2. This same procedure was
followed in Experiment 3 (whole probes) and Experiment 4 (part probes) but in these
experiments the presentation time of the target was extended to 750 ms. Both
Taiwanese and Dutch participants saw all four experiments.
Trials were blocked by Stimulus Type (Taiwanese vs. Dutch) and Orientation
(Upright vs. Inverted). In each of these four blocks a face target was presented with
the correct probed two times at the left, and two times at the right side, resulting in 32             
trials per block. Each block started with four practice trials (one of each condition),
making a total of 256 trials per experiment. Feedback was provided on the practice
trials but not on the experimental trials. Both the block order within an experiment
and the order of presentation of the experiments were balanced between participants.
In an instruction presented on the computer screen, participants were asked to
indicate (by pressing the leftmost or rightmost key on the response box in front of
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them) as fast and accurate as possible whether the left or the right picture presented
the correct probe.
Results Experiments 1 to 4
In all experiments the data were analyzed by entering errors and correct response
times (RT) in separate ANOVAs. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.
We first examined overall patterns of performance by entering data in an ANOVA
with Stimulus Type (Dutch face vs. Taiwanese face) and Stimulus Orientation
(upright vs. inverted) as within-subject variable, and Participant Group (Dutch vs.
Taiwanese) as between-subject group. A relative inversion effect (a stronger
inversion effect for own face than other face type) would be reflected in a three-way
ANOVA. Furthermore, we specifically examined the own-race advantage comparing
only upright face condition in an ANOVA with Stimulus Type (Dutch face vs.
Taiwanese face) as within-subject variable and Participant Group (Dutch vs.
Taiwanese participant) as between-subject variable.
Experiment 1: Wholes matching with 200 ms presentation. Responses were in general
Slower to inverted faces (F(1, 45) = 38.03, p < .001). Response times also showed an
interaction between Stimulus Type and Participant Group (F(1, 45) = 4.45, p < .05), as
Dutch participants showed an overall faster response to Dutch than Taiwanese faces,
while Taiwanese participants did not show such effect. In accuracy, a main effect of
better performance with Dutch than with Taiwanese faces was found (F(1, 45) = 13.89,
p = .001). Performance was worse with inverted than with upright faces (F(1,45) =
84.36, p < .001), and this inversion effect was stronger for Taiwanese participants (F(1,
45) = 6.10, p = .02). Neither accuracy nor latency showed a three-way interaction
between Stimulus Type, Stimulus Orientation, and Participant Group.
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Own-race effect. Response times showed no main effect of race, but an own-race
advantage was observed as the interaction between Face Type and Participant Group
was significant (F(1, 45) = 8.60, p = .005). As can be seen in Table 6.1, Dutch
participants were faster with Dutch upright than Taiwanese upright faces, while
Taiwanese participants showed the opposite pattern. In accuracy, there was an
overall worse performance with Taiwanese face stimuli (F(1, 45) = 20.37, p < .001).
Experiment 2: Whole-to-Part matching with 200 ms presentation. One Taiwanese
participant showed scores on the conditions approaching chance (mean percentage
correct was 53%), and was excluded from analysis.
Response times only showed a main effect of slower responses to Dutch than to
Taiwanese face stimuli (F(1, 45) = 11.62, p = .001). Accuracy showed an interaction
between Stimulus Type and Participant Group (F(1, 45) = 4.50, p =.04), as Dutch
participants were better with Dutch than Taiwanese faces, while Taiwanese show an
opposite pattern. Again a main effect was found of worse performance with inverted
than upright presentation condition (F(1, 45) = 38.38, p < .001). Importantly, in this
experiment we found a three-way interaction (F(1, 45) = 7.36, p =.009). A separate
analysis on the two participant groups showed that Taiwanese participants show an
interaction in accuracy, and as can be seen in Table 6.1 the worse performance with
inverted presentation was stronger for own (Taiwanese) than other face type (F(1, 22)
= 4.70, p = .04). This interaction was not significant for Dutch participants.
Own-race effect. Response times showed only an effect of faster responses to
Taiwanese face stimuli (F(1, 45) = 4.08, p < .05). However in accuracy an own-race
advantage was observed (F(1, 45) = 15.42, p <.001) as Dutch participants were better
with Dutch faces while Taiwanese participants were better with Taiwanese faces.
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Experiment 3: wholes matching with 750 ms presentation. There was an overall effect
of better (F(1, 46) = 6.20, p = .02) and faster (F(1, 46) = 5.55, p = .02) responses to Dutch
than Taiwanese faces. In response times this effect interacted with Participant Group
(F(1, 46) = 6.37, p = .015), as Dutch participants responded much slower to Taiwanese
than Dutch faces while Taiwanese participants did not show such difference. There
was again an overall effect of Stimulus Orientation, with both faster (F(1, 46) = 86.38, p
<.001) and better (F(1, 46) = 108.4, p < .001) responses to upright than inverted faces.
In response times Stimulus Orientation interacted with Stimulus Type (F(1, 46) = 9.22,
p = .004) as the inversion effect was stronger for Taiwanese than for Dutch face
stimuli. In accuracy, Stimulus Orientation interacted with Participant Group (F(1, 46)
= 7.35, p = .009) as the orientation effect was stronger for Taiwanese than Dutch
participants. In neither latency nor accuracy did we find a three-way interaction.
Own-race effect. In latencies an own-race advantage was observed (F(1, 46) = 8.33,
p = .006); Dutch participants were faster with upright Dutch than upright Taiwanese
faces, while Taiwanese participants showed the opposite pattern. Accuracy showed
an overall better performance with upright Dutch than upright Taiwanese faces (F(1,
23) = 3.04, p = .10).
Experiment 4: whole-to-part matching with 750 ms presentation. Response times
showed an overall pattern of faster responses to Taiwanese faces (F(1, 46) = 11.82, p =
.001), particularly for Taiwanese participants (F(1, 46) = 5.50, p = .02). Performance
was better with upright than with inverted faces (F(1, 46) = 56.06, p < .001). Accuracy
also showed an interaction between Stimulus Type and Participant Group (F(1, 46) =
7.16, p = .01), as Dutch participants were better with Dutch faces while Taiwanese
participants showed an opposite pattern of better performance with Taiwanese Faces.
No three-way interaction effects were obtained.
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Table 6.1 Percentage correct and mean correct response time in ms (RT) in face matching
experiments.
Dutch participant Taiwanese participant
task orientation stimulus % Cor RT % Cor RT
WW 200 up Dutch                          94               650                  91               806
Taiwanese                88            731               87             775
inverted Dutch                          87               783                  81               904
Taiwanese                 83              838                78              931
WP 200 up Dutch                        79            1007                72            1161
Taiwanese                76            978               79           1085
inverted Dutch                        71            1031                66            1164
Taiwanese                   72               935                  67             1083
WW 750 up Dutch                        94              832                92              835
Taiwanese                 88              862                89              750
inverted Dutch                        85              969                80              970
Taiwanese                 84            1139                79            1048
WP 750 up Dutch                        87            1144                80            1080
Taiwanese                 83            1157                82              970
inverted Dutch                        78            1163                72            1106
Taiwanese                 76            1111                 74            1013
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Own-race e#ect. In response times (F(1, 46) = 5.80, p = .02) as well as latencies (F(1,
46) = 5.36, p = .03) an interaction between Stimulus Type and Participant Group was
found, indicating an own-race advantage (see Table 6.1). In addition, there was a
trend for faster responses to Taiwanese than Dutch faces (F(1, 46) = 3.50, p = .07). As
can be seen in Table 6.1, this effect might mainly be due to the fast responses of
Taiwanese participants to Taiwanese upright faces.
Discussion
These experiments showed that a) the own-race advantage was found significantly in
all matching experiments b) the inversion effect was also clearly present but c) these
factors do not necessarily interact. The own-race advantage was obtained in each
experiment but most often was not accompanied by a larger inversion effect for own-
than other-race faces.
The relative better (or faster) performance with own- than other-race faces was
clearly present in these results, and found irrespective of task settings and
presentation time. This own-race advantage is reflected in an interaction between
Stimulus Type and Participant Group. The effect can therefore not be explained as
one type of face (Dutch vs. Taiwanese) being more difficult to discriminate than the
other face type, nor by a better performance level of one participant group over the
other.
The inversion effect was clearly manifest in these matching experiments. In all
experiments less errors were made with upright than with inverted faces. There was
an effect of task on the inversion effect in latencies, as faster responses to upright than
inverted faces were found in the wholes matching tasks (Experiments 1 and 3) but not
in the whole-to-part matching tasks (Experiments 2 and 4). This is in agreement with
our assumption that the tasks matching a part to the whole face encourage a more
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parts-based strategy, as a parts-based strategy would indeed decrease the inversion
effect.
An important finding in these experiments is that the inversion effect is not
necessarily larger for own- than other-race of face. Although both the own-race
advantage and the inversion effect were clearly present in all matching experiments,
we did not find evidence that the underlying factors of these effects depend on each
other. Only in one experiment did we find an own-race advantage as well as a larger
inversion effect with own- than other-race faces. Our results thus indicate that the
own-race advantage can exist in the absence of particular dependence on configural
as opposed to featural information (as measured in the inversion effect).
Why did the three-way interaction appear only in Experiment 2? Let us first look
at the possibility that floor or ceiling effects blocked such interaction. The pattern of
performance in the other experiments does not confirm such hypothesis. For one, all
conditions are far from chance (over 70% correct). For all experiments there is
sufficient room for better performance with own race upright as well as for worse
performance with other race in inverted condition. Furthermore, if this explanation
were true, one would expect that the patterns of performance at least show the right
direction for a three-way interaction, which is not the case.
If the larger inversion effect with own face is not prevented by ceiling or floor
effects, then why does it only appear in Experiment 2? Logically it is somehow related
to the specific task settings, which are short presentation time, and probes consisting
of only eye or mouth. At this moment, we do however not know what is the correct
explanation as it is not possible to establish what factors cause the appearance of a
larger own- than other-race inversion effect. We do not believe this is an important
issue in this manuscript as it is not of consequence to our main findings and
conclusions.
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We found that indeed participants are worse in matching other-race than own-
race faces. However, the better performance with own-race of face does not
completely depend on configural processes, as in this case the own-race advantage
would always be accompanied by a stronger interaction effect with faces of the own
race than faces of another race. This suggests that the other-race advantage depends
on featural or parts-based information, as well as on configural information.
In our next two sets of experiments Dutch and Taiwanese participants are asked
to recognize faces as "a face" (recognition at the level of stimulus class). Again we
examine the effect of own- vs. other race of face. The relationship between race and
detection is yet unclear. Greater familiarity might be expected to lead to quicker
recognition as "a face" (e.g. the own face, see Tong and Nakayama, 1999). If the same
processing route and representations are used for recognition of individual faces as
recognition of the stimulus class faces, one would expect that the more elaborate or
efficient representations of own-race faces used in identification also facilitates
recognition of these faces as "a face". However, based on our previous findings with
prosopagnosic patients (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a) we expect that matching
individual faces depends on a different route than recognition of the face class.
Therefore, we hypothesized that an advantage with own race of faces in identification
does not influence own- vs. other-race face performance in recognition of the face
class.
Face Categorization
Participants were presented with faces, shoes, and houses and asked to categorize the




Participants. Participants were 16 students from Tilburg University, Tilburg, The
Netherlands and 16 students from the National Yang-Ming University in Taipei,
Taiwan.
Materials. Face stimuli were the 8 Taiwanese and 8 Dutch faces used as target
stimuli in the previous set of experiments. Furthermore, 16 pairs of shoes (8 male
shoes) were photographed in frontal view (i.e. with the tip of the shoe pointing
toward the camera) and in 3/4 orientation (tip turned in horizontal plane to the side of
camera). Another 16 pairs of shoes were photographed only in 3/4 orientation.
With the same apparatus, frontal view photographs of houses were taken and
subsequently computer edited as grayscale pictures. One prototypical picture of a
house was selected to be used as framework. Only the roof and outer contour was left
intact, the rest of the house was filled with an uniform gray color. With the computer
image-editing program, 16 different houses were created by placing different sets of
inner features (a door and two windows) from the other photographed houses in the
outer contour. The features were always in an identical configuration such that house
contour and location of the three inner house features were always the same. Thus,
the house stimuli were created in a manner that only subtle differences existed
between individual houses. The shoes and house stimuli were also used in previous
studies (De Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, Degos, 1998; De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a). Further
materials were as described in Experiment 1.
Procedure. Trials were blocked by task (face vs. shoe categorization). A block
started with instructions on the computer screen, followed by six practice trails. A
trial started with a 500 ms warning signal, followed by an image of a face, shoe or
house presented on the computer screen. Participants were asked to press either the
leftmost or rightmost key, indicating whether the image was target or distractor.
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Participants were always asked to respond as fast and accurately as possible. The
image was presented until key press, and the next trial started after one second. In the
face categorization task, the 16 faces (8 Taiwanese and 8 Dutch faces) were target
stimuli while distractor stimuli were the 16 shoes (8 male and 8 female) and 16
houses. These exact same stimuli were used in the shoe categorization task but now
shoes were the targets with faces and houses as distractors. These two tasks were
repeated to allow within-subject balancing of task order (shoe vs. face categorization)
as well as target-corresponding hand (left or right)
Results. Firstly we examined the overall pattern of performance of face, shoe and
house stimuli, and secondly we looked at the influence of own- vs. other race of face.
In both face categorization and shoe categorization participants showed good
performance, with high accuracy (both hits and correct rejections, see also Table 6.2)
and fast mean answers. House stimuli were always responded to fastest and with
highest mean accuracy (see Table 6.2). We compared performance with faces with
that of shoes. Faces were responded to faster or better both when presented as target
(face categorization task) or when presented as distractor (shoe categorization task).
Separate ANOVA's were performed for "hit" and "reject" trials, with stimulus (face,
shoe) as within-subject factors and Participant Group (Taiwanese, Dutch) as between-
subject factors. For both Dutch and Taiwanese participants, correct responses to faces
in the face categorization task were faster than correct responses to shoes in the shoe
categorization task (F(1, 29) = 10.34, p = .003). Correct rejections of faces were however
slower than rejection of shoes (F(1, 29) = 10.99, p = .002). Again, this effect did not
interact with Participant Group. No effects were found in a similar analysis on
percentage correct.
The second question concerns the effect of own- vs. other face (Dutch vs.
Taiwanese) on performance level in the categorization tasks. The response times were
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entered in an ANOVA with Stimulus Type (Dutch, Taiwanese) as within-subject
variable and Participant Group (Dutch, Taiwanese) as between-subject variable.
Separate analyses were performed on reaction times of correct "fac€' response in the
face decision task, and correct rejection of faces ("no shoe") in the shoe recognition
task. The same analysis was performed on percentage correct scores. In the face task,
latency and accuracy showed neither a main effect of Stimulus Type, nor an
interaction of Stimulus Type with Participant Group. In the shoe task, only one effect
was found: less errors were made with Dutch than Taiwanese faces (F(1, 29) = 4.59, p
= .04). Again, no own-race bias was found, as Stimulus Type did not interact with
Participant Group.




task stimulus % Cor RT % Cor RT
face task Dutch face                              95          416              96          433
Taiwanese face                          93           407               97           432
shoe                         95      416         96      425
house                        96      395         97      404
shoe task Dutch face                            94         446             96         489
Taiwanese face                          97          436               97           498
shoe                         93      437         95      493
house                        97      412         98      464
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Discussion
Houses were always responded to faster then other stimuli. This could be related to
the specific stimuli we used, making them "stand out" and easy to discriminate from
the other stimuli. Another possibility is that the good performance is related to some
effect of training as it is the only stimulus type that was never a target and therefore
could always (in both tasks) be rejected.
We found that being presented with a face apparently facilitates both "hit" as
"false alarm" response. This is in line with previous face detection research, which
has indicated that threshold is lower at responding to face stimuli than to non-face
stimuli composed of the same features (Purcell & Stewart 1988). One could say that
the face stimuli does "stand out", facilitating affirmative response.
Most important finding was that although in the matching experiments clearly an
advantage of own- over other-race faces was found, such an effect of race of face was
not found in the categorization task. This indicates a difference between the processes
and representations involved in face matching and those involved in face
categorization. In the next experiment, we again examined the (absence of) effect of
race in recognition of the face class. Rather than categorizing stimuli as belonging to
one or the other stimulus class, we now present a face-decision task. Instead of faces
among objects, in this task faces are presented with non-faces. While in the former
experiment a strategy of looking at properties of the other classes of stimuli was
possible (which draws attention away from properties of the face stimuli), this
experiment presented only face-like stimuli. Perhaps this presence of more similar




Face and non-face stimuli were presented at either 50 ms (Experiment 7) or 200 ms
(Experiment 8) exposure time followed by a mask, or with unlimited viewing time
(Experiment 9). Participants were asked to judge whether the presented stimulus was
a normal upright face. The hypothesis is that again no effect of own- vs. other-race of
face will be found.
Participants. Participants were 16 students from Tilburg University, Tilburg, The
Netherlands and 16 students from the National Yang-Ming University in Taipei,
Taiwan. Each participant saw all tasks.
Materials. The stimuli presented in the matching experiments were again used in
this task. Again, each picture measured 7.5 by 7.5 cm, and from a distance of
approximately 40 cm the stimuli subtended a visual angle of 10.6 degrees. Each of the
two types of face stimuli ("Dutch", "Taiwanese") was presented both in normal
orientation ("upright") as well as 180 degrees rotated ("inverted") condition. All
other material settings were as described in the previous experiments.
Procedure. Each task started with six practice trails and continued with two blocks
of experimental trials. In each of these blocks 48 trials (8 per stimulus condition) were
presented in random order. A trial started with a l s warning signal, followed after
500 ms by a fixation cross at the center of the screen. In the "unlimited time" task, the
stimulus followed the fixation cross and was presented till response. In the other two
tasks presentation times were 200 ms and 50 ms and a mask of 200 ms followed the
stimulus. An instruction on the computer screen asked participants to press one key
(either right or left, depending on response condition) when presented with "a
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normal face" and to press the other key when presented with "an inverted face,
turned upside down . Tast< Cunlimited, 200 ms, 50 ms) and response condition (left
right) was balanced between participants, but the unlimited time presentation
condition was always presented last. The long viewing times might allow learning of
the images, which would interfere with performance on the other face decision tasks.
To avoid a strategy of looking at one location of the screen to see if a detail of upright
vs. inverted faces is there, pictures were presented at one of six locations slightly off
the center of the screen. RT was measured from offset of the mask.
Results. First we examined the overall pattern of performance Data were entered
in an ANOVA with Stimulus Type (Dutch, Taiwanese) and Stimulus Orientation
(Upright Inverted) as within-subject factor, and Participant Group (Dutch,
Taiwanese) as between-subject factor. In the 50 ms presentation time task, responses
were faster (F(1, 30) = 9.61, p = .004) and non-significantly better (F(1,30) = 3.43, p =
.07) to upright than to inverted faces. Responses were faster to Taiwanese than to
Dutch face stimuli, but this effect was not significant (F(1, 30) = 3.40, p = .075). In the
200 ms presentation time task, responses were faster to upright than to inverted faces
(F(1, 28) = 6.11, p = .02). In the task with unlimited presentation time no significant
effects were found. There were no significant effects of Participant Group (Taiwanese
vs. Dutch).
The second question concerns the effect of own- vs. other race of face (Dutch vs.
Taiwanese) on performance level in the decision tasks. The response times were
entered in an ANOVA with Stimulus Type (Dutch, Taiwanese) as within-subject
variable and Participant Group (Dutch, Taiwanese) as between-subject variable.
Separate analyses were performed on reaction times of correct "iac€' responses and
reaction times of correct "inverted face" responses for each of the tasks. The same
analysis was performed on percentage correct
" iace" and percentage correct
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"inverted face" answers, although few errors were made and thus no effects were
expected here. These analyses were performed not only to examine the possibility of
an own-race advantage in accuracy. Analyses of accuracy also allowed controlling for
possible trade-off effect and response bias (e.g. if relatively fast responses to a certain
Stimulus Type are accompanied by many errors).




task orientation stimulus % Cor RT % Cor RT
50 ms up Dutch                    95          534              96          612
Taiwanese                 94           527                 95            600
inverted Dutch                           93             563                  93             654
Taiwanese                   91             562                  92             633
200 ms up Dutch                    94          502              97          610
Taiwanese                   96             502                  96             611
inverted Dutch                         96            510                 95            677
Taiwanese              93          511              92          655
unlimited up Dutch                         93            454                 97            532
Taiwanese                 95            464                 97            516
inverted Dutch                         93           463                 95            529
Taiwanese               95          462              96          546
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These analyses only showed in the 200 ms presentation task a non-significant
trend (F(1, 28) = 3.97, p =.06) for overall worse performance with Taiwanese inverted
faces than Dutch inverted faces. Response times showed no effect of Stimulus (Dutch
vs. Taiwanese upright face), nor an interaction between Stimulus and Participant
Group. This absence of an effect of race of face was found in all three tasks, and both
in speed of correct "face" as correct "inverted face" responses (see Table 6.3). In
accuracy, again there was neither an effect of Stimulus Type nor an interaction of
Stimulus Type with Participant Group.
Discussion
The difference between upright and inverted orientation might be a response bias
(faster and better responses to -face" than to "non-face"). The advantage of upright
faces can however also be interpreted as a general orientation effect similar to the
better performance with upright than inverted presentation condition found in the
matching experiments. The orientation effect did not interact with race of the face
presented, or with Participant Group. This indicates that there was no effect of
response category ("face" vs. "inverted face") interacting with the own-race effect.
Only one influence of Stimulus Type was found (worse with Taiwanese faces in
200 ms inverted face condition) but this Was not significant. In these experiments, we
did not find an advantage of one's own race as opposed to cross-race faces, as the
interaction between participant (Taiwanese, Dutch) and type of stimulus (Taiwanese,
Dutch) never reached significance. The absence of this effect was clear and consistent





In the task matching individual faces, we found both an inversion effect (better
performance with upright faces than faces turned upside down) and an own-race
advantage (better with own-race than other-race faces). However, the inversion effect,
generally taken as an indication of relative dependence on configural processes, was
not necessarily larger for own- than other-race faces. As the own-race advantage was
always present this indicates that the better recognition of the own-race faces is not
necessarily accompanied by a greater dependence on configural processes. The
second and third set of experiments required recognition of the face class rather than
discrimination of faces at the level of the individual face. In these experiments no
effect of race of face was found. Thus, the higher efficiency with own-race faces when
discriminating individual faces did not make it easier to recognize this stimulus as "a
face".
In the experiments requiring matching of individual faces, as expected both the
inversion effect (overall better performance with upright than inverted faces; Yin
1969) and the own-race advantage (better performance with upright faces of the own
race than upright faces of the other race; Valentine et al. 1995) were present. In
contrast with the proposition by Rhodes et al. (1989), the own-race advantage was not
necessarily accompanied by a larger inversion effect for own- than for other-race
faces.
Our findings clearly contrast with those of Rhodes et al., and indeed there are
several differences in the design of the experiments. Most important is that our
matching experiments were set up to isolate as much as possible the visual processes
involved. While we presented a visual matching task, in the study of Rhodes et al.
participants were asked to recognize previously learned faces in a forced choice
recognition task. The second important difference is that while in our experiments
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faces are matched either in upright or in inverted orientation, in the study of Rhodes
et al. the faces were always learned in upright orientation. Thus, the "upright" vs.
"inverted" conditions differ not only in stimulus orientation but also on whether or
not a transformation needs to be made. The different conclusions in the studies might
thus be interpreted as indicating that the dependence on configural information in
these experiments is influenced by task settings. For example, perhaps the use of
configural information, as measured in the inversion effect, is more important when
memory rather than visual processes are involved. More studies would be needed to
see whether this explanation finds further empirical support.
Alternatively, the own-race effect does not completely depend on the use of
configural information. Literature does not convincingly show a larger inversion
effect with own-race faces. Even in the study of Rhodes et al., the larger inversion
effect was not always clearly present sometimes marginally significant and
sometimes even absent (matched pairs presentation in Experiment 2). Given the
difficulty of having a null finding published, it is even possible that other authors
have tried to replicate an increased inversion effect with own-race as compared with
other-race faces, but failed. Finally, Rhodes et al. did not report the own-race
advantage (better performance with upright own-race than upright other-race faces)
together with the increased inversion effect with own race. Therefore this study in
theory related the own-race advantage to a stronger dependence on configural
information but this was not measured in the experiments.
Note that our findings do not address the issue of whether faces are stored in
memory in a norm-based or exemplar-based manner. Valentine (1991) proposed a
framework in which faces are stored as points in a multidimensional space. In this
model, only exemplars are stored and therefore it contrasts with norm-, schema- or
prototype- based models (Goldstein & Chance, 1980; Rhodes, Brennan, & Carey, 1987;
Valentine & Bruce, 1986). However, in both models of how face representations are
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stored, discriminations between individual faces are based on variations of a certain
(limited) set of information. In the face recognition literature the importance of
"configural information", meaning that individual faces are discriminated through
subtle variations in relational information, is generally accepted (Searcy & Bartlett,
1996; Thompson, 1980). We therefore adopt the idea of "configural information"
being of particular importance in visual processes of face identification (in fact this
idea was confirmed by our findings), without addressing the issue whether the faces
are stored in a norm-based or exemplar-based manner.
We do not dispute the importance of experience or expertise in studies on own-
race advantage. If it is not experience underlying the better performance with own-
race faces, there must be an innate system favoring own-race faces. However the
experience hypothesis rather than the innate hypothesis is supported by the finding
that children show a smaller own-race advantage (Chance, Turner, & Goldstein,
1982). It seems very likely that the own-race advantage is at least partially based in
more experience with the own-race face. The results of the present study do however
question the hypothesis that better performance with faces of the own race is caused
by dependence on configural information only. If this is true, then why is it not
reflected in stronger inversion effect in visual matching tasks?
Previous research on the relationship between expertise and the use of configural
information has not always provided clearly interpretable results. A thorough
discussion of this question would be too extensive, but we will discuss a few
important studies here. Tanaka and Gauthier (1997) tested biology experts, car
experts and dog experts on the recognition of a previously learned whole stimulus, as
opposed to recognition of only a part of this stimulus. In all three groups, expertise
did not result in greater dependence on holistic information, as measured in the
advantage of whole stimulus condition over part condition. Does this mean that this
paradigm did not measure the same "configural processes" that are assumed to
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underlie the inversion effect? If this assumption is true, a difference might exist
between the use of "holistic" as opposed to "configural" information. Otherwise, the
study indicates that greater expertise with a certain visual stimulus class does not        -
necessarily lead to increased use of configural information for this stimulus class.
Gauthier and Tarr (1997) endorsed a view of "configural sensitivity" as a
consequence of expertise. Participants learned either briefly or extensively a set of
manufactured shapes called "Greebles". Participants that had received extensive
learning (Greeble experts) were more impaired than control participants (novices)
were, if the configuration was transformed. Unfortunately, to conclude that this
indicates a relationship between expertise and use of configural information, a similar
(control) manipulation of featural information would have been necessary. As experts
have received extensive training on these particular upright stimuli, it seems
necessary that any deviation from the learned stimuli relatively impairs experts more
than novices. Furthermore, the argument that expertise rather than face class
underlies the use of configural information is less convincing when the effect of
configuration is found with manufactured and face-like stimuli rather than real-life
objects. If factors such as expertise and within-class recognition rather than stimulus
class underlie the use of configural information, effects reported with faces must also
be found with other experts, such as the dog and car experts.
Therefore, a particular convincing argument was provided by the study of Carey
and Diamond (1986). As discussed in the introduction, Carey and Diamond (1986)
found that dog experts indeed show increased inversion effect when presented with
the type of dogs they were experts at. In our study, the participants did show greater
expertise with their own-race of face, but did not show an increased inversion effect.
One difference between our study and that of Carey and Diamond is again that we
presented visual matching tasks while their participants recognize previously learned
or familiar material. Perhaps the influence of expertise on the use of configural
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processes is related to the way these stimuli are represented in memory, rather than
to visual encoding processes.
In summary, the discussion on the role of expertise in face recognition processes
has not been settled yet. Our results have added to this discussion the suggestion that
the influence of configuration as a function of expertise might be more strongly
present in the representations stored in memory rather than being present in tasks
involving only visual processing of the stimulus. A second possibility is that expertise
with similar looking stimuli (such as faces or dogs) influences not Only configural but
also featural information. This latter suggestion also provides an alternative
explanation of the absence of "holistic" advantage stronger for expertise than for
novices in the study by Tanaka and Gauthier (1997). This does however not explain
the effect reported by Diamond and Carey (1986). Perhaps the larger inversion effect
of experts is based on their larger familiarity and therefore efficiency with upright
presentation of the dogs, while for novices there is relatively less familiarity with
upright presentation and therefore less difference between performance on upright
and inverted presentation.
In the second and third set of experiments, we presented tasks at the level of face
class recognition rather than matching individual faces. While the own-race
advantage was clearly present in all experiments matching individual faces, such
own-race advantage was not found in tasks at the level of recognition of the face
class. This suggests that the advantage with own-race faces does not influence the
decision whether the presented stimulus is a face or not. This relation has not be
studied before, but is in line with our expectations based on recent
neuropsychological findings (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a). We examined two patients
suffering from prosopagnosia, a deficit in recognizing faces in which recognition of
other stimuli is intact. These patients showed a very different pattern in face
matching experiments (one showed use of parts-based procedures while the other
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showed interference of the face configuration). However, both showed good
perception of the face in a face detection and face categorization task. We proposed a
"dual route" model, as their patterns of performance reflected different use of
configuration in the matching experiments, but this difference between the patients
had no influence on their performance in the detection and categorization tasks.
Possibly different types of representations, or different processes are involved, in the
recognition of a face as "a face" as opposed to recognition of individual faces at the
subordinate level ("John's face"). The findings in the present experiment support for
this hypothesis. Both Taiwanese and Dutch participants show expertise (better
performance) with own- than with other-race faces in the visual processes of face
recognition at the subordinate level, as shown in the matching experiments.
However, better visual processing of own-race faces did not affect performance on
the face detection and face categorization tasks. These results indicate that recognition
of the face class vs. recognition of individual faces does not rely on the same
representations and processes.
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In these studies we examined the visual processes underlying face recognition ability.
We studied prosopagnosic patients, children, and normal adults. As the chapters are
individual articles, conclusions of the studies are discussed in the chapters. Below is a
brief discussion of more general implications of our findings.
The prosopagnosic patients are unable to recognize faces, and we found the
impairment accompanied by anomalous patterns of performance in face matching
tasks. We reported "inversion superiority" and "face inferiority", thus performance
was worse with normal upright faces than with inverted or scrambled faces. For these
prosopagnosic patients the presence of a normal (upright) face stimulus blocks the
use of alternative intact processing routes. Worse performance with upright than
inverted face orientation was first reported by Farah, Wilson, Drain, and Tanaka
(1995); and their explanation of this finding assumed an impaired "face module".
This explanation was however not validated in our studies, as inversion superiority
effects were obtained not only with faces but also with other (object) stimuli.
In face recognition literature, a particular importance of'configural' or 'holistic'
processing is assumed for face recognition, while objects can be recognized using
'featural' or parts-based processes. Our studies did not support such strict division.
Face recognition ability and configural processing ability are not exactly the same, as
decreased face ability (in prosopagnosia, or in normal adults presented with other-
race faces) is not accompanied by decreased use of configural information. Vice versa,
the influence of configural processes in object recognition was shown by the
prosopagnosic's 'inversion superiority effect' with objects.
'Farah, M. J., Wilson, K., Drain, H., & Tanaka, J. (1995). The inverted face inversion effect in
prosopagnosia: Evidence for mandatory, face-specific perceptual mechanisms. Vision
Research, 35(14), 2089 - 20'93.
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Conclusions
Opposite to the assumption of a "face module" is the proposal that faces are only
special in their particular combination of stimulus properties: particularly the
expertise we all have in face recognition, and the fact that face recognition requires
discrimination of similar looking exemplars within-stimulus class (viz., the stimulus
class "faces"). As can be derived from the previous paragraph, our findings do not
support a one-on-one relationship between level of expertise and use of
configuration. Prosopagnosic patients showed an influence of configural information
in face recognition, without face recognition expertise. Use of configural information
was even found with unfamiliar objects. Furthermore, expertise with own-race faces
is not necessarily accompanied by greater use of configural information, as measured
in the size of the inversion effect.
We did find an influence of within-category matching on use of configuration, as
both the own- and the other-race of face matching performance was better with
upright than inverted faces. We propose that this effect of configuration is not strictly
reserved for face stimuli. The mandatory use of configuration in a within-category
matching task obtained with prosopagnosic patients was found with objects as well
as faces.
We also studied the development of configural processing of faces vs. objects. The
use of configuration was already found in three- and four-years-old, but only with
age the use of configuration was tied more strongly to the stimulus class of faces
rather than to objects. There is an interesting parallel between this finding and the
contrasting matching performance of acquired vs. developmental prosopagnosia.
Only the acquired prosopagnosic case, presumably born with a normal face
recognition system, showed continued influence of configuration in both object and
face matching. In contrast, the developmental case apparently lacks configural
processes altogether, and showed no effect of face or object configuration.
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Conclusions
Our final conclusion is that the representations and processes involved in
recognition or detection of the face class are not similar to those involved in
recognition and matching of individual faces. The acquired and developmental
prosopagnosic patients, impaired in face recognition but showing very different
patterns of matching performance, could both rely on intact recognition of the face
stimulus as "a face". Further support was found in our study with Taiwanese and
Dutch participants. Representations and processes used in matching tasks provided
better performance with own- than other-race faces, but these more efficient processes
or more detailed face representations did not provide an own-race advantage in face
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APPENDIX B
Performance of patient RP on standardized visual processing tasks
1. Low level visual processes
Birmingham Object Recognition Battery (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1993)
RP Normal Mean (SD)
-line length (test 2) 24/30(Normal) 26.9 (1.6)
-size (test 3) 26/30(Normal) 27.3 (2.4)
-orientation (test 4) 23/30(Normal) 24.8 (2.6)
-gap (test 5) 37/40(Normal) 35.1 (4.0)
-minimal feature match (testD 22/25(Normal) 23.3 (2.0)
-foreshortened views (test 8) 23/25(Normal) 21.6 (2.6)
-object decision (test l OB, 'hard') 27/32(Normal) 25.4 (4.7)
2. Object recognition
Boston Naming test 56/60 (normal)
Snodgrass and Vanderwart picture naming (1980) 115/120 (normal)
3.  Face  recognition
Warrington 32/50 (impaired)
Benton 31/54 (impaired)
Cartoon Faces 2/26 (impaired)
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APPENDIX C
Frontal view target with 3/4 view probes below,
simultaneous or delayed face matching task
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APPENDIX D
Frontal view target with M view probes below,
simultaneous or delayed shoes matching task
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APPENDIX F
Wholes matching task with "normal" faces
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Example of original and changed external features in "switched hair" experiments
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APPENDIX J
Face stimuli in unnatural vs. natural parts condition
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APPENDIX K
Example of whole faces matching condition presented to
children (Chapter 5); only eyes are different.
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APPENDIX L
Example Taiwanese faces in frontal view target with 34 view probes below.
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Gezichten zijn misschien wel de meest belangrijke visuele stimulim voor ons, omdat
zij ons essentiele informatie verschaffen voor het opzetten en onderhouden van
sociale contacten. Er is dan ook een intuYtieve logica in het idee dat deze belangrijke
informatie verwerkt wordt door gespecialiseerde processen in de hersenen. De vraag
in hoeverre gezichten "speciaal" zijn ten opzichte van andere visuele stimuli heeft in
recente jaren veel en divers onderzoek geinspireerd.
Een overtuigend argument voor het "speciale" karakter van gezichtsherkenning
komt uit neuropsychologische rapporten over "Prosop-agnosia" (Bodamer, 194D.
Prosopagnosia, oftewel prosopagnosie, is een vorm van agnosia (een hersenstoornis
waarbij de patiiint wel kan zien maar niet herkent wat hij of zij ziet), die specifiek is
voor gezichten. Door het specifieke en zeldzame karakter van deze stoornis doen
problemen van prosopagnosie patianten vreemd aan, zij kunnen bijvoorbeeld niet
hun eigen gezicht in de spiegel herkennen maar wel hun eigen portemonnee. Een
prosopagnosie pati8nt kan personen nog wel aan andere kenmerken herkennen, zelfs
aan visuele kenmerken zoals kleren, haardracht en lichaamshouding. Van deze
"alternatieve route" wordt vaak handig gebruik gemaakt. Een bekend voorbeeld is
een prosopagnosie patient die aan zijn vrouw vraagt een herkenbare jurk te dragen
op een feest.
Een voor de hand liggende interpretatie van deze aandoening is dat de
"gezichtsherkenning-processen" niet meer functioneren. Dit maakt echter nog niet
duidelijk op welke manier deze processen zich onderscheiden van andere processen.
10 Om het voor de leek iets begrijpelijker te maken: een "stimulus" is iets dat via de
zintuigen binnenkomt en waar een reactie op volgt. Het woord wordt gebruikt om te
beschrijven wat  in een experiment aan de proefpersoon wordt gepresenteerd, bijvoorbeeld
plaatjes van een gezicht, of plaatjes van schoenen. Nog zo'n'vakgebied' woord is
"representatie", dit verwijst naar wat in je hoofd zit waardoor je iets kunt herkennen. Je ziet
een schoen, daarna herken je dat als "schoen". Er is dus een representatie van "shoen" in je
hoofd waardoor datgene wat je ziet betekenis krijgt.
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In de gezichtsherkenningsliteratuur zou je kunnen spreken van twee kampen. Ten
eerste de theorie8n die veronderstellen dat bij het zien van gezichten (in
tegengestelling tot bijvoorbeeld het zien van een portemonnee of een huis)
automatisch "gezicht" processen in werking gesteld worden, die niet of minder
betrokken zijn bij het herkennen van andere visuele patronen. Een sterke versie van
deze theoriean gaat uit van "modules" in de hersenen (Fodor, 1983). Een
"gezichtsherkennings-module" is een verzameling aangeboren, specifieke en
onafhankelijke functies, bovendien op een speciale locatie in het brein, dat selectief
actief is bij het herkennen van gezichten.
De tweede groep theoriein gaat in tegen dit idee van specifieke processen
gereserveerd voor een bepaald soort visuele stimulus (het gezicht). In contrast met de
eerste groep theorie n zijn er volgens deze tweede groep theorieen wel objecten te
vinden die herkend worden door dezelfde processen als gezichten. Mits getest met de
juiste taken en de juiste controle stimuli zouden prosopagnosie patidnten ook slecht
presteren met niet-gezichten. Testen naar "objectherkenning" en naar
"gezichtsherkenning" zouden vaak niet vergelijkbaar zijn. Het onderscheiden van
.
objecten" (stoel, tafel, auto, mes) is relatief makkelijk omdat ze weinig op elkaar
lijken, terwijl voor het onderscheiden van gezichten veel subtielere verschillen
gevonden moeten worden. Dit betekent dat een persoon die enkel een probleem heeft
met het maken van dergelijke subtiele onderscheidingen nog steeds in staat is de
kleur van een jurk te herkennen, maar faalt bij het herkennen van een specifiek
gezicht. Volgens deze groep van theoriein zijn gezichten enkel "speciaal" in de
combinatie van eigenschappen die bij gezichten horen. Hierbij worden met name
twee eigenschappen genoemd. De eerste is dat gezichtsherkenning berust op het
onderscheiden van individuen binnen dezelfde visuele klasse (namelijk gezichten)
terwijl bij het herkennen van objecten een onderscheid tussen visuele klassen (stoel,
tafel, auto) gemaakt moet worden. De tweede eigenschap is de expertise die wij
allemaal hebben in het herkennen van gezichten; iedereen is getraind in het
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herkennen van gezichten, en in verhouding tot andere visuele stimuli worden
gezichten dan ook goed herkend.
Voor beide soorten theoriein is nog niet duidelijk welke visuele functies bij het
herkennen van gezichten horen. Er lijkt een algemene consensus te zijn over het
belang van "configurationele" informatie, hoewel de definitie van deze term sterk
verschilt. Met configurationele informatie wordt bedoeld relationele (spatidle)
informatie van de delen ten opzichte van elkaar, maar ook de plaatsing van de delen
ten opzichte van het geheel. Ook wordt de term gebruikt in het model waarbij een
individueel gezicht herkend wordt door het te vergelijken met een "gemiddeld
gezicht" dat is opgeslagen in ons geheugen. Configurationele processen kunnen dan
de relationele informatie in een individueel gezicht vergelijken met de relationele
informatie in dit "gemiddeld" gezicht (of prototype).
Los van deze theorieen over configurationele informatie bestaat een theorie die
het herkennen van gezichten in verband brengt met "holistische" informatie (Farah,
1990). Bij gezichten kijk je naar "het geheel" terwijl objecten meer "deelsgewijs"
worden waargenomen. Deze theorie wordt hier verder niet besproken. In feite is het
zo dat bij het interpreteren van resultaten van experimenten dit onderscheid tussen
"configurationeel" en "holistisch" nauwelijks gemaakt kan worden.
De term configuratie wordt hier gebruikt zonder te verwijzen naar de ene of
andere theorie, en betekent hier relationele informatie van de gehele stimulus.
Tegenover configurationele informatie staat informatie van afzonderlijke onderdelen,
en losse kenmerken. Dit is in overeenstemming met de algemene aanname in de
literatuur dat het "speciale" van gezichtsherkenning verwijst naar een bijzonder
belang van configurationele informatie, terwijl andere visuele stimuli (voor het
gemak wordt vaak een tegenstelling gemaakt tussen "gezichten versus objecten")
meer deelsgewijs worden waargenomen.
Een bekend verschijnsel bij dit onderscheid tussen gezichtsherkenning en
objectherkenning is het "inversie effect". Vergeleken met andere visuele stimuli heeft
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herkenning van gezichten veel te lijden als de stimuli niet rechtop maar omgekeerd
(ondersteboven) worden aangeboden. Omkeren vermindert de prestatie op een taak
veel sterker bij gezichten dan bij andere visuele stimuli (zoals huizen, stoelen). De
verklaring van dit effect is in overeenstemming met de aanname dat configurationele
informatie van groot belang is voor gezichtsherkenning. Omdraaien belemmert het
gebruik van "configurationele" informatie, terwijl het gebruik van informatie over de
losse delen relatief gespaard blijft.
Er is een vreemd patroon van een omgekeerd inversie effect gevonden bij
prosopagnosie pati8nt LH. Deze presteerde beter in een conditie waar de gezichten
zijn omgedraaid dan in een conditie waar de gezichten gewoon rechtop zijn
georiinteerd. Dit werd voor het eerst gerapporteerd door Farah, Wilson, Drain en
Tanaka (1995). De auteurs verklaarden dit verschijnsel door aan te nemen dat
prosopagnosie patidnten een beschadigde "gezichtsherkennings-module" hebben.
Het onontkoombare gebruik van deze module bij gewone (rechtopstaande) gezichten
veroorzaakt de slechte prestaties, terwijl bij omgekeerde gezichten alternatieve routes
aangewend kunnen worden die de prestaties verbeteren.
In hoofdstuk 1 tot en met 4 van dit proefschrift worden studies beschreven met
prosopagnosie patienten. Ondanks veranderingen in de taken en in het soort stimuli
liet de patiant die in 1995 bestudeerd was door Farah et al. (LH) opnieuw een betere
prestatie met omgekeerde gezichten ("inversie superioriteit") zien. Ook een patiant
waar dit effect nog niet eerder gevonden was (RP) liet inversie superioriteit zien.
Omdat we vooral in visuele processen geinteresseerd zijn, werden herkenningstaken
aangeboden waarbij stimuli met elkaar vergeleken werden. In veel onderzoek werden
geheugenprocessen meer aangesproken door een stimulus eerst te laten leren, en
daarna een taak aan te bieden waarin deze geleerde stimuli herkend moeten worden.
In hoofdstuk 1 staan drie experimenten beschreven, waarbij LH en controle
proefpersonen taken uitvoerden met rechtopstaande en omgekeerde gezichten. De
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controle proefpersonen (studenten) worden bij oils onderzoek getest om te bekijken
wat het normale patroon van resultaten is met deze taken en stimuli. In het eerste
experiment werden stimuli gemaakt van menselijke en dierlijke gezichten, maar
ondanks deze onnatuurlijke gezichten presteerde LH opnieuw goed in omgekeerde
maar niet in rechtopstaande conditie ("inversion superiority"). LH had daarnaast ook
een betere prestatie bij herkenning van een gezichtsdeel in een gezicht met de
onderdelen op de verkeerde plaats dan bij herkenning van dit deel in de context van
een normaal gezicht ("face inferiority"). Deze experimenten laten zien dat deze taken,
opgezet om een deelsgewijze waarnemingsstrategie aan te moedigen, nog steeds
resulteren in LH's verstoorde prestatie op een normaal, rechtopstaand gezicht.
Controle proefpersonen lieten bij deze taken het normale patroon zien van betere
prestatie met normale, rechtopstaande gezichten.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een belangrijk argument gegeven tegen de "verstoorde
gezichtsmodule" verklaring van Farah et al. LH's inversie superioriteit effect wordt
namelijk niet alleen met gezichten maar ook met objecten gevonden. Deze resultaten
geven verder aan dat LH's verstoorde gebruik van configuratie ook een rol speelt bij
het herkennen van objecten.
De resultaten in deze twee hoofdstukken gaan in tegen een strikte versie van het
model waarin gezichtsherkenning afhankelijk is van de vaardigheid om
"configurationele" of "holistische" informatie te verwerken, terwijl andere stimuli
(objecten) ook goed herkend kunnen worden op basis van informatie over losse
kenmerken of onderdelen. Het inversie superioriteit effect laat zien dat het vermogen
gezichten te herkennen verloren kan zijn zonder dat er enkel deelsgewijs wordt
herkend, immers de verschillende prestaties op rechtopstaande en omgekeerde
gezichten laat zien dat de patienten nog steeds de configuratie van het gezicht
verwerken. Dit blijkt ook duidelijk uit het voordeel van "scrambled" gezichten boven
normale gezichten bij LH (hoofdstuk 1). Deze "scrambled" gezichten verschillen
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alleen van normale gezichten in een verstoorde configuratie (mond, ogen en neus
staan op verkeerde plaats) terwijl alle andere informatie gelijk is gebleven.
In hoofdstuk 3 worden resultaten beschreven van visuele herkennings- en
vergelijkingstaken van een "acquired" en een "developmental" prosopagnosie
patii#nt. Het contrast tussen deze twee patienten toont aan dat er geen vast patroon
van gebruik van configurationele processen verbonden is aan prosopagnosie (in
overeenkomst met het idee dat er verschillende manifestaties van prosopagnosie zijn,
Schweich & Bruyer, 1993). Terwijl bij de "acquired" prosopagnosie patidnt die geen
gezichten kan herkennen sinds een ongeluk in zijn jeugd, inversie superioriteit werd
gevonden, liet de patidnt die de aandoening zijn leven lang gehad heeft geen verschil
tussen rechtopstaande en omgekeerde gezichten zien. De tweede kwestie van
hoofdstuk 3 is het onderscheid tussen het herkennen van individuele gezichten (b.v.
"Dit is Ferdinand's gezicht") en het herkennen van de gezichtsklasse ("dit is een
gezicht"). Terwijl de beide pati6nten zeer van elkaar verschilden in hun patroon van
resultaten bij het vergelijken van individuele gezichten (het verschil in inversie effect
hierboven genoemd) lieten beiden eenzelfde patroon zien van zeer goede herkenning
van de gezichtsklasse (taken waarbij een stimulus als "gezicht" herkend wordt).
Het inversie superioriteit effect van de prosopagnosie patienten laat zien dat
configurationele processen en gezichtsherkenning-processen niet precies
overeenkomstig zijn. Deze conclusie is in tegenspraak met de aanname (zie Levine &
Calvanio, 1989) dat de verstoorde visuele processen in prosopagnosie altijd
configurationele processen zijn, waardoor de patient afhankelijk is van deelsgewijze
processen.
De conclusie dat deze aanname niet juist is, wordt ondersteund door de studies
met prosopagnosie patient RP in hoofdstuk 4. De bevindingen met RP weerspiegelen
die van LH, namelijk een inversie superioriteit effect met gezichten en objecten
(huizen), alsmede een "gezicht inferioriteit effect". Ook liet RP een invloed van haar
en haarlijn op het beoordelen van interne gezichtskenmerken zien. Als totaal laten
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deze resultaten zien dat RP's slechte herkenning van gezichten samengaat met het
waarnemen van de gehele gezichstconfiguratie. Visuele processen die de configuratie
van het hele gezicht verwerken zijn in ieder geval deels intact en RP is niet
afhankelijk van deelsgewijs waarnemen van losse kenmerken.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de ontwikkeling van configurationele processen bij het
waarnemen van objecten en gezichten onderzocht. In lijn met de aanname dat
configurationele informatie van groot belang is bij gezicht de vaardigheid gezichten
te herkennen, is gesuggereerd dat een ontwikkeling van configurationele processen
ten grondslag ligt aan de ontwikkeling van gezichtsherkenning. Kinderen zouden
afhankelijk zijn van deelsgewijze waarnemingsprocessen (Carey & Diamond, 1977;
maar zie ook Carey & Diamond, 1994). In hoofdstuk 5 worden twee vragen gesteld.
De eerste is of kinderen inderdaad meer van deelsgewijze processen afhankelijk zijn
dan van configurationele processen. De tweede is of in het patroon van ontwikkeling
gevonden wordt dat gebruik van configuratie verbonden is aan de stimulusklasse
van gezichten. Als dit het geval is, zou het relatieve belang van configurationele
informatie in gezichtsherkenning, ten opzichte van objectherkenning, hetzelfde
moeten zijn bij kinderen en volwassenen. Eerder onderzoek vond wel gebruik van
configuratie bij kinderen maar stelde ook dat dit bij kinderen relatief minder
ontwikkeld is dan bij volwassenen (zie Carey & Diamond, 1994; en Tanaka, Kay,
Grinnell, Stansfield, & Szechter, 1998). Of het relatief sterk gebruik van configuratie
bij gezichten ten opzichte van gebruik van configuratie bij objecten ook bij kinderen
aanwezig is, werd nog niet eerder onderzocht.
Er werden in dit hoofdstuk de resultaten van zes experimenten besproken. Net
als RP hadden de kinderen relatief veel last van incongruent haar bij het beoordelen
van interne gezichtseigenschappen. Verder konden niet alleen de volwassenen, maar
ook de kinderen gezichten niet beter herkennen in een conditie waar gezichten
opgedeeld zijn in "natuurlijke delen" (ogen etc. intact), vergeleken met een conditie
waar gezichten opgedeeld zijn in "onnatuurlijke delen" (door ogen, mond etc. heen,
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waardoor een intact oog of mond niet meer te zien is). De derde set experimenten
testte het inversie effect bij kinderen en volwassenen, zowel met objecten als met
gezichten. In overeenkomst met eerdere bevindingen vermeld in de literatuur lieten
kinderen een betere prestatie zien bij het vergelijken van rechtopstaande dan bij het
vergelijken van omgekeerde gezichten. Echter nog niet eerder aangetoond is dat
volwassenen een sterker inversie effect met gezichten laten zien, terwijl bij kinderen
dit effect even sterk bij gezichten als bij objecten was. Tot slot werden jonge kinderen
(drie- en vierjarigen) getest. Net als volwassenen waren deze kinderen beter in een
conditie met hele stimuli dan in herkenning van een stimulusdeel. Dit "whole probe
advantage" toont aan dat ook deze jonge kinderen naar de hele stimulus en niet naar
losse stimulusdelen kijken. Opnieuw lieten alleen volwassenen een relatief sterk
gebruik van configurationele informatie bij gezichten maar niet bij objecten zien,
terwijl kinderen niet zo'n onderscheid maakten tussen gezichten en objecten. Al deze
experimenten wijzen op het gebruik van configurationele, niet deelsgewijze,
herkenningsprocessen bij kinderen (zelfs drie- of vierjarigen). De tweede bevinding
van deze experimenten is dat de relatie tussen het gebruik van configurationele
informatie en de stimulusklasse gezichten bij volwassenen (opnieuw) gevonden
werd, terwijl kinderen een invloed van configuratie bij zowel gezichten als objecten
lieten zien. Dit lijkt aan te tonen dat met leeftijd niet het gebruik van configuratie in
het algemeen ontwikkelt maar dat wat ontwikkelt met leeftijd een interactie tussen
gebruik van visuele processen (configurationeel versus deelsgewijs) en stimulusklas
(gezichten versus objecten) is.
De grotere expertise in het herkennen van een gezicht van het eigen ras ten
opzichte van gezichten van een ander ras is een bekend verschijnsel. In hoofdstuk 6
wordt onderzoek gedaan naar het gebruik van visuele informatie in eigen ras
gezichten versus gezichten van een ander ras (het gebruik van de term ras valt te
betwisten maar is hier overgenomen uit soortgelijk onderzoek). Aan Taiwanezen en
Nederlanders werden taken aangeboden met Taiwanese en Nederlandse gezichten.
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Proefpersonen werd gevraagd te beoordelen welke van de twee gezichten hetzelfde
was als een eerder gepresenteerd geheel gezicht. Er waren vier experimenten: behalve
gehele gezichten werden ook gezichtsdelen (twee paar ogen of twee monden)
aangeboden in de herkenningstaak, en hele gezichten of gezichtsdelen werden 200 of
750 milliseconde aangeboden. Zoals verwacht was het "eigen ras voordeel" duidelijk
aanwezig in al deze experimenten. Echter het voordeel van eigen ras gezichten ging
niet noodzakelijk samen met een groter gebruik van configurationele informatie bij
deze gezichten (zoals gemeten in de grootte van het inversie effect).
In een tweede set experimenten kregen Taiwanese en Nederlandse proefpersonen
taken waarbij de gezichtsklasse herkend moest worden in plaats van individuele
gezichten. Gezichten, schoenen en huizen werden als "gezicht" of "geen gezicht"
gecategoriseerd. In een ander experiment (met dezelfde proefpersonen) werden
dezelfde stimuli als "schoen" of "geen schoen" gecategoriseerd. Ook werd deze
proefpersonen een beslissingstaak aangeboden waarbij stimuli als "gezicht" of
"omgekeerd gezicht" werden geclassificeerd. Deze stimuli verschenen 50
milliseconde, 200 milliseconde of ongelimiteerd (tot het antwoord komt) op het
computerscherm. In contrast met de eerste vier experimenten werd bij deze
experimenten geen eigen ras voordeel gevonden. Dit is in overeenstemming met de
suggestie in hoofdstuk 3, dat andere functies ten grondslag liggen aan het herkennen
van de gezichtsklasse dan aan het bestuderen of herkennen van individuele
gezichten. De meer efficiente processen of meer gedetailleerde representaties die het
eigen ras voordeel in de eerste vier experimenten veroorzaakten, hadden geen
invloed bij deze taken waar gezichten als "een gezicht" herkend moesten worden.
Omdat dit proefschrift bestaat uit een reeks artikelen, worden de belangrijkste
conclusies per hoofdstuk beschreven. Deze conclusies komen ook naar voren in de
bovenstaande samenvatting van de afzonderlijke hoofdstukken. Toch zijn er ook
implicaties voor de algemenere vragen van het onderzoeksgebied, die uiteengezet
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zijn in het eerste deel van deze samenvatting. Deze implicaties worden nu besproken.
Er wordt op drie kwesties ingegaan. De eerste gaat over het onderscheid tussen het
herkennen van individuele gezichten versus het herkennen van een gezicht als "een
gezicht" (dus de algemene klasse). De tweede kwestie is wat gezegd kan worden over
wat aan het begin van deze samenvatting de "tweede groep theoriei#n" werd
genoemd. Volgens deze theoriein zijn gezichten enkel "speciaal" in de
ongebruikelijke combinatie van eigenschappen. De derde kwestie brengt ons weer
terug naar de beginvraag, namelijk of de resultaten van dit promotie-onderzoek
ondersteuning geven aan het idee dat er speciale gezichtherkenningsprocessen zijn.
De eerste implicatie van onze resultaten komt niet voort uit de vragen die aan het
begin van deze samenvatting gesteld zijn. De resultaten geven aan dat in theorie6n
over gezichtsherkenning noodzakelijk een Onderscheid gemaakt moet worden tussen
het herkennen van individuele gezichten (wiens gezicht is dit?) en het herkennen van
de gezichtsklasse (is dit een gezicht?). Dit blijkt vooral uit bevindingen in hoofdstuk 3
en in hoofdstuk 6. In hoofdstuk 3 lieten twee prosopagnosie-pati2nten verschillende
patronen zien in taken waarin indivuduele gezichten herkend of met elkaar
vergeleken moesten worden. Bij deze taken leek patiiint AV weinig of geer't gebruik te
maken van configurationele informatie, terwijl bij pati8nt RP juist het gebruik van
configurationele informatie zijn prestatie leek te verstoren. Beiden lieten echter een
heel ander patroon zien bij herkenning van de gezichtsklasse, waar ze goed op
presteerden. Zij hadden dus elk een eigen patroon van verstoringen in het herkennen
van individuele gezichten, maar dit had geen effect op de herkenning van de
gezichten als "een gezicht". Dit impliceert dat niet dezelfde visuele processen of
representaties betrokken zijn bij de herkenning van individuele gezichten als bij de
herkenning van de gezichtsklasse. In hoofdstuk 6 werden experimenten beschreven
waar Taiwanese en Nederlandse proefpersonen gepresenteerd worden met
Taiwanese en Nederlandse gezichten. Proefpersonen presteerden bij het herkennen
van individuele gezichten beter met eigen dan met ander ras gezichten. Deze meer
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efficiante processen of meer verfijnde representaties van eigen ras gezichten
veroorzaakten echter niet een eigen ras voordeel als een stimulus als "gezicht" versus
"niet gezicht" herkend moest worden. Het onderscheid tussen herkenning van
individuele gezichten versus herkenning van de gezichtsklasse is eerder gemaakt in
studies naar de locatie van gezichtsherkenning-processen (zie bijvoorbeeld
Kanwisher, 2000). De studies die hier gepresenteerd worden impliceren echter ook
een duidelijk functioneel verschil: de twee soorten taken maken niet gebruik van
dezelfde visuele processen.
De tweede meer algemene kwestie is de vraag of gezichten enkel "speciaal" zijn
door hull combinatie van eigenschappen. Vooral twee eigenschappen zijn hierbij van
belang. Ten eerste de expertise die iedereen opgebouwd heeft met
gezichtsherkenning en ten tweede het feit dat bij het herkennen van gezichten
verschillende leden van dezelfde visuele categorie (namelijk "gezicht") vergeleken
moeten worden. Vooral de combinatie van deze twee eigenschappen zou herkenning
afhankelijk maken van bepaalde configurationele processen. Een bekend voorbeeld
van een ondersteuning aan dit idee is de bevinding van Diamond en Carey (1986),
waar honden experts een relatief sterk inversie effect lieten zien bij het onderscheiden
van verschillende honden. Zoals gezegd zou vooral het gebruik van "configuratie" de
visuele processen van gezichtsherkenning onderscheiden van de visuele processen
van objectherkenning. Daarom bespreken we nu wat onze resultaten vertellen over
de relatie tussen aan de ene kant de twee eigenschappen "expertise" en "leden van
dezelfde visuele categorie herkennen" en aan de andere kant het gebruik van
configurationele processen.
Uit verschillende experimenten kwamen resultaten naar voren die moeilijk te
rijmen zijn met het belang van expertise bij het gebruik van configurationele
informatie. Het ontbreken van gezichtsherkenningsexpertise in prosopagnosie, en de
verminderde expertise bij herkenning van gezichten van een ander ras ging niet
noodzakelijk samen met een verminderd gebruik van configurationele informatie.
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Ook lieten LH en RP noodzakelijk gebruik van configurationele informatie (inversie
superioriteit) zien bij voor hen onbekende objecten (verschillende schoenen). Het
effect van configuratie bij het onderscheiden van verschillende schoenen ondersteunt
wel de relatie tussen het "binnen de categorie" herkennen en het gebruik van
configuratie. Echter hierover kunnen geen duidelijke conclusies getrokken worden
aangezien de controleconditie, waarbij het gebruik van configuratie bij het
onderscheiden "tussen categoridin" wordt bestudeerd, niet in dit proefschrift is
opgenomen. Bij theorieitn die het belang van deze eigenschappen voor het verklaren
van "gezichsspecifieke" bevindingen aanhangen, wordt meestal beargumenteerd dat
juist de combinatie van deze eigenschappen van belang is. Dit argument verklaart
echter niet het inversie superioriteit effect met schoenen, waarbij een sterke (maar
verstoorde) invloed van configuratie gevonden wordt zonder expertise met deze
stimuli. Ook zou dit model voorspellen dat de expertise met eigen ras gezichten
resulteert in een sterker inversie effect met eigen dan met ander ras gezichten, echter
dit werd niet gevonden.
De volgende vraag is dan natuurlijk wat onze studies onderscheidt van eerdere
studies die w61 een sterker gebruik van configuratie vonden bij expertise met een
stimulusklasse (hierover wordt ook gesproken in hoofdstuk 6). Het voornaamste
verschil tussen onze studies met eerdere studies (bijvoorbeeld Diamond en Carey,
1986), is dat bij de taken die in dit proefschrift beschreven worden bijna altijd
minimaal gebruik gemaakt wordt van het geheugen. Mogelijk zijn de eerder
veronderstelde en gevonden relaties tussen expertise, binnen categorie vergelijken, en
configurationele processen dan ook gerelateerd aan de wijze waarop geleerde
gezichten (of objecten) in het geheugen gerepresenteerd zijn.
De derde en laatste kwestie is of er gesproken kan worden van "speciale"
processen die zich enkel met gezichten bezighouden. Omdat in de literatuur meestal
gesproken wordt over het "speciale" belang van configurationele informatie is in dit
proefschrift vooral gekeken naar visuele configurationele als tegengesteld aan visuele
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deelsgewijze processen. Een strikt onderscheid tussen het gebruik van
configurationele informatie bij het herkennen van gezichten terwijl alleen objecten
ook herkend kunnen worden op grond van losse kenmerken of onderdelen werd niet
ondersteund door de resultaten. In feite bestaat zo'n strikt onderscheid uit twee
aannames.
De eerste is dat de vaardigheid in gezichtsherkenning en de vaardigheid in het
verwerken van configurationele informatie een ddn-op-ddn relatie hebben. Deze
aanname wordt in onze studies niet ondersteund. Een verminderd vermogen in
gezichtsherkenning gaat niet noodzakelijk samen met een verminderde invloed van
configurationele processen. Zo zijn prosopagnosie-patienten niet afhankelijk van
deelsgewijze waarneming. Ook gaat de betere prestatie met eigen ras gezichten niet
noodzakelijk samen met toegenomen gebruik van configurationele processen. Ook de
studies met kinderen gaven aan dat er niet ddn-op-6 in relatie is tussen
gezichtsherkenning en gebruik van configurationele informatie, omdat bij kinderen
niet dezelfde interactie tussen gebruik van configurationele informatie en het
herkennen van gezichten gevonden werd als bij volwassenen.
De tweede aanname is dan dat het grote belang van configurationele informatie
bij objectherkenning niet gevonden wordt, oftewel er is geen noodzakelijk gebruik
van configuratie bij herkenning van objecten. In onze studies werd echter wel
noodzakelijk gebruik van configurationele processen gevonden bij het herkennen van
niet-gezichten (objecten). Zo werd het "inversie superioriteit effect" bij prosopagnosie
patienten niet enkel met gezichten maar ook met objecten gevonden. Deze bevinding
maakt verder duidelijk dat het inversie superioriteit effect niet verklaard kan worden
door een defecte "gezichtsmodule".
In onze studies werden taken aangeboden die vooral een beroep deden op
vergelijking, en visuele processen, en veel minder gebruik maakten van
geheugenprocessen. Mogelijk worden de "speciale" effecten van gezichten juist
veroorzaakt door de manier waarop gezichten in het geheugen worden opgeslagen.
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Onze resultaten geven aan dat de "speciale" effecten die met gezichten gevonden
worden niet veroorzaakt worden door exclusief gebruik van bepaalde visuele
processen. Hoewel gezichten zich "speciaal" gedragen ten opzichte van andere
visuele stimuli, werden geen aanwijzingen gevonden voor "speciale", voor gezichten
gereserveerde, visuele processen.
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